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Military Affairs

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15 March 1991

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Gen Dukhov on Army's Political Role

91UM0244A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 18 Dec 90 p 4

[Interview with People's Deputy of the Ukrainian SSR Gen. B. Dukhov by L. Alhanov: "The Motherland Needs a Strong, Battle-worthy Army"]

[Text] Boris Inokentiyovych, it is no secret that the speech given by the USSR Minister of Defense on the central television on November 27 was received in different ways by people in this country. Some sighed with relief: at last the firm voice of the army has been heard! Others rushed to conclude that the military have asserted their claim to power. What is your view on this?

[Dukhov] I agree with the position that was set out in the speech by the Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov. The Minister of Defense said what he said, not more nor less. So there is no point in reading between the lines, searching for a sub-text or interpreting this or that phrase in one's own way. It is absolutely clear that the television speech was dictated by the extraordinary situation that has developed around the Armed Forces. It was a reaction to cases of attacks against servicemen, which have become more common, and to the anti-army campaign which has been launched by certain political forces. Actions directed against the army objectively lead to sabotage of the country's ability to defend itself. So they cannot be ignored. There are evident attempts to undo the Armed Forces, to pull them into national corners. Some people even try to dictate strategic conditions.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] You have in mind the claims for nuclear weapons, which are heard in some of the republics?

[Dukhov] Not only that. Although these declarations are serious enough. Those demanding that nuclear weapons be divided up are dilettantes, that is, people who are absolutely incompetent in military affairs. They are motivated by nothing but political ambitions. Furthermore, they simply do not realize what this can lead to. The realization of their ambitious plans would inevitably ruin the system of strategic defense and lead to the appearance of several dozen nuclear states, the violation of parity. Imagine the reaction to this in the world. It could even lead to the establishment of international control over our nuclear forces. But not only is pulling our nuclear weapons in different directions dangerous for the security of the country and for peace, so are the declarations heard in some republics about the need to remove troops, relocate them and so on. Is this not undermining our ability to defend ourselves? Who will replace these troops?

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] In this regard, the proposals are not lacking. In particular, there is the idea that every republic should have a national armed force. How do you view this approach to solving the problem?

[Dukhov] I will allow myself to disagree with those who propose it. It is obvious that such a change cannot be made within a short period of time. And for how long can a country be left without defense coverage? For a day, two days, a month, a year? I, as a professional soldier, consider that this cannot be done even for one minute.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] What is your position towards the idea of establishing a national army in the Ukraine? Some people think that when the armies in the republics are "their own," the attitude towards them will change, that is, no one will offend soldiers or attack them or military installations.

[Dukhov] I was and remain a supporter of a single Armed Forces. If we are for the preservation of the Union, then the army must be united. This is more useful from the economic and political and military points of view. If you take the position of the Ukraine leaving the USSR, then the army should be independent. The link here is obvious.

Now as to my attitude to "our own" army. Here we should analyze what we understand by "our own": in spirit or national affinity? Or perhaps in terms of the tasks that it faces, of traditions? I am not sure that the present composition of troops on the territory of the Ukraine can accommodate all the political forces that are active in the republic. I am not sure that it could accommodate them all even if we completely changed the personnel. And this means that the attitude to the army cannot be uniform throughout society. Of course, how this attitude is manifested is another matter: through criticism, violence or armed attacks.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] This was addressed in the speech by the minister of defense, who made it unequivocally clear that any acts of violence against servicemen will be countered with adequate action. Do you see a threat in this warning?

[Dukhov] No, there is no threat there. Although some have already, excuse the word, blabbed to the whole world that the Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov is frightening the people. No, the warning is addressed not to the people, but to those who behave like bandits. Up to now, they have been treated politely, with persuasion, and for this we have paid a high price: the lives of soldiers and officers. The army has often had to pay for the mistakes of politicians. But it has had enough of playing the role of lightning rod. Those who have not understood or simply do not want to understand this, who try to continue to use these methods, will inevitably be repelled. In extreme situations, for the purpose of self-defense, army personnel will use weapons.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] In relation to this, what can you say about the events in Namangan?

[Dukhov] What happened there was a tragedy. But in my view, it was planned. Let us analyze it together. Some servicemen were riding on a bus. An argument broke out

between them and some passengers. Perhaps this was even by chance. Who began the argument has not been established. But I believe it was not the servicemen. How did events then develop? The bus changed its route and for some reason went to where a crowd had already gathered. There was a pile of rocks there, sharpened construction irons. Was this chance again, or an action planned in advance? I think it seems more like the latter. It suited someone to kill soldiers from the Ukraine and Russia. And the organizers of the murder wanted army units, which were standing in the way of those who wanted to create lawlessness, to be removed from the area. At the same time, they were testing the possible reaction. Unfortunately, this time again, it came too late. But what is there to say now? People were killed. It is painful to realize this.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] But they could have avoided being killed if they had returned home in time. Resolutions have been passed by the parliaments of the Ukraine and Russia about returning their soldiers from "hot" spots.

[Dukhov] It is true, this resolution was passed at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on July 30. On October 10, the question was examined again. And I became convinced once more that the resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet of the republic were correct.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] And finally: on the day of the Namangan tragedy we saw published the Decree of the President of the USSR "On acts relating to defense passed by union republics." This decree, undoubtedly, revokes the resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the return of soldiers from "hot" spots.

[Dukhov] Yes, it revokes them. But I am certain that this is only temporarily, until the passage of the law regarding Interior Ministry troops and the regulation by the Ministry of Defense and the Interior Ministry of questions relating to the conscription of citizens for terms of service to be spent outside of their republics. Beyond any doubt, young people can be sent to serve in "hot" spots only if they agree to do so. And only by contract. Because if one is to risk one's life, then one should at least know for what. Patriotism, romanticism—these are, understandably, strong motivations and one cannot discount them. But we should not forget that in the areas of conflict there is shooting. We cannot forget that people die there. That is why service there presents constant threat and risk, which should at least bring significant material reward and benefits at the cost of the appropriate union organs. Summing up what has been said, I want to stress again: the army and servicemen should not pay for the mistakes of politicians. I am also convinced that we need a strong, battle-worthy, modern army which can reliably defend the people and the Motherland.

Supreme Soviet Commission Acts on Military Dachas

91UM0243A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 52, 26 Dec 90 p 9

[Article by Yuriy Shchekochikhin, people's deputy of the USSR, member of the Supreme Soviet's Commission on Privileges and Benefits: "'Marshals' Dachas a Burden on the Taxpayers: The Findings of the Parliament's Commission"]

[Text] Col Justice Vladimir Sergeyev's article "Inviolable Privileges" was published on 28 November of this year. It told about abuses involving the construction of dachas for higher command personnel. The newspaper came out just prior to the session of the Supreme Soviet's Commission on Privileges and Benefits.

It was established at the session:

- that over a period of decades there developed within the USSR Ministry of Defense, with no legal basis and arbitrarily defined by decrees and instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, and orders issued by the minister of defense (ordinarily secret orders), the practice of building private residences, other buildings and facilities with funds allocated by the USSR Ministry of Defense out of the state budget for national defense;
- that considerable amounts of money were spent on this construction, frequently arbitrarily, over and above the estimates and without its use being monitored by the USSR Council of Ministers or proper oversight by the Main Military Procurement.

(For example, instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers to the Ministry of Defense in 1981 authorized the construction of as many as 35 service dachas at an estimated cost of 40,000-45,000 rubles [R] each and a total cost of R1.8 million during the 11th five year period. A total of 18 separate residences were actually built in 1983 and 1984 at a cost of R3.7 million for construction and equipment, and R133,400 for furniture and other items.)

- that some separate residences were assigned for life to high military officials and, following their death, to their widows or other relatives. Furthermore, the generals who replaced them built expensive new separate residences and other structures.

In 1989, for example, another three dachas were built according to individual plans for comrades V.M. Arkhipov, M.A. Moiseyev and K.A. Kochetov, army generals appointed to high positions in the USSR Ministry of Defense, and another for Comrade D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense. A total of R308,700 was spent on these dachas, including R73,900 for furniture and other items. And there is reason to believe that these figures are understated.

A facility with communications center costing more than R250,000 was built for the home of Comrade M.A. Moiseyev, who replaced Comrade S.F. Akhromeyev as

chief of the General Staff. The gas boiler-house and engineer system were rebuilt, which cost another R328,000. A residential facility was built and other work was performed within the dacha complex of Comrade K.A. Kochetov at a cost of around R300,000.

Dacha No. 10 was modernized before Comrade Army Gen M.I. Sorokin moved in, which raised its actual value to R343,000, while the documents continued to reflect the former value of R43,000.

The former dacha of Marshal N.F. Shestopalov, consisting of 14 rooms with a total area of 431 square meters and valued at R121,800, was first reconstructed and then razed to make room for the construction of Dacha No. 1 for Comrade D.T. Yazov, minister of defense.

- that excessive costs for the construction and equipment of these separate residences were paid out of funds allocated for capital construction and repair, and many of the jobs were performed by servicemen, which had an extremely negative effect upon the construction process and construction periods for other social, personal service and medical facilities for many servicemen and their families;
- that there are expensive buildings and installations in military hunting areas with large quantities of valuable equipment designated for the use of a small group of people and off-limits to all other citizens.

More than R1.5 million allocated for national defense is earmarked for the upkeep of the Zavidovo State Reserve alone, and a total of R327,000 is spent just as pay and allowances for officers and warrant officers. A total of 11 officers and 98 warrant officers are engaged in servicing the park, plus a guard and support battalion made up of extended-duty personnel.

Around R245,000 is spent on the upkeep and operation of just two vacation facilities under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Tsentrlnaya and Yuzhnaya (Shalash), originally built as the so-called "General Residence of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev," whose value is set at more than R10 million. A total of R67,600 goes for wages for a staff of 30 servicing personnel.

The commission resolved:

That the performance of the USSR Council of Ministers with respect to the legal regulation of the procedure for the construction, the granting of authority to use and the operation of these facilities of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and to the monitoring of the use of funds allocated for these purposes is unsatisfactory, as is that of the Main Military Procuracy with respect to its oversight over observance of the law in the construction and use of service dachas under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The commission has instructed the USSR People's Control Committee, together with the KRU [Control and Inspection Administration] of the USSR Ministry of Finance and the Zhilsotsbank [Bank for Housing and

Municipal Services and Social Development] and with the participation of the Finance Inspectorate of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to audit by 1 February 1991 the financial and management activities of the USSR Ministry of Defense with respect to the construction, maintenance and operation of buildings used as dachas, boarding guest houses, hunting lodges, former residences and so forth.

It has instructed the USSR Procuracy to check out information on abuses of service positions and violations of the law contained in materials of the USSR People's Control Committee and reports published in the mass media. The general procurator is to monitor the implementation of this assignment personally.

**What Preceded the Commission Session
(documentary evidence)
To Comrade N.I. Ignatovich, chairman of the
Commission on Privileges and Benefits of the USSR
Supreme Soviet**

Memorandum

We, people's deputies I.I. Misuna and Ya.Ya. Bezbakh, representative of the USSR People's Control Committee V.I. Sergeyev and People's Deputy of the Krasnogorsk Gorispolkom M.F. Savchenkov, members of the USSR Supreme's Soviet's Commission on Privileges and Benefits, report that, following the commission's instructions, we departed on 26 November 1990 for the settlement of Bakovka, Moscow Oblast, to inspect the territory on which are located:

- the dacha of Comrade S.L. Sokolov;
- Reception House No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Defense;
- the dacha of relatives of S.M. Budenny;
- the dacha of Comrade A.D. Lizichev;
- Comrade D.T. Yazov's retreat.

The matter of our access to all dacha facilities of the USSR Ministry of Defense was coordinated in advance with the ministry's leadership, for which purpose representatives from the USSR Ministry of Defense were assigned to accompany the commission members.

After arriving at the checkpoint to this territory, surrounded by a fence and guarded by a military patrol, we were prevented from inspecting the territory. At our demand a middle-aged man dressed in civilian sports clothes arrived and introduced himself as a warrant officer but refused to give his name.

Gen D.D. Yarmak informed us that Directorate 9 of the USSR KGB was not granting us admission. In response to this Comrade Sergeyev stated that he would immediately telephone the KGB and learn who had given the order preventing the people's deputies of the USSR from inspecting the dachas.

Comrade D.D. Yarmak explained to us that "apparently some order has not been executed and passed on to the soldier."

We spent a full 40 minutes waiting for that order to come and the guard chief to arrive, after which we bid farewell to the representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense near the dachas and returned to Moscow."

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA commentary:

Was the case discussed at the first session of the parliamentary Commission on Privileges and Benefits with its new membership just a small detail? After all, there are not so many marshals in the nation, and even those millions spent year after year out of the state budget to build castles and palaces for the top brass were just a drop in the budgetary bucket....

No, it was not a small detail.

And although at the commission meeting Ministry of Defense representatives attempted to downplay the significance of the matter, which has been raised by the public for more than a single year now, these separate residences, closed to the view of outsiders (including the people's deputies) by solid walls, are, in my opinion, an example of the system which has developed in our nation, a system which once formally abolished classes but which has itself created a new class, the latter shamelessly enjoying privileges paid for out of a budget intended for all.

No, the commission was not attacking the army. On the contrary, it was a matter of protecting the army (including hundreds of thousands of officers lacking housing) from the excessive demands of some of its leaders for super-privileges.

This is why the commission session evoked such interest. The discussion was not about another redistribution of wealth (There have been so many such redistributions in our history!), but about a system which enables some people to enjoy super-incomes at state expense, while others eke out a miserable existence.

So long as such a system exists, it is absurd to talk about a law-governed state or a law-governed society.

Poll on Public Attitude toward Armed Forces

91UM0243B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Col G. Andreyev; "The Army's Rating Is Rising: A Look at 1991 by Col G. Andreyev, Military Sociologist"]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Sociological polls have shown that faith in many of the state's institutions has eroded. The army's prestige has also suffered, although it is given a higher rating than other state organizations. What kind of improvements in the public's attitude toward the army do you foresee for next year?

[Andreyev] Public opinion polls conducted in 1989 and 1990 by sociologists with the All-Union Center for the

Study of Public Opinion showed that the Armed Forces have a consistently high rating. A total of 35% of those polled have full confidence in the army, for example, which is 10-15% higher than for other government institutions.

A fairly high percentage of them combine a positive attitude toward the army with criticism of its deficiencies. Relatively few have no faith in the army at all. And this is despite a noisy anti-army campaign. I believe that the army's rating will increase in the new year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What trends do the sociologists perceive in the army itself?

[Andreyev] The political sentiments of the servicemen will focus on their readiness to perform their duty to defend the homeland. The personnel are tired of mass-meetings. The main political feelings will have to do with the reduction of the Armed Forces and the removal of forces from Eastern Europe: uncertainty about the future, perplexity and dissatisfaction. In studies conducted in November 1990 around 80% of the officers and warrant officers expressed dissatisfaction with the social and legal guarantees of the service; two thirds of them, with social and living conditions. These trends will continue.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What can you say about the quality of replenishments in 1991?

[Andreyev] Last year 35,000 young men refused to serve. The social makeup of the replenishments is also deteriorating. Three fourths of the draftees themselves assessed their level of preparedness for the service as "medium"; one out of two could not recall the title of the last book he had read; 75% have no experience in public work; one out of three was involved in groups committing crimes prior to being drafted.... The situation will remain the same in the coming year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Do you have any forecasts about the competition for admission to higher military schools?

[Andreyev] In 1979 two thirds of the draft-age youth expressed the opinion that being an officer carried prestige; last year, only one in five did so. I am still hoping for improvement, however. In the situation of a market economy and paid education at certain VUZs the youth will want an education at military schools. We predict the greatest competition to be for the airborne, air and engineering schools: up to 10 applicants for each opening. The youth will want to go where they can acquire an education with prestige in the society, where there is a sense of the romantic aura of military service. We also expect extensive competition for entrance to the political schools: three or four applicants per opening. We expect fewer for VUZs preparing specialists for the branches of the Armed Forces and troop arms which are being reduced: tank, rocket and other troops.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The problem of "dedovshchina" has become somewhat less acute, but what internal army problem will be the primary one in 1991, in your opinion?

[Andreyev] A positive trend will be a reduction in the number of crimes resulting in the death of people in the army, even though, according to published data, it continues to grow in the society. Draft-evasion and desertion are among the troubling problems.

Tension with Local Authorities in Birobidzhan

91UM0250B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt. V. Pylyayev and TASS correspondent G. Anisanya: "Conflict Prevention Efforts"]

[Text] Although the Far Eastern region is not categorized as a "hot spot," the relationship between the military command and the local authorities became a topic of discussion in Birobidzhan. Representatives of the units stationed in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, people's deputies, the personnel of military commissariats, and members of party committees, the Komsomol obkom, and the oblast trade union council met to discuss this issue.

The officers complained that the unit in which Maj. V. Tikhomirov is serving did not receive ration cards and that soldiers on leave in the city cannot buy sweets in the stores. The local authorities are sometimes indifferent to the problems of the families of officers and warrant officers. Relations between border troops and the local population have been tense. People have responded to restrictions in the border zone by threatening the troops and by beating up some officers.

The unity of the army and the people, which has been proclaimed verbally, must be restored in fact. This was the unanimous opinion of all the people at the gathering.

'Propaganda Association of the USSR Armed Forces' Formed

91UM0250A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Major S. Kalinin, chairman of the central council of the Propaganda Association of the USSR Armed Forces and staffer in the Komsomol Affairs Division of the Main Political Directorate, by Capt. V. Popov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Serving Simultaneously as Propagandists and Businessmen"]

[Text] Today the appearance of new sociopolitical unions, blocs, groups, and associations is rarely surprising. This might be why the public and press paid little attention to the news of the establishment of the Propaganda Association of the USSR Armed Forces for youth. In our opinion, however, this is a noteworthy event.

The creation of the association and its plans were discussed by the chairman of its central council, Maj. S. Kalinin, staffer in the Komsomol Affairs Division of the Main Political Directorate.

[Popov] Before we move on to plans and intentions, let us discuss the reasons why this new youth organization was established.

[Kalinin] Today many people have a skeptical view of any initiative by Komsomol organs. They frequently see these moves as a fight for the honor of the uniform, and not in the best sense of this term. We have to admit that all sorts of things happen, but I believe that the association will perform vital work. Judge for yourself. At the 21st Komsomol Congress, the Komsomol organizations of the Army and Navy and of border and internal troops were granted the rights of partners in the federation of the union Komsomol organization. The Second Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee authorized us to establish various associations and societies. It was on this legal basis that we established our youth association. We are a self-supporting, public organization of volunteers, founded by the Komsomol Central Committee and the Komsomol organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy, the border troops of the USSR KGB, and the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Obviously, our activity will not be a replacement or substitute for the activities and duties of the working bodies of the Main Political Administration. A central council and auditing commission have been elected. The association has been registered and has all of the rights of a legal person. We have our own official seal and an account in the construction division of the Moscow Residential and Social Bank. We also plan to build up a network of primary organizations of our association in military units, establishments, academic institutions, and enterprises. Incidentally, the Komsomol Central Committee has already contributed institutional capital in the amount of 80,000 rubles.

[Popov] So you have a seal and you have money, but what about ideas? Do you have any ideas?... And there is something else I would like to know. The speakers at the first conference of your association had more to say, in my opinion, about commerce than about the moral education of youth. Furthermore, it is no secret that dubious enterprises are being established under the Komsomol's aegis: video salons showing a particular type of movie and erotic exhibit halls and centers. Does the association intend to avoid these temptations?

[Kalinin] You know, I once had the good fortune of completing a managerial training course, and I am well aware that all of the "pros" and "cons" have to be considered before any steps can be taken. We are, after all, entering a market. The market will not forgive blunders. It will exact severe penalties for them. This means that we simply have to function simultaneously as

expert propagandists and first-rate businessmen. This was probably the reason for the commercial concerns of some conference delegates.

As far as ideas are concerned.... We are fully aware that we cannot be successful by following the old trite patterns or by organizing cheap little undertakings like video salons. We in the army are now the focus of public attention. "Pluralists" of every stripe and coloring are aiming their big guns at the army. Believe me, they will exaggerate our slightest errors and are certain to take advantage of them. We can only counter this by performing work that is talented and interesting enough to attract youths and convince them to follow us. We must convince youths that the army is not a crowd of narrow-minded, bitter, and ignorant people. It is a group of thousands of courageous young men. They are men of honor and integrity. They are the personification of genuine male valor and male fraternity. They are men devoted to their fatherland. There are some people today, after all, who do not want our youth to love their motherland and be prepared to defend it. We have seen a flood of posters, pins, and chevrons with foreign military symbols, which are persistently thrust upon our young men who still do not have firm guidelines for living.

[Popov] In these cases you will probably have to start from scratch.

[Kalinin] You are right. It is upsetting that few pins and chevrons with our own military symbols can be found even in military commissariats. You will not see any brochures, books, albums, or posters describing military academies or the specific nature of different branches of the armed forces. But believe me, young people are interested in all of this. Here is an example. We made some commercials for the Alma-Ata Combined-Arms Command School and Serpukhov Missile Command School and showed them during the "When Soldiers Sing" and "Up to 16 and Over" programs on television. What happened? We received more than 3,000 telephone calls from all over the country....

What else have we done? Funds have already been allocated for the production of pins, pennants, and booklets with military symbols, soldiers' albums, and much, much more. The receipts from the sale of these will be used to finance various youth initiatives, open leisure centers in garrisons, and reward outstanding servicemen. Charitable goals have not been forgotten either. We intend to help veterans of the Afghan operation and low-income soldiers' families.

[Popov] You have big plans, but who will carry them out? Where will you get the personnel?

[Kalinin] The association needs people who can work with youth and who, to put it in loftier terms, have a calling for this. We have these people, but they must also know something about marketing and about commerce.... Many are not knowledgeable enough in this area yet. This means we will be teaching and learning.

It will be our pleasure to hear any good advice or good wishes. Our telephone number in Moscow is 293-77-18.

Artillery Officer Elected Gorkom Secretary

91UM0259A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt. Col. A. Knyazev: "Major Sokorchuk—Gorkom Secretary"]

[Text] Carpathian Military District—The officer-communist was elected first secretary of the Sambor Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party at a city party conference. Our temporary correspondent met with Vasilii Nikolayevich Sokorchuk.

"I was born in 1954 in the settlement of Chervonoye in Andrushevskiy Rayon of Zhitomir Oblast in a family of workers," the officer related.

"I served in the engineer forces, in the artillery. I held various officer posts. In 1987, communists entrusted me with leading a regiment party organization.

"How did I find myself in the role of first secretary of the gorkom? They elected me chairman. Later, at the party gorkom plenum, they included me in a commission for the preparation of a report and election conference. When the question arose of whom to recommend for the post of first secretary of the gorkom, they also named me as a candidate and the commission was supported in the unit and in the party obkom.

"The elections in the plenum were held on an alternative basis: there were three candidates. They preferred me.

"The social and political situation in our region today is complex. In my view, precisely the Ukrainian Communist Party gorkom must cement all democratic forces in Sambor. There are many attacks against communists at this time. Yes, there are people in the party who compromised themselves. But these are isolated cases. Most are honest and decent workers. We will fight for their honor and dignity.

"I have already been in many villages and at kolkhozes and I have talked with the people. One gets the impression that no one is managing the national economy. The party has abandoned its previous functions and the soviets have no time. They are being seized by the euphoria of meetings. And then there are the religious quarrels.

"The illegitimate actions of local authorities are also adding fuel to the fire. Let us say that the presidium of the city council issued an ultimatum that all school directors and heads of educational institutions leave the CPSU. Following the intervention of our gorkom, the peremptory tone was replaced with a recommendation. Nevertheless, this contradicts all normative acts on the protection of human rights. I have no intention of renouncing the continuing fight for their observance.

"The attitude toward military people in the city is ambiguous. There is growing persecution of the army as supposedly an "occupying" army. Mass meetings and pickets are being organized and the fall call-up is being boycotted. Even children became hostages of political ambitions. On one of the days, the garrison kindergarten had no meat. There was a demand for the intervention of the garrison commander. It is practically impossible to find work for the wives of servicemen. The housing situation is very difficult. They use various pretexts not to provide apartments for military people. Five families here now live in the barracks.

"I anticipate the question: I suppose everything is all right for you personally in this regard? Yes, we have an apartment with an area of about 24 square meters. Four of us live there. So the "party bureaucrats" are not living so elegantly. I am not thinking about moving to a private residence and I do not intend to raise the question of increasing my living space.

"They elected me for five years. It is understandable that I am directing all of my attention to concern about the city party organization: to strengthening its ranks and to freeing them from capitulators.

"The secretaries of party organizations at any level are called upon to work in the masses and to study the opinions and moods of the people. Without this the authority of the CPSU in the population is unthinkable. I am not thinking about the day-to-day reaction to all events. I read in the newspapers just a few days ago that a party club called "New Party" meets in Sambor on Sundays. I did not know anything about it and that is my omission. It turns out that they invite those who were once excluded from the CPSU and those being subjected to punishment. That is, people who have been offended in some way. I decided that I had to go to hear, as they say, first hand what they are talking about. I will also present my position.

"Under the conditions of the transition to market relations, we will have to protect those people who are temporarily out of work. I do not rule out the possibility of acting as an intermediary in the establishment of cooperatives. Medical people have already approached me and raised the question of the purchase of imported equipment for a diagnostic center in the city. If the notion is realized, I am certain that the inhabitants of Sambor will be satisfied.

"I am not so gullible as to think that the work will be easy. I am convinced that it will be difficult. But I hope that my tempering in the army will help me...."

Supervisory Commission on Investigations into Soldier Deaths

91UM0259B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Andrey Yevgenyevich Sebentsov, chairman of a subcommittee of the Legislative Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "In the View of the Legislator"]

[Text] After the ukase of the president of the USSR on measures to realize the proposals of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, many letters were received on the subject of the "Soldier's Home" with the request that we talk about the work of the special commission to verify the objectivity and completeness of the investigation of the reasons for the deaths and injuries of service personnel and military construction personnel in peacetime.

At the request of the editor's office, Andrey Yevgenyevich Sebentsov, deputy chairman of the special commission, people's deputy of the USSR, and chairman of a subcommittee of the Legislative Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, responds to the questions of readers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Andrey Yevgenyevich, on 1 January, in accordance with the ukase, the commission was supposed to report to the president of the USSR on the results of its work. What specifically was it able to do? This question is just about the most common one in all of the letters from parents of soldiers.

[Sebentsov] I will note first of all that the work to realize the proposals of the committees of soldiers' mothers will not be limited to the indicated time period. And there are several good reasons for this. When you delve into it, such a complex area as this one requires much more effort than was supposed. The president was given the first results and recommendations in the form of a preliminary report. The work is now continuing.

Now about what was done. Yuriy Khamzatovich Kalmykov assembled the commission in the proposed time immediately after the publication of the ukase. It included authoritative jurists and representatives of the USSR Procuracy and Main Military Procuracy, USSR Ministry of Justice, and Military Tribunal. Also invited were people's deputies of the USSR and a number of republics, representatives of soldiers' parents....

Time was required to draw up the by-laws of the commission, which, as the rules on the commission, were affirmed by a separate ukase of the president. And also for the development of a working procedure for the groups that operationally go out to the military units, if an alarm signal came in from there on nonstatutory interrelationships. Ten groups were formed for the review of 107 criminal cases. At the request, of soldiers' mothers, who met with Mikhail Sergeyevich, it was precisely these offenses that were the object of close study. But by 1 January the commission had already received more than 2,000 requests and work has also been organized on them.

The cases are reviewed and analyzed in the groups. It is still too early to talk about the conclusions. But if, let us say, shortcomings are revealed in the conducting of the investigation and court examination, this will be basis also to evaluate the work of the military procuracy and tribunal accordingly.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And are there enough of these criminal cases to make an objective assessment of the action of the entire military procuracy?

[Sebentsov] It is impossible to say categorically that these 107 cases represent the bulk of the criminal cases raised in connection with the death and injury of military personnel. They are the most "flagrant" cases. Among them are many that have already been checked out several times. In short, they are disputed. I admit that they give a somewhat worse picture.

Of course it would be better to study, say, 500 criminal cases. But this would require much more time and effort.

We also took on the task of preparing recommendations or, if you like, of determining in a concentrated manner the ways to reduce injuries and death in the forces. For this is a tragedy: parents send their boys to the army healthy in the hope that there they will become real men and then something inexcusable happens.

So we see it as our duty to clarify, or, more accurately, to preclude the occurrence of tragic situations in the future.

Even the initial results of our work are convincing: it is necessary to make the military units more open. I personally do not see it as a "crime" that some public organizations have focused their attention on the state of the daily life and relationships between military personnel and multinational collectives. In any case, the lads will know that at any moment it is possible to appeal not only to the commander but also to civilians with their concerns, pain, and fears, if they should arise. To a certain extent, moreover, such conditions will also discipline the ranking personnel in that same regiment or large unit.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are your ideas close to the proposals that will be reflected in the commission's summary document? If they are, is it not possible to name a few more specific proposals?

[Sebentsov] Yes, I hope that they will also be reflected in the summary document. The following position will obviously find a place there as well: protect the military procuracy and the military tribunal against the "guardianship" of the Ministry of Defense. In my opinion, this will give them more independence. But I would not want to anticipate all the conclusions of the commission at this time. I will say only that before adopting any wishes or suggestions we will test them again and again through public opinion and assess their realism.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] That is, open the way to the progressive things that one can already put into practice?

[Sebentsov] Yes. I will stress this aspect as well: we have carefully studied and will give maximum attention to those recommendations that were formulated by different committees and assemblies at different times and also were published in newspapers or submitted to the appropriate bodies by the parents of soldiers.

And another thing. I consider it essential to disclose the statistics on injuries and deaths in the forces so that there will be no fantastic deductions on this account.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Andrey Yevgenyevich, in the mail for the "Soldier's Home" there is a letter asking: Are all such statistics abroad publicized?

[Sebentsov] No. But I think that such information is nonetheless much more available to public opinion there than it is here. Any figure is understood in comparison with others. I am certain that our people and the parents of the soldiers must have a real notion of what is happening in the army. In my view, obscurity in this question not only complicates the resolution of the problems but also harms the authority of the armed forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The loss of a son is immeasurable grief for a mother. When you learn of such an event, your heart breaks from the inability to do anything to console or help the parents in this great misfortune. And without giving way to emotions, it is probably very difficult to answer the most burning questions objectively: How could this happen in peacetime? Who is guilty? But it is no secret that some will shamelessly try to utilize these tragic facts for their own personal purposes.

[Sebentsov] I agree that there are also those who use such events to raise their own political reputation. On the 23th and 24th of December, for example, there was an extraordinary congress of the parents of military personnel. The "shield" went to great efforts to carry it out. I was at this congress and noticed its dual character: on the one hand, the organizers helped the mothers of the soldiers to establish an All-Union association and, on the other hand, they sought to take control of the movement of soldiers' parents and to use it in their own interests, thereby willingly or unwillingly traumatizing the parents and pouring salt in their wounds, figuratively speaking.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] At the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Deputy V. Ochirov presented comparative statistics on deaths and injuries in the army and in civilian life. What would you say about them?

[Sebentsov] Of course we live in the same society and the army is not separated from it by an iron wall. Yes, there are fewer cases of deaths and injuries in the army but there must also be significantly more order in it!

In this connection, I would like to note another aspect. If our young lads perish as a result of an accident—let us say someone drowned while swimming—that is one thing. But great alarm and indignation are caused by events in which injury and even death have to do with violence, the unhealthy atmosphere in the military collective, barracks hooliganism and the notorious old ways.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] There is the opinion that your commission should be made permanent and they are even proposing that it be transformed into a subcommittee of the USSR Supreme Soviet. What do you think about this?

[Sebenstov] Clearly it is necessary to have some permanent bodies to guarantee the legal protection of military personnel. They must work on a professional basis. Our commission made up of people's deputies and parents of soldiers will hardly be able to exist for long. I would put it this way: it is necessary to make exemplary those bodies that are called upon to deal with these questions on a permanent basis. I mean the military procuracy and military tribunals. It is necessary to coordinate their actions with public organizations, about which was spoken above.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] When will the commission complete its work and present its final conclusions?

[Sebenstov] I want to emphasize once again: these results will not complete the work foreseen by the ukase. But we will give our report on what has been done in the near future, in January.

Arms Thefts in Transcaucasus Noted

91US0295A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Colonel L. Arshantsev and Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "When Will They Bid 'Farewell to Arms?'"]

[Text] For many years now there has been no peace and accord in our common house. Marks designating conflicts and internecine wars have appeared here and there on the political map of our country. People who lived for centuries on the same land without asking one another about their ethnic backgrounds have split into hostile camps. Erstwhile neighbors and good friends have gone at one another—us against them. People blinded by hatred have reached for weapons...

Major-General of Justice V. Ivanov, military procurator of the Transcaucasus Military District, said: "Last year, a powerful surge of arms and ammunition theft among the troops occurred in Transcaucasia. I see a rule here: After all, interethnic passions flared up as never before in 1990 as well. Overall, more than 800 weapons and over 130,000 rounds were stolen from the military stocks stored in the territory of Transcaucasian republics. Sixty-three cases of attacks on military installations were registered, as well as more than 20 cases of servicemen being attacked in order to take weapons or explosives...

Statistics are eloquent: Between 1946 and 1 January 1990 not even 100 weapons were stolen from the troops of the district or lost by servicemen. Everything else was lost in just one year. Armenia accounts for the lion's share of the "stray" arsenal. The statistic of stolen

weapons in Georgia is "more modest"—176 "barrels," of which 84 have already been recovered. In Azerbaijan, it is 15 weapons...

In a conversation with one of us, K. Kazaryan, minister of internal affairs of Armenia, unequivocally indicated that the inability of some officials to provide security for weapons and ammunition facilitates the theft of weapons from the troops.

Certainly this is not the primary cause of the upsurge in weapons theft; it is the complex political situation that has emerged in Transcaucasia. Nonetheless, the following was noted at a recently held meeting of the Transcaucasus District Military Council: the troops were very slow to respond to the unstable sociopolitical situation in Transcaucasia and the activation of extremist representatives of various political parties and movements and criminal elements who seek to acquire weapons in any way possible. Moreover, massive violations in the organization and performance of guard and routine garrison duties have become commonplace, as well as failures to comply with requirements for organizing the storage of weapons and ammunition in depots and arms rooms in units and small units...

There is an explanation for this—difficulties which the troops of the district have recently experienced. Vacancies in command and political officer positions and the loss of contact and mutual understanding with local soviet, party, and youth organs have brought about a serious weakening of political and indoctrination work in units and small units. Hence an increase in the number of servicemen who have taken part in weapons and ammunition theft for various reasons.

For example, five first-year cadets of the Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command School stole 30 assault rifles and 1,500 rounds for them for political reasons (according to available data, the criminals are currently with one of the armed nationalist groups of Georgia). One-quarter of the crimes have been committed for mercenary reasons: at present, commandos pay 15,000 rubles per assault rifle...

By now, serious though belated measures have been taken by the troops to prevent weapons theft. Weapons and ammunition have now been concentrated at well-fortified depots which are properly equipped and guarded. However, this could have been done sooner. What interfered with this, and who was responsible for unintentionally arming the commandos?

The assault rifles and pistols, grenade launchers and flame throwers that have already fallen into the hands of the latter-day "fighters for the national independence" of Georgia and Armenia and criminal elements still pose a genuine combat threat. Current leaders of Armenia and Georgia maintain in all forums that on the whole the political situation in the republics is stable (with the exception of "hot spots"—Artsakh, Tskhinvali), and that the crime situation gives no particular cause for alarm and is under the control of law enforcement organs.

For example, K. Kazaryan, minister of internal affairs of Armenia, said: "It is unnecessary for us to enlist the help of military units in order to maintain order on the territory of Armenia, as envisaged by the well-known decree of the USSR president. We are capable of solving our own problems with our own resources, without exposing the army to the wrath of the people and without causing tension in the republic. At present, our militia is vigorously making operations and search efforts aimed at uncovering individuals who have gained illegal possession of weapons, confiscating these weapons, and returning them to those they have been stolen from. For example, yesterday an operations team confiscated an assault rifle from criminals which had been stolen a year ago from a military unit. On the whole, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Armenia has already recovered more than 100 weapons stolen from, among others, the troops..."

Referring to data received at the Military Procuracy of the Transcaucasus District, we are compelled to remind Karlos Bagratovich that this is not exactly the case. The Armenia MVD recovered only about 10 "barrels" seized by the criminals last year and in January of this year, and another 30 were seized with the assistance of territorial KGB organs. Most strangely, virtually none of the commando raiders have been apprehended or had criminal charges filed against them. Almost all of those convicted in cases associated with gaining illegal possession of weapons have been servicemen. As they say, they have been the responsibility of the military procuracy rather than the militia organization.

Lieutenant-Colonel of Justice V. Khoroshun, military procurator of the Investigative Department of the Transcaucasus Military District Procuracy, told us: "Last year, the courts tried 34 cases involving 58 servicemen who participated in stealing weapons and ammunition. All of them have been convicted..."

Therefore, at present the troops of the district themselves and the military procuracy are the echelons "concerned" the most about the instances of arms theft from the troops and are involved in the most active manner in looking for these "barrels" and returning them to their rightful owners. The contribution of the republic law enforcement organs to the elimination of underground arsenals in Armenia, as well as in Georgia, may be considered purely symbolic for now.

When discussing how difficult it is to organize the recovery of weapons stolen from the troops even when the thieves and their addresses are known, Colonel of Justice A. Tokhmakhov, military procurator of the Leninakan Garrison, and Garrison Commandant K. Shevchenko noted that local militia employees do not strive to use their powers in such cases.

It is surprising that the actual helplessness of the local law enforcement organs is displayed against the background of quite stern decrees of the leaders of the republics on disarming illegal formations which were

issued at various times following a similar decree of the USSR president. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia Z. Gamsakhurdia also signed such a decree, giving the commandos one month to turn in their weapons.

However, one month passed, and another one is about to end, but nobody has been or is willing to turn in weapons. Likewise, there have been no resolute actions on the part of the territorial law enforcement organs aimed at eliminating the underground arsenal.

In light of this, a statement made by the MVD of Georgia on 21 January of this year is interesting. On the one hand, it calls for "surrendering illegally seized materiel, weapons, and other combat assets to the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs," whereas, on the other hand, "...those deciding to engage in armed service to the Motherland will be given an opportunity to do so within existing state structures."

What legitimate state structures are meant here? Are these the recently created republic internal troops—the national guard? What about weapons: Will they be issued, or may one bring "his own?" Excuse us, but in this case this has to do with the legalization of illegal armed units rather than their disarmament. Will this altogether remove from the agenda the issue of punishing individuals who have gained illegal possession of weapons, murdering and inflicting severe bodily injuries on servicemen in the process? Is this not to say that indulgences are granted to those who will commit such crimes in the future and later take up the banner of the national guard?... May this be called a wise policy which promotes relieving tension in the region?

Something similar also happened in Armenia. It is now clear that the disarmament of the ANA (Armenian National Army) achieved its goal only in part. Actually, the ANA commandos by far did not surrender all their weapons to the law enforcement organs. Some assault rifles and machine guns had "gone underground" ahead of time, and so did many commandos after the elimination of ANA structures. However, some of the illegally created military detachments were given an opportunity to be incorporated in "the existing state structures," having one way or the other sworn "allegiance" to the AOD (Armenian Pannational Movement) which had come to power in the republic. As is known, a special missions regiment was created in Armenia under the republic MVD. Those who see the soldiers of this regiment will easily recognize the familiar features of the former fedayeen in their countenance...

While legalizing this "soldiery" at present, do the leaders of the republic consider whose interests it is going to defend and who their issued (or, perhaps, criminally acquired) weapons will be used against?

At any rate, Zviad Gamsakhurdia has every reason to consider this seriously. In fighting "the dominance of the Communist Party in Georgia," he and his comrades did a lot in their time for the illegal armed units to appear

and gain strength. However, now that Gamsakhurdia heads the republic and is in power, has he begun to reconsider his past deeds?

Soon after Z. Gamsakhurdia signed a decree on disarming the illegal units, D. Ioseliani, one of his main political opponents and the leader of the paramilitary organization Mkhedrioni, held a press conference in Tbilisi. He declared that surrendering weapons voluntarily is out of the question. His detachments need the weapons in order to restore order in South Ossetia...

After all, Mkhedrioni is not alone. The Legions of Georgian Falcons and the detachments of White George also have weapons... It is easy to imagine the kind of "order" they will restore on the land of Georgia using them...

When will peace come to the land of Transcaucasia? Perhaps, no one in our country is in a position to answer this question at present. However, it is obvious that the road to peace will be much easier if, for example, a radical solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem which suits both Armenia and Azerbaijan is found and if the causes of interethnic antagonisms in the republics are eliminated on the whole. This is up to the Union and republic parliaments and governments, to all politicians, to all people with common sense. However, do we have a right to toss firewood on the ever-burning fires of conflicts, arm ourselves feverishly and without scruples, line up in combat columns, and man the barricades as we await this radical solution? When will the sober voice of our peoples saying "farewell to arms!" sound? When will organs and politicians empowered by us, whom at present commandos firing automatic weapons and machine guns prevent from hearing and understanding one another, begin to quietly settle interethnic disputes?

Meanwhile...

Major-General of Justice V. Ivanov said: "New alarming statistics have appeared in the first months of 1991. Commandos and criminal elements have stolen 90 'barrels' in the territory of Armenia, and three in Georgia. So far, it has been quiet in Azerbaijan..."

Col-Gen Stefanovskiy on 'Radar' TV Company

91UM0426A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel-General G.A. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy and chairman of the board of TPO Radar, by unnamed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; date and place not given: "What Are Radar's Objectives"]

[Text] *The joint order recently adopted by the chairman of Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] and the USSR Minister of Defense concerning the establishment of the artistic teleradio production company (TPO), Radar, has evoked a broad*

response among KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers. Many are interested first and foremost in the objectives and tasks of the new television and radio company, and in its status.

Our correspondent asked Colonel-General G.A. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and chairman of the board of TPO Radar, to talk about it.

[Stefanovskiy] First of all, I must note that the question of establishing a similar television and radio association had come up before. But now, when a tense situation has set in about the Army and on many fundamental positions in society, its necessity is rather obvious. The main objective is preparation of thematic broadcasts and also assistance to both television and radio media in resolving pressing problems concerning the defense construction of the state, the conduct of military reform, an increase in the authority of the USSR Armed Forces and the prestige of serving in them, strengthening the unity of the Army and the people, humanization of military service and moral formation, and the patriotic education of our youth.

This is not some kind of declaration of well-known truths. It is a question of priority, if you wish—about the fate of spiritual and political values, with whose help the interests of the security of the state were always supported. Today, these values are being eroded shamelessly in the minds of the Soviet people, especially the youth.

Destructive forces and the leaders of informal associations and parties who are inclined to extremism would very much like to determine by themselves the mood and attitude of fellow citizens toward the events that are occurring in the country, in the Army, and in other state institutions. They do not shun anything in realizing their political ambitions, including illegal actions against servicemen. It is not so much the scale of the anti-Army campaign that is so striking as its essence, which has been reduced to ideological adventurism. As a result, many are gaining the impression that the Army is almost the incarnation of all of our troubles, among which are the dilapidation of the economy, the reduction in the financial capabilities of the country, and the viability of the administrative command methods of leadership...

Tell me, is it really possible to ignore this inexhaustible stream of distorted information about the Armed Forces? Radar intends to conduct an open and constructive conversation about the life of the Armed Forces, not excluding, of course, criticism as well. But practical and creative criticism.

I also want to emphasize: The new television and radio company, in whose programs army subjects will predominate, has not been organized to settle scores with somebody or to "militarize" people's consciences, as some zealots of abstract pacifism are trying to represent. Radar has a broad program of activity that has nothing in common with these fabrications. But, of course, it will defend the interests of the Army and the security of the

country. And there is nothing unnatural here. Incidentally, I will note: Many states of the world maintain such television and radio broadcasts and even television and radio companies at their own expense. As for TPO Radar, it will function on the principles of full economic accounting, self-paying, and self-financing, being guided by the provisions for joint-stock companies and companies with limited responsibilities, which was affirmed by a decree of the government of the country of 19 June 1990.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Incidentally, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, not long ago Radio Liberty, citing the weekly KOMMERSANT, reported that there are no public organizations among the founders of Radar, but that their legal term denotes "two financial military units and two space defense complexes..."

[Stefanovskiy] Very likely, this kind of a political background suits those who are not averse to frightening the people and foreign countries with impending totalitarianism once again. In fact, everything is simpler and more honest. Among Radar's founders there are several public organizations and among these, the All-Union Soviet of War and Labor Veterans, the All-Union Naval League of Youth, and the Youth Association of Soviet Armed Forces Propaganda. There are also two military units that are involved more in the national economy. One of them is engaged in construction, and the other one supports space vehicle launches. But no one is really trying to hide them. To give more information, I will add that the All-Union Foreign Economic Association Goskontsert and six labor collectives of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (USSR Gosteleradio) have also agreed to be shareholders of Radar with full rights... In accordance with this agreement, the preparation of Radar television and radio programs will also be participated in by its artistic and technical personnel. So that idle conjectures about the seizure of the airwaves and the "repainting" for this purpose of military organizations as public organizations is deprived of any logic, to say nothing of their moral aspect.

[Correspondent] You said that Radar has a wide program of activity. How does it differ, for example, from programmed aspects of the military press, and which of them today should be general and priority?

[Stefanovskiy] It is intended that the technical, financial, and legal capabilities of Radar make it possible to resolve various substantive tasks—from artistic and production to philanthropic.

Radar, figuratively speaking, is another mouthpiece of glasnost, which will provide information on problems of the Army and society to a multimillion audience. Therefore, if it talks of key points, like other military press organs, it will have to throw light on democratic processes in the Armed Forces and questions concerning the

social and legal protection of servicemen. But also to show how commanders and military-political organs are working in this direction.

Recently, despite the social and interethnic tension in a number of republics, positive changes have taken place in the joint activity of military personnel and local organs with respect to absolutely new public movements and organizations. It is necessary to be able to notice and support the good shoots of stability and harmony. I suppose that everyone is interested in this today who is not indifferent to the fate and security of the people and the Fatherland.

New GlavPUR Agency for Social Organizations

91UM0426B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Kondratyev; place and date not given: "Readiness for Dialogue"]

[Text] A new subdivision has appeared in the structure of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy—the Department for Work with Socio-political Organizations and Movements. Our correspondent met with Colonel V. Kondratyev, chief of the department.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What was the reason for establishing such a department?

[Kondratyev] I think that this is one more practical step in carrying out the program of reforming the political organs in consonance with the decree of the USSR president and their new tasks and functions.

But as for the vital necessity, I would like to emphasize: We quite often do not note innovations in social development, and we thereby doom ourselves to unwarranted losses. Here are just several features. The problems of the Army, at one time purely "departmental," have long since become an object of intent, exacting, and at times speculative, interest. Here and there military service cards were burned in front of call-up centers. Mothers of soldiers whose hearts were filled with just alarm took to the streets; and, often with the pain of unhealed wounds, they also responded to unbridled anti-Army propaganda. A legal conflict that is difficult to overcome also arose between the center and the regions on questions of military construction. The need developed to analyze closely what it is here that involves the objective process of democratic development, what is in the area of human emotions, and what falls under shameful lies. Finally, and this is the main thing, what should be placed in the category of critical problems requiring the application of practical measures.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What do you see as the main assignment of the new department?

[Kondratyev] In a fundamental sense, it is a question of countering, with an active and mainly creative dialogue,

destructive efforts to put the Army and society at opposite poles. Of course, an underestimation of the objectively evolving critical problems and a simplified view of the real situation reduce the possibility of developing fundamental measures for the future improvement of the Armed Forces. And dialogue is not an end in itself. Figuratively speaking, it is an attempt to understand the cause and effect relationships of the ailments in society and in the Army, and to define accurately the diagnosis and methods of treatment.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In other words, you intend to make a specific contribution to the task of consolidating society, first and foremost on questions of military policy and the vital activity of the Army and the Navy?

[Kondratyev] I think that the task is quite realistic. Although we are not harboring any illusions, and we recognize how complex it is. The Army, not of its own will, was dragged into the maelstrom of political passions. Many problems have to be moved from the narrow rut of rally passions to the channel of mutually acceptable compromises and realistic proposals. This will make it possible to separate the genuine supporters of improving the Army from the imaginary ones. But not to exclude the latter, so to say, from the list of partners in the dialogue, but to identify positions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And the last question: about priorities in the work of the department in the short term...

[Kondratyev] To be concise, very active contacts with parties and movements, dialogue and joint analysis of their programmed objectives in the area of military policy, and broadly informing about the daily vital activities of the Army and Navy. But also mutual cooperation and possible concentration of efforts to improve the moral and spiritual education of pre-induction youth, the humanization of the service, public control of the state of law and order, and others. Apparently, in light of new legal provisions, the problem of "the Army and religion" will require a more precise definition.

We already have a dialogue going with various associations of soldiers' mothers, whose representatives took part in the work of a special commission that was established in fulfillment of the decree of the USSR president of 15 November of last year. At the recently held "roundtable," it was stated: Problems remain, and work has to be continued. It is necessary, in my opinion, to also support the proposal: To establish public commissions in the center and in the localities on the question of the social protection of servicemen.

I would especially like to provide large reserves of close cooperation with people's deputies-servicemen on the most urgent problems of the defense of the country and the socio-legal protection of servicemen and their family members.

I hope that all of this, among other factors, will promote the creation of favorable conditions in society for the full and qualitative implementation by the Army and the Navy of their functions in the defense of the country.

Official Sketches Crime Rate in Army

91UM0248A Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA
in Russian No 23, Dec 90 (Signed to press 7 Dec 90)
pp 8-9

[Article by Colonel of Justice L.A. Smertin, assistant at the Main Military Procuracy: "Crime Is Not Giving Up"]

[Text] As is known, the increase in crime in the nation last year was over 30 percent. The army was no exception either. The Assistant of the Main Military Procuracy, Colonel of Justice L.A. Smertin, examines how things were during the first nine months of the current year in comparison with the analogous period of the previous one.

During the current year, the trend for increased crime in the nation has been maintained. In September, the bodies of the procuracy and internal affairs recorded over 1.7 million crimes and this was 13.1 percent more than over the same period of the previous year. One out of every five crimes was a major crime. An increase in the crime rate has been noticed in all the Union republics, with the exception of Azerbaijan.

The crisis phenomena in society are also being felt negatively in the Armed Forces. Increased crime is continuing here as well. During the current year, 37.9 percent more crimes were recorded than in the analogous period of 1989. A negative trend in the dynamics of the crime rate is noticed in virtually all the Armed Services and combat arms, the districts, groups of forces and fleets. An exception is the Central and Southern Groups of Forces where the drop was almost 30.9 percent and 16 percent, respectively. But this must be attributed rather to the withdrawal of the troops.

Unfavorable trends are also characteristic for the structure of crime:

Almost ¼ of the crimes are major crimes and in a number of military districts their share is even higher, the number of premeditated murders was 20.3 percent higher, premeditated severe bodily injury was 35 percent higher and the number of rapes increased;

Among military crimes, one can note a rise in absences without leave by almost double;

The number of abuses of official position, including violations of disciplinary practice and assault and battery, rose by 16 percent.

There is serious concern for the unabating instances of mockery and humiliation. These have been carried out in front of fellow servicemen and often in front of commanders. Here for the young men inducted into the army the impression of all-permissiveness is created and there is fear for their lives and health. They feel a real prospect of being in the place of the victim next time. They lose their will to resist and their faith in the ability of the command to protect them against arbitrariness and instill firm proper order. For this reason, I feel that

it is no accident that there has arisen and is growing a movement of soldier mothers who are endeavoring to protect their sons against the tyranny of hooligans and the barracks version of "no quarter given."

At present, it would be hard to raise the issue of the effectiveness of any measures to combat crime or prevent it, when there has been a noticeable drop in the disciplinary level among officers. Unfortunately, the crime rate among them this year rose.

But the officers have not only themselves committed crimes but also seal the crimes of subordinates. Around 500 such cases have been discovered by the military procurators.

At present, in one of the military procuracies of the Far Eastern Military District, a criminal case is being investigated on the concealment of ten crimes. In another unit they have disclosed the concealed fact of the death of a Private Volkov who perished as a result of mockery and humiliation by fellow servicemen. These facts were known by the unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nesterenko, but he concealed the crime and did not inform the military procurator of the murder and did not initiate a criminal case. Now he himself is serving a sentence.

The unstable sociopolitical situation in the nation has had a significant influence on the increased theft of firearms and ammunition. Over 200 crimes involving the taking of almost 500 barrels have been recorded and this is an increase of almost 50 percent. However, judging from the criminal cases, there has not been the natural increase under such conditions of vigilance or the taking of the required measures. In particular, up to 30 September of the current year over 30,000 dumps and storage facilities holding weapons, ammunition and explosive had not been provided with security and alarm systems and this facilitates the breaking into them.

Audits conducted for the first time by the Directorate of General Supervision under the Main Military Procuracy with the aid of specialists from the USSR Ministry of Finances and the Central Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Finances have established that the bases and troop units have acquired surplus and obsolete military equipment and supplies valued at more than 350 million rubles. And this has happened because officials from the Ministry of Defense directorates have concluded contracts with industry for the production of weapons and equipment without considering the actual needs. Much is spoiled and is broken up and the losses are colossal. Just in the course of supervising the execution of the laws concerning the protection of state property, during the current year the military procurators have recovered more than 12 million rubles from the guilty parties and decisions have been taken to seek 25 million from them.

Calling on specialists from the USSR Ministry of Finances and Gokhran [State Repository], inspections have been conducted on carrying out legislation concerning the fight against mismanagement and theft. In

the course of these, measures have been taken for the cooperative and other organizations to pay more than 8 million rubles to the state budget for air shipments and over a half billion rubles have been deposited on account of the precious metals.

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Conditions for Early Discharge Described

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in Russian No 23, Dec 90 (Signed to press 7 Dec 90)
pp 10-11

[Unattributed interview with Colonel V.I. Petrov, chief of directorate group of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "Again on Rights and Benefits"]

[Text] Perestroika in the nation and the army, democratization and glasnost have brought revival in all strata of our society. This has also been reflected in the editor's mail. An analysis of it shows that the military commissariats, the law enforcement bodies and the unit commanders as yet still do not explain to the servicemen with sufficient competence the provisions on military service, the requirements of the legislative enactments and so forth. For this reason, the soldiers frequently seek advice. Upon the request of our correspondent, the Chief of the Directorate Group of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Col V.I. Petrov, provides an explanation to a number of such questions.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Ilich, many have asked whether the students in correspondence and evening divisions of VUZes, the students in technical schools and students in the specialized secondary schools doing their military service can be discharged into the reserves ahead of time, before the start of the academic year?

[Petrov] Unfortunately, there is no such opportunity. And this is why. As a rule, discharge of servicemen into the reserves is not carried out before the arrival of their replacements. And according to the USSR Law on Universal Military Service, the call-up of citizens for military service occurs in November-December. However, the command of the units can consider the situation and if possible tries to accommodate many of the men from among the students and discharges them first.

[Correspondent] Many are also interested in the question of early discharge into the reserve for servicemen due to family status. Is it possible that the corresponding procedures have not been established here?

[Petrov] Of course they have. In particular, Article 40 of the Law on Universal Military Service does this. A serviceman who, in his opinion, has the right to an early discharge into the reserves should submit a request up the line of command. This request from the serviceman or a statement from relatives within a three day period is forwarded by the commander for verification to the rayon military commissariat and the commission of the commissariat together with representatives from the

executive committee of the rayon soviet and the trade union organization within a 10-day period must verify the family status of the serviceman. The certificate of investigation is forwarded through the oblast military commissar with his conclusion to the commander of the troop unit where the man is serving.

[Correspondent] How can one correctly establish for a serviceman or his relatives the right to an early discharge into the reserves because of family status?

[Petrov] For this it is essential to study Article 34. Here there is one particular feature that often is not taken into account. Its sense is that a deferment from induction into active military service because of family status is granted to inductees who are the support of close relatives (these relatives are listed in the article). Many persons overlook the words "at their support." However, precisely these words contain the basic reason for the right to deferment, since the mere presence of the relatives indicated in Article 34 for the inductee (serviceman), if they are not actually supported by him, in and of itself does not give him the right to deferment from induction (to early discharge into the reserves).

[Correspondent] In 1989, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU adopted a decree "On Increasing the Length of Leaves to Women Having Young Children." This year, upon the proposal of the USSR president, the Supreme Soviet as a priority reviewed and approved the Decree "On Certain Measures to Improve the Status of Women, to Protect Maternity and Infancy and Strengthen the Family." Will these be felt in an improvement in the status of female service personnel?

[Petrov] Undoubtedly. The extending to female service personnel of the standards to increase the length of partially paid leave and additional leave without the maintaining of pay and in-kind supplies to care for an infant until it reaches the age of three has already been announced by an order of the USSR minister of defense. I think that all other benefits and advantages established for women will be extended to our female personnel fully.

[Correspondent] Service has specific features for women. For example, if they are on active military service in positions of warrant officers ["praporshchik," "michman"], sergeants, master sergeants, soldiers and seamen, with the birth of a child they can be discharged early both at their own request as well as by a decision of the command immediately upon completion of their post-natal leave. In recent years, in essence, they have not been granted leave to care for a child. Is this the case?

[Petrov] Yes, it actually is. Many female service personnel were discharged without the granting of leave. In June of this year, particular amendments were incorporated in the procedure for their early discharge due to the birth of children and the impossibility of their performing service duties. The command was permitted to discharge them only after they had used up the leave

granted by current legislation for pregnancy and birth and for caring for a child until it reaches the age of three.

[Correspondent] There are also serious problems for the families of personnel on regular service. They, as a rule, are not provided for in housing and domestic terms and they have insignificant material supplies and money. The Ministry of Defense has adopted a decision to provide an opportunity for married servicemen to serve closer to the place of residence of the family. Judging from the flood of letters from wives and from the servicemen themselves, this decision is not carried out everywhere. What is the problem here?

[Petrov] Actually since 1989, the General Staff in induction for active military service, has allowed married citizens to be sent wherever possible to troop units close to the place of residence of the family. In each specific instance on an individual basis, the induction commissions take decisions proceeding from the real possibilities as well as the professional qualities of the inductee, but considering the primary and high-quality manning of the units.

But in terms of married servicemen already on active military service, no instructions were issued to move them closer to the place of residence of the family. This would involve significant material and financial outlays, problems of the high-quality manning of the troop units as well as tasks for increasing their combat capability.

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Round-up of Readers' Comments on Reduction in Force

91UM0257A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt-Col O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "I Am Appealing for Help: Reflections on Readers' Letters on Armed Force Reduction"]

[Text] In previous surveys we have discussed the problem of officers discharged into the reserve, raised questions about the social protection of servicemen and told about laws in the making. How has the mail from readers changed in the meantime.

For several months there was a drop in this kind of mail. I believe that this was due not to the vacation season but to reports in the mass media about the development of laws and decisions pertaining to the military reform. Everyone hopefully awaited their appearance. In September, for example, the USSR Council of Ministers approved a special government program embracing all aspects of social security for servicemen and their families. In November the USSR Council of Ministers passed a decree significantly altering the food supply system and increasing pay and allowances. The President of the USSR issued an decree "On Certain Measures to Enhance Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen." The fact remains, however, that the public and social

status and life of the men in the shoulder boards has become even more uncertain during that time, and attacks on the army have been stepped up. Officers, warrant officers and their families have become one of the least socially protected segments of the society. Particularly in areas with a complex sociopolitical situation and in republics advocating withdrawal from the USSR. I feel that all of this prompted the "second wave" of letters. What do they contain?

"I am turning to you as my last hope," writes Senior Lieutenant I. Naydenov of the Baltic area to the editors. "It will soon be a year since I submitted my application for discharge from the Armed Forces. I have adequate reason for doing so. They include poor living conditions, an ill mother living alone, dissatisfaction with my job.... No one cares about how I am doing or what is troubling me. My life has come to a standstill, and I have been getting nowhere for many months now...." This kind of letter expressing hopelessness or distress at the callousness and lack of concern is particularly typical for the young officers. Their letters, ordinarily a result of long reflection on their life, the service and their place in it, come from diverse areas of the nation and various branches of the Armed Forces. "This letter is from a group of officers consisting of Maj V. Gritsev, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant O. Rybiy, deputy company commander for political affairs, and Senior Lieutenant V. Musatov, secretary of the unit party organization. At the beginning of May our unit was withdrawn from the Southern Group of Forces to the Volga-Ural Military District. Prior to our departure we were given high-level assurances that at the new location we would be permitted to transfer without hindrance to where we had apartments and that those who did not want to continue in the service would be discharged. Now we are told: Whoever promised you that, let him carry out his promise." I am trying to understand the officers and, most important, to make the reader aware of the suffering of the people who find themselves in this situation. Why are some leaders deviating from their promises so casually? Frequently, however, behind the outward causes and family problems lies dissatisfaction with their service and living conditions and their social status. That is, it is sometimes not the service itself which forces a person to leave his beloved work and betray the army, but living conditions which are intolerable according to modern concepts. Many of them serve well in such situations, to be sure. But there are also those who ask why the man in the shoulder boards should suffer. For an idea?

Our officer corp has always been known for its traditions of honor and is rich in people with pure, passionate hearts. Today we see in the society a devaluation of many, previously sacred concepts, a reassessment of values—of ideals, if you like. I am personally convinced that our army and its best members are least of all influenced by the golden calf. They are still standing alert duty, descending into the ocean abyss and flying out on intercept missions primarily at the dictates of duty, of

conscience and honor. But is it not time for us to look at a different aspect of the matter? While there was previously some sort of compensation for the hardships of the service, today, with the approach of the market economy, this incentive is simply laughable. Here is an example. I recently saw this tempting advertisement on a trolley: "Trolley driver wanted; wages, 650 to 900 rubles...."

Every occupation is honored in our nation. However, when the state values the labor of a driver more than that of a pilot, a ship commander or a law-enforcement agent, let us say, I believe something is wrong. In that kind of system an officer can only hang from a thread and live on "thank-yous." Thank God, we still have many such "eccentrics". They simply love their work, difficult as it is. They love it not for any specific benefits but in their hearts. It would seem that we should value such people all the more therefore and give them due credit for their selfless labor.

Obviously, everyone understands this, both those who are submitting applications for discharge and those who keep them "on the shelf," so to speak. We cannot permit the army to fall apart, of course. But let us ask ourselves honestly: Can we retain people today with prohibitions and threats of court action or discharge them with a certificate of unreliability? Would it not be better to get to the bottom of the factors motivating them to do this?

"We have finally realized that those ideals and concepts to which we aspired were only a naive dream in our actual situation," Lieutenants O. Tolmak and S. Volchkov said, pouring out their hearts in a letter from Tallin. Lieutenants S. Belik, D. Burma and O. Fedorov... wrote from the Ussuriysk area about their loss of ideals and their disappointment. And Senior Lieutenant Med Service V. Cherkobay, a doctor in the Western Group of Forces, writes with urgency—with despair, I would say. We sent his first letter to the appropriate personnel agency for consideration. The decision on a discharge is being made with difficulty. Now he has written again to say the following: "For numerous reasons of all sorts I cannot and will not continue in the service. For a 30-year-old, and especially one with two children, this is more than just a firm and final decision." The officer could be punished, of course, and forced to continue serving.... And so the delays continue.

As one reads the mail, one arrives at the conclusion that problems are sometimes caused simply by a lack of precisely defined criteria for the matter in some personnel agencies. Otherwise, how does one explain the fact that some officers are discharged at once, others only after a long period of red tape and nerve-racking effort, still others.... Lieutenant (Res) A. Kravchenko sent the editors an open letter to the USSR Minister of Defense. What about? Born into the family of a military pilot, he spent his whole life preparing to follow in his father's footsteps. Only on the third try, however, did he enter a school. He was immensely happy. However.... "We were permitted to complete the school," he reports, "only on

the condition that we would be discharged into the reserve due to the reduction of the Armed Forces. And this was the inglorious end of my military career before it even began. Why is it that during the period of restructuring, when only the best things should happen, the opposite is occurring. The people who want to leave the army are not permitted to do so, while those like me, who are strong and want to serve in it, are discharged?"

Why, indeed? Kravchenko lists how much of the people's money the state has spent on his training and requests to be returned into the Armed Forces, promising to be an "excellent pilot." What does one tell him?

Some letter writers have interpreted the democratic principles and conditions of the army in the opposite way, to be sure. They employ far from democratic means and methods of applying "force" upon commanders and chiefs in an attempt to get their problems resolved as rapidly as possible. After achieving their aims, they frequently conclude that they have acted precipitously. Capt A. Druzhinin, a deputy commander for political affairs in a separate radar company in Turkmenia, wrote the following: I have been discharged from the Armed Forces on the basis of an application written in a state of agitation, without even a response to my request to return the application.... I am therefore expressing my disagreement with the order from the Commander in Chief of the Air Defense Forces and am announcing a hunger strike. It turned out, however, that Druzhinin was expelled from the CPSU for negligence in the performance of his service duties. Prior to that he had had four party penalties and a warning that he was not measuring up to service requirements. Despite this, the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces decided to grant him a hearing. The officer was at the political directorate when we called. They talked with him and advised him to take his application to the unit officers' assembly.

The mail has of late increasingly contained letters with ultimatums. They include declarations of hunger strikes or appeals to the nation's President, as in the case of Lieutenants Kiselev, Yershov and Loginov of Perm. A hunger strike is no way to resolve any matter, of course. The roots of such actions no doubt lie in the persistent indifference displayed for the people's problems, however. Does this not account for the second wave of disturbing letters?

"That and our legislative activities in the nation," was the opinion of Col V. Sadovoy, an officer with the Political Directorate of the Air Defense Forces. "The people are frightened at the confusion in which the army finds itself, a subject of dispute and division...."

As already stated, progress is being made on this matter at the state level, and we only have to be patient. Things will not be better, however, if the legislative acts in the making turn out to be rough and unfinished. This is obviously the only explanation for the delay in preparing the Law of the USSR on Defense and other vitally necessary documents which would permit the Armed

Forces to fulfill its purpose and would provide prestige for the men in the shoulder boards. This matter was brought up, incidentally, at a meeting of the president of the USSR with deputies of the servicemen. The draft Law of the USSR on Defense already exists, it was stated there, and has been sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

As we can see, these documents continue to be at the center of the nation's leadership. This was confirmed by the President at that meeting, who said that the nation's leadership is keeping its eye on the reform of the Armed Forces and related laws in its work.

It should also be stated that, since we have set out on the path of a law-governed state, all disagreements, conflicts and problems should be resolved not by means of ultimatums, strikes and hunger strikes, but based on the law. There is no other way.

After this article had been readied for the press, two reports came in from personnel agencies at the newspaper's request. The first, signed by A. Gorbenko, stated that because of the large shortage of officers in the unit, there is no justification for discharging Lieutenants S. Belik, D. Burma and O. Fedorov into the reserve. The second, signed by Col B. Volkov, deputy chief in the personnel section of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces, reported the following: Maj V. Gritsev and Senior Lieutenants V. Musatov and O Rybiy have been discharged into the reserve by order of the USSR Minister of Defense under Article 59, Paragraph V, in connection with the reduction of manning levels.

People's Deputies Inspect Garrison's Housing

91UM0256A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Col V. Belousov: "Where the Officers Have to Live"]

[Text] A group of people's deputies and representatives of ministries and agencies, headed by L. Sharin, has completed its work in the garrisons of the Moscow, Kiev, Baltic and Belorussian military districts, which are receiving units and formations from the countries of Eastern Europe. Housing for officers and warrant officers, schools, kindergartens and nursery schools for children and job placement for family members are the main thing on which the parliamentarians focused their attention.

What is the housing situation today—are people being left in the streets or, as some of the mass media are asserting, spending the winter in tents? No, you won't see that at any of the garrisons. The minimal conditions for housing have been created everywhere. Not all families are receiving apartments in major buildings right away. Some will have to live at first for a while in re-equipped barracks, sports facilities or in prefabricated panel dormitories. This, of course, does not remove the housing problem overall, but in the summer of last year, when the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for

Defense and Security made its first trip to the troops, there was not even full confidence in that solution to the issue.

An enormous amount of work has been done over the last six months. The central burden has naturally fallen on the construction subunits of the districts. But the assistance of the local authorities has come to be more substantial. They have an understanding attitude toward the problems of the military in the Nizhegorod Oblast Ispolkom, in Dnepropetrovsk... It must nonetheless be stated outright that it is little consolation to an officer with a family living in a 15-meter room in a prefabricated module. It is fine if it is just a year or two, but what if it is more? These questions were asked at meetings of the people's deputies with the members of servicemen's families. And how in general, they were asking, can we make such a hasty decision on the withdrawal of troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia? Won't the same thing happen in the withdrawal of troops from Germany and Poland?

Before this trip, I asked the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were conducting the negotiations to explain how it is possible to conclude intergovernmental agreements—in accordance with which we withdraw our troops—regardless of whether they settle up with us for the facilities left behind or not. V. Kopeltsev answered that passions were boiling in Eastern Europe at the time, and they had to act under pressure, and in general, he added, we were very trusting, but love and friendship do not exist in diplomacy—only interests...

It is truly impossible to comment on these words of the diplomat. But the problems must be solved no matter what. The people's deputies are trying to solve them immediately. The meeting in the Baltic Military District was typical in this regard. The commander of the motorized rifle division that had come here was reporting the situation. The commander of the district, as well as his deputy for construction and billeting, a member of the military council and representatives of the local authorities, were present. "The training ground where our families will have to live," says the division commander, "has no school. We will have to drive the first graders ten kilometers..." Questions are asked of him: "Are there accommodations for a school? Teachers can be found among the officers." "That's it then," concludes the chairman of the oblast ispolkom, "there will be a primary school at the training ground."

The assistance of military experts—officers V. Vashev, A. Sheyenko, L. Gerasimenko and V. Samoylenko, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations V. Golubev and V. Ryabchuk, Ministry of Finance V. Vechkanov and Gosnab N. Alchebayev—has greatly facilitated the productive work of the people's deputies.

Chief of Admin Directorate on Compulsory Insurance Program

91UM0256B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with USSR Ministry of Defense Affairs Directorate Chief Major General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov by Major I. Ivanyuk under the rubric "Topical Interview": "...And an Insurance Policy"]

[Text] *The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decree on mandatory state personal insurance for servicemen, as well as reservists during periods when they are completing active training exercises.*

The editors asked USSR Ministry of Defense Affairs Directorate Chief Major-General L. Ivashov to comment on the substance of that document.

[Ivanyuk] Leonid Grigoryevich, this decision must probably be regarded, first and foremost, as the next important step in consolidating social guarantees for the defenders of the Motherland and their families?

[Ivashov] I want to begin with the fact that the government's decision was made in accordance with the decree of the president of the USSR of 5 Sep 90 entitled "Some Measures to Strengthen the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen." The initiative on the necessity of this type of state insurance came from the USSR Ministry of Defense. The military-law commission had earlier submitted such a norm to the draft Law on the Status of Servicemen, and it is present in the draft of that law that was published in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

USSR Minfin [Ministry of Finance], USSR Gosstrakh [State Committee for Insurance] and other agencies took part in the development of the draft decree of the USSR Council of Ministers along with the Ministry of Defense. Several variations for making the insurance payments were considered, as were various sizes for the insurance amounts.

[Ivanyuk] How does the final version look?

[Ivashov] The words "mandatory state insurance" speak for themselves. The serviceman, as it were, is automatically considered to be insured from the day of his call-up for military service. The bodies of Gosstrakh, in the cases stipulated by the decree of the government of the USSR, pay 25,000 rubles to the heirs of a serviceman who is killed or dies. This provision also extends to citizens that die before the expiration of a year after their discharge from the service or active exercises as a consequence of wounds, injuries or diseases sustained during the period of completion of military service or exercises. If the insured is found to be disabled in connection with his completion of military service or exercises before the expiration of a year after discharge, he will receive the corresponding amount from the insurance. That totals 15,000 rubles for invalids in group I, 10,000 in group II and 5,000 in group III.

A conscript serviceman or reservist is paid 1,000 rubles if he is deemed unfit for further service or exercises for reasons of health during the completion of exercises. The insurance payments are also provided for in the event injury is sustained—1,000 rubles for a severe injury and 500 rubles for a slight injury.

[Ivanyuk] Why define exactly those sizes of payments anyway? How can the life or health of people be valued in rubles?

[Ivashov] You are right, it is impossible to measure the death or suffering of people who have been maimed and the grief of their relatives and loved ones in monetary terms. And no amount of money can serve as consolation. The issue is something else—the state is taking on itself a portion of the expenses to compensate for the material costs. This is essential assistance, since in many cases the family loses its breadwinner and the bulwark of the family. As for the size of the payments approved by the government, they are defined by today's real capabilities in the face of the financial and economic situation that exists in the country.

The military-law commission of the Ministry of Defense, when developing the draft Law on the Status of Servicemen, by the way, proposed a different approach to resolving this issue. And I am not ruling it out that the norms that are stipulated today will be changed as early as during the discussion of the draft Law on the Status of Servicemen in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Ivanyuk] When will this decree take effect? To whom and what cases does it extend?

[Ivashov] First of all, I should specify at once that the payments under this type of insurance will be made only provided that the death, disability or illness ensued after 31 Dec 90. Second, refusals to pay the insurance amounts are also possible. In cases, for example, where this or that harm to the health of a serviceman was a consequence of his intentional actions or actions where he is to blame. The statistics of the incidents are such that almost a quarter of them occur due to a personal lack of discipline of servicemen or as a consequence of criminal activities.

[Ivanyuk] But won't it happen that the responsibility of the commanders and superior officers for preserving the life and health of their subordinates will diminish under these conditions?

[Ivashov] The responsibility for the life and health of subordinates will never be taken away from the commanders at all levels. The USSR Minister of Defense begins his workday with a report on the deaths of servicemen and other instances connected with the health of people. An investigation is assigned for every incident, be it a suicide, an accident or a failure to observe safety rules.

The institution of the state life and health insurance for soldiers will naturally require the development of some additional organizational and educational measures as well.

But much has been and is being done on that plane already. The readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA have probably noticed that the draft laws on "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" and "The Status of Servicemen" have a series of norms aimed at improving the preparation of the young for military service and raising the requirements on the draft commissions and the medical certification of draftees. Focus is also placed, in the draft copies of the new service-wide charters, on preserving the life and health of servicemen and strengthening the demands on commanders to ensure proper safety measures when organizing exercises, training and operations. These requirements have been made concrete in the orders and directives of the minister of defense. The question of preventing the death or injury of servicemen was one of the chief ones at a conference of the leadership of the armed forces of the USSR in December of last year. The requirements for the quality of the hardware and weaponry coming to the troops and the navy have been tightened. The main criterion is reliability and safety in operation.

[Ivanyuk] But it will be impossible to eliminate tragic incidents nonetheless. What are the main causes of them?

[Ivashov] Let's look at the statistics on the causes of peoples' deaths. What do they tell us?

First of all, they are the result of catastrophes, accidents and violations of safety measures. There were several instances of a fatal outcome as the result of mockery of fellow servicemen. Instances of suicide among servicemen and the murder of civilians also occur, unfortunately.

Second, as follows from the statistics, incidents and tragedies occur much less often with the representatives of those regions and republics where work is better arranged to prepare the young for the fulfillment of their constitutional duty, where the authorities and the administrations are genuinely concerned about this. I would like to single out the serious and thorough approach to the resolution of these issues in Uzbekistan.

But what can you say about the republics of the Baltics, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia, if their leaders themselves plant a disrespect for military service in young minds?

The elimination, or at least reduction to a minimum, of the deaths and injuries of our sons during their service in the army is thus only possible through the joint efforts of the Ministry of Defense, the local authorities and parents.

Military Procurator's Assistant on Service Casualties

91UM0258A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 9 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Chief Military Procurator's Senior Assistant Colonel Justice Valeriy Ivanovich Prishchepa by V. Ivanov under the rubric "Discussion on a Sore Subject": "Did Not Perish in War"]

[Text] *On a wave of genuine concern for the state of affairs in our army and navy, one today hears such things as thousands of people are perishing, there is "hazing" in the army left and right, that criminal behavior has flourished in the army...*

What do senior officials of the military procuracy think about this? Our interviewee today is a senior assistant to the chief military procurator, Colonel Justice V.I. Prishchepa.

[Ivanov] Valeriy Ivanovich, the number of those who have perished in the army is not yet subject to disclosure. This is a secret not only in our military, but also in other armies around the world. But that situation makes it possible for certain forces to speculate on various types of data and to accuse the military legal-protection bodies, including the procuracy, of attempts to hide the truth from the public.

The topic of our discussion requires concrete facts and examples nonetheless, since only they are able to give a full picture of the state of law and order in the army environment.

[Prishchepa] The size of our army is about four million people today. This is comparable with a Russian oblast of medium size. If we were thus to compare the number of crimes that occur in such an oblast with the number of crimes in the army, believe me, they would prove to be several times less in the army.

Compare: about fifteen thousand people perished in production across the country over the last year alone, as many as the army lost over the ten years of combat operations in Afghanistan. Army losses in peacetime conditions, you understand, are much fewer than in war. And today they are—although far from fine—much lower than in civilian life.

[Ivanov] The youth, in other words, are risking their life and health to a lesser extent in military service?

[Prishchepa] Undoubtedly. I understand very well that my answer will not bring back to their mothers the only sons who died in military service, but facts are facts. We will try, as much as possible, to clarify the situation with the tragic statistics...

The losses of servicemen today are distributed in roughly this way: a third are caused by crimes, and the remaining

two thirds are accidents—crashes, collisions, careless handling of firearms—that is, situations that do not constitute a crime.

One out of five crimes in the army is committed in the military-construction detachments [VSO]. And the VSOs themselves comprise less than ten percent of the overall personnel complement of the armed forces. The serious criminal situation there really is obvious. It is caused, in my opinion, by the fact that there are neither material incentives (everyone knows what the pay is there, and some even return from the service in debt) nor military regulations in effect in the so-called "stroybats" [construction battalions]. There is, after all, no true military service there, the military construction workers hold weapons only when taking the oath. The poor military and labor discipline fosters contempt for the law.

The injury and fatality rates of people in the VSOs—and not only there—are caused, in most cases, by violations of safety rules in the performance of operations. From three to twelve percent of the estimated cost of any facility under construction, for example, should be spent on ensuring safety according to prevailing norms. In practice, absolutely not. Lives are lost, guys do not return home as a result...

The fact that the detachments of military construction workers are affiliated with about fifteen non-defense ministries and agencies also heightens the tension. And that is, after all, unconstitutional. The sectors, not providing the soldiers with the essential working conditions, or often a place to work either, try to retain a cheap reserve of manpower by fair means or foul.

But problems have moved from a standstill anyway. Protests submitted by the USSR Procuracy and supported by the public and mass media have had their first results—the decision has been made to disband the VSOs in the non-defense sectors of the national economy. The call-up into militarized construction subunits stationed at the facilities of these ministries has already been halted, starting this year.

[Ivanov] I want to touch in our discussion on the painful subject of the suicide of servicemen (suicide rate). The opinion exists that the conditions of military service are so harsh and inhumane that yesterday's schoolboys cannot stand them and put an end to themselves. How is it actually?

[Prishchepa] I'll quote the figures—this type of human loss comprises 22 percent of those who perish in the army. But it should be understood here that, according to statistics, there are 3.9 instances of suicide per hundred thousand of population among women, while for men it is 30.8. The difference is almost eight times. These ratios are evidently somehow connected with the specific features of the psychological make-up of men. And if you take into account that men comprise the majority of the army, it becomes more comprehensible why this tragic statistic, just like in civilian life, wins its share.

[Ivanov] But you will agree, in any case, that a youth who has decided to kill himself is an abnormal phenomenon. Medical research on those servicemen who have made an attempt on their own lives or, for example, have tried to desert their units, display serious deviations in their psyches. How did guys with such serious abnormalities get into the ranks? There are special medical commissions for the draftees...

[Prishchepa] A quite thorough medical study of the personnel in the army and navy was performed last year. The result was that about 10,000 servicemen were discharged and returned home. The fact that sick people ended up in the army is the fault of the commissions of the military commissariats. Their formation is a problem now, however—it is becoming more and more difficult for the commissariats to attract physicians with the conversion of health care to economic accountability [*khozrashchet*]. Try and uncover the psychological deviations of a new draftee if there is no psychiatric specialist on the commissariat medical commission. And why not? There shouldn't even be one anyway—according to prevailing legal norms, a person cannot be compelled to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.

So it happens that if a young serviceman has some anomalies in his psyche, they are manifested only in the course of service, and can have tragic consequences both for the soldier and for those around him.

Young sergeant A. Lyalin killed himself in the Transbaykal Military District. According to the conclusions of the court psychiatric evaluation, he was suffering from schizophrenia and was not responsible for himself at the time of his suicide. Another former serviceman, G. Polishchuk, put an end to his life while in a state of neurotic reaction. He repeatedly demanded that his parents take every step to have his service transferred to his place of residence before hanging himself.

While citing these examples, I will nonetheless state that just 8.3 percent of the suicide rate among servicemen is from suicides associated with psychological illness and psychotic states. We are thus not inclined to consider each suicide as a manifestation of a person's abnormality alone.

[Ivanov] You have in mind cases where the cause of the soldier's suicide is his torment by his "elder" fellow servicemen?

[Prishchepa] Yes. And even though such crimes comprise a small portion of the total number (2.8 percent of all those who perish), they are a shameful blemish on the army. The battle against "hazing" in the units and subunits today is merciless, and those accused of such crimes are being strictly punished by tribunals.

[Ivanov] I see another tragic column in the document lying in front of you—the victims of road accidents are entered in it. How great are they in the army?

[Prishchepa] More than 70,000 people were killed on the country's roads last year, and several hundred over that same period in the army. But that is too many nonetheless, even though the quantity of motor-vehicle accidents in the army with human injury, as opposed to life on the "outside," is decreasing. The reasons for people being killed at the wheel are violations of rules and requirements once again. According to international norms, only drivers who have reached 21 years of age can transport people. The commanders violate this strict requirement—where can they get drivers that meet that condition if the principal age of conscript servicemen is 18-20 years old? Speeding while driving motor vehicles is another of the principal reasons for road casualties.

It should also be said that today, as never before, the lack of physical and moral preparedness of the draftees for army service is great. The abolition of the course of initial military training in the schools and the commercialization of the DOSAAF system have reduced the already poor capabilities of the draftees, which has an effect on their period of service.

There are many instances where servicemen perish namely due to their poor physical condition in situations that are, it could be said, ordinary rather than extreme. For example, a group of soldiers decided to go swimming while on leave. I will note at once that they were sober. But one of them drowned—he swam out too far, got tired and began to call for help, but it did not get there in time... Some 130 people have drowned under similar circumstances in the army this year!

[Ivanov] The unfortunate mothers of lost servicemen are appealing over and over to various offices, including the Chief Military Procuracy, with demands to find the guilty and punish them...

[Prishchepa] A mother's grief is inconsolable, no words can bring back a lost son... But I can assure you, regarding the way we are handling those appeals, that they are being pursued with the maximum carefulness and completeness.

[Ivanov] That activity probably got an extra impetus after the ukaz of the president of the USSR, "Steps to Realize the Proposals of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers." The ukaz, after all, provides in particular for the creation of a special commission for the additional study of all cases connected with instances of the death of servicemen...

[Prishchepa] We are working actively with that commission, but I want to dwell on something else here. The Chief Military Procuracy is being reproached for the fact

that we do not permit so-called "independent" legal scholars to check these cases, scholars who upon checking frequently turn out to be people who were at one time chased out of the procuracy system for gross violations of legality, falsification of materials, drunkenness or even the commission of crimes... They include, for instance, Major L.A. Glushchak, discharged from the armed forces because he violated procedural laws when investigating cases, and who moreover loved to go driving after having been drinking... And they are trying to palm such a person off on the commission as an auditor!

Or here is another candidate for the auditors—investigator L.A. Panteleyeva. She would also like to inspect the procuracy bodies, to which she still has to explain the reasons for violations she committed in the performance of preliminary investigations...

[Ivanov] Some mothers of lost servicemen are demanding that they be paid material compensation on the scale of 15,000 to 100,000 rubles, in freely convertible currency no less...

[Prishchepa] I feel that there should be payments, and they should not be made in the form of one-time, special ones, but rather on a legal foundation. If a citizen dies while part of some organization, the owner of the source of the increased hazard—a ministry, by way of example—makes restitution for the difference between the amount of the social pension designated for orphans and the income they received before the demise of the breadwinner. But that procedure does not extend to the families of lost servicemen! That is not fair. The Ministry of Defense should also loosen its purse-strings in such a case as the agency that did not take the essential steps to avert the demise of people under peacetime conditions.

This approach would not only restore justice in relation to the families of the servicemen, but would also create an economic incentive for ensuring greater safety for the servicemen and suitable conditions for their service and everyday life. The legal practices that exist today with the infringement of the rights of the families of lost servicemen, when we refuse them full compensation, could be altered by a decision of the Committee for Constitutional Control of the USSR.

The Chief Military Procuracy is doing, and will do, everything that depends on it so that the causes for the deaths of servicemen are eliminated, although you will agree that it is not we, the military legal scholars, that create those conditions.

Air Defense Since Rust' Incident

91UM0275A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 90
(signed to press 31 Oct 90) pp 35-41

[Article by Major O. Milchakov: "Paradoxes of the 'Rust Affair'"]

[Text] "Dear editors! The article which I wish to offer you already has been published in SOBESEDNIK (No 22, 1990). More precisely, only part was published. Unfortunately the abridgements distorted the article's chief idea. In essence, what turned out was a set of prepared facts, while I was trying to pose the question differently: not so much about who was guilty and who was punished as about the lessons which must be learned from this incident. There was also one other conclusion: new documents have appeared which permit taking a broader look at events connected with the Rust flight. This is why I am turning to KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL with the hope that you will publish the article in its entirety. I believe it is in the interests of the matter to analyze just what has changed in the air defense system in past years and whether there is a guarantee that history will not repeat itself.

"Respectfully,
"Major O. Milchakov."

More than three years have passed since the day they were expelled from the party and removed from their positions. But to this day it is difficult to understand how to regard these people: as victims of circumstances or as culprits (even if indirect) for such a sensational "Rust" adventure. Who were they before this? And who are they now? And finally, the most important question: How could it happen that a half-educated pilot, a boy, was able to negotiate all barriers of our protective air defense systems and land on Red Square?

Lieutenant Colonel N. Karpets cried. The words of the military tribunal chairman seemed to bow him down to the floor, tracing the invisible barrier between past and future: "Sentenced to five years imprisonment with punishment to be served in a strenuous regimen corrective labor camp."

"For what? How could that be? For I wanted to do the best..." There was turmoil in his head and his lips quivered. But suddenly Karpets caught himself thinking: "But had I issued the information on time, what then? Who would have been sitting in the dock?"

This same thought also did not leave Major V. Chernykh. On 28 May 1987, by direction of Karpets, he delayed issuing information on the target to the higher command post by 15-16 minutes. For this Chernykh was sentenced to four years imprisonment.

Well in fact, what if he had issued the information on time? For the sake of fairness we will say that the case was reviewed soon after the sentencing. The USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium concluded that the

actions of Karpets and Chernykh were not of a deliberate nature and did not entail grave consequences (of which they had been accused initially). Thus their terms of punishment were changed. Having fallen under amnesty, Karpets and Chernykh were released from custody and discharged from the Armed Forces without a terminal gratuity. But if we look at the big picture, then was it really fair that only two persons were in the dock at that time?

"...The Air Defense Forces command authority displayed impermissible unconcern and indecisiveness to stop the flight of the intruder aircraft without resorting to weapons. This fact indicates serious shortcomings in organization of the performance of alert duty in guarding national air space and absence of proper vigilance and discipline..."

Do you remember? These lines were from an announcement of a session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo of 30 May 1987.

In reflecting on those events now, rereading volume after volume of materials of the criminal case and delving into the vicissitudes of the legal proceedings, a person involuntarily arrives at one conclusion: this should not have happened.

But it happened...

We will omit all details of Rust's journey to Finland and then the secret penetration of USSR air space. They are well known. What is important is something else: Why was unconcern displayed on the part of the air defense leadership? The fact is, the aircraft was detected by radar equipment. Radar operator Private Dilmagombetov was the first to get a fix on it. The target did not respond to interrogations and the operator reported this to his superiors. Captain Osipov, company command post duty officer, gave the "Readiness" signal for the company. Specialists classified this target as a light-engine craft, about which they also reported through channels.

And then the first paradoxes: those lower in this chain functioned precisely and skillfully, but the seemingly rehearsed system began to break down "on top." Karpets and Chernykh dawdled (further on I will try to find the motives which prompted their criminal sluggishness), and those who by virtue of their official position were obligated to make a decision on stopping the intruder's flight also were in a state of confusion, and this confusion ended up in inaction. Just what was the problem?

...According to Rust, only once did he see a Soviet fighter-interceptor. The aircraft flew around the Cessna on the right, then on the left, and finally beneath it. "I could distinguish the white helmets, orange flight suits and oxygen masks of the Soviet pilots. . . . I awaited signals for landing, but they did not come. Therefore I maintained a heading of 117, proceeding at an altitude of 600 m."

Yes, the Cessna's radio was inoperative, but there are generally accepted signals signifying the demand to land.

The fact is, Rust asserts that had he received such a command he would have aborted the flight without delay. Just why did no signals for a landing come? And why did our fighter appear only after an hour, and in the singular? The original cause of course lies in the late report by Lieutenant Colonel Karpets and Major Chernykh. Their guilt is obvious, for which they ended up in the dock. The fact is that they tried to establish the nature of the target independently. That is how it has taken shape in air defense: you are punished both for reporting late and for issuing "false" information. It is a double-edged weapon...

Nevertheless... Had Karpets and Chernykh reported promptly, people at the command post still hardly would have taken steps to stop the intruder aircraft's flight, and here is why.

FROM THE RECORD OF INTERROGATION OF MAJOR GENERAL G. KROMIN: "Witness G. V. Kromin testified that in his opinion the fact of a violation of the USSR air space border . . . was not promptly registered because of the technical capabilities of radio-technical equipment . . . in operating against a small, low-altitude aircraft..."

But at the same time Colonel N. Skorokhod, former commander of the unit where Karpets and Chernykh were serving, testified that "the target was detected for the first time at 1429 hours in the border area over waters of the Gulf of Finland. . . . Information permitted declaring the target as a minimum a violator of flight procedures . . . and taking steps to detect . . . and force the aircraft violating flight procedures to land."

The witnesses testified further: "Based on results of two fly-arounds of the target, Pilot Puchnin discovered a light-engine sports aircraft with a blue stripe along the fuselage..."

The testimony of Colonel Krivosheyev should be added to what has been said:

"The target was observed stably by radiotechnical sub-units along the entire route..."

FROM THE RECORD OF A SUPPLEMENTARY INTERROGATION OF MAJOR GENERAL G. KROMIN: "...At that moment the air situation generated no alarm in me. . . . All my actions were dictated by the fact that I had no information that this target was a state border intruder and I acted toward it as toward an unidentified object."

Permit me to inquire: What about the classification of the target as an aircraft violating flight procedures? And Pilot Puchnin's report? The senior commander personally telephoned him and clarified whether or not what he saw resembled a flight of birds, to which the officer unequivocally responded: "It was an aircraft."

But Major General Kromin later testified in the interrogation: "In connection with my reports to Major General Melnikov I can explain that I reported all the work to

him and he expressed the supposition that these were birds. . . . I said that birds were birds... I did not assign a mission to force the target to land..."

By the way, one very noteworthy detail: Major General Kromin did not immediately admit that he did not assign subordinates the mission of forcing Rust to abort the flight. Initially he tried simply to lay the blame at another's doorstep. For clarity we will quote the testimony of Witness A. S. Korniyakov: "On 30 May Major General G. V. Kromin tried to convince me over the telephone that he assigned me a mission to force the target to land, and I did not answer him on this question.

"On 31 May at 1900 hours in the presence of General A. D. Demyanov and Colonel Krivosheyev Major General Kromin told me in his office that he had ordered that the target be forced to land. I responded that I had not received such a mission. After an analysis of all conversations (of the recording), General Kromin said (word for word): "Yes, I did not assign you such a mission."

FROM THE USSR AIR CODE APPROVED BY USSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM UKASE OF 11 MARCH 1983: "An aircraft crossing the USSR State Border without appropriate permission of corresponding competent entities or which has committed other violations of rules for overflying the USSR State Border and the procedure for using USSR air space is recognized as an air intruder and is forced to land if it does not obey demands of flight control entities..."

If despite orders the intruder aircraft does not land, provisions of the Law "On the USSR State Border" adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 24 November 1982 apply to it. Article 35 of this Law states: "In protecting the USSR State Border . . . on land, on the water, and in the air . . . in cases where a violation cannot be stopped or violators cannot be detained by other means, Border Guard Troops and Air Defense Forces employ weapons and combat equipment. In necessary instances weapons and combat equipment of other branches of the USSR Armed Forces can be employed in protecting the USSR State Border."

We will note: "...combat equipment of other branches of the USSR Armed Forces." A very essential specification. But how does this provision "work" in fact? How did the command authority of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District help its neighbors from Air Defense when they requested that a helicopter be assigned? Not at all. The answer was approximately of the following content: "Our pilots are not ready to work in the clouds..." That is coordination for you. But the most interesting thing is that the "ground people" as always remained aloof and, moreover, spoke ironically and not very ethically about the neighbors: "Again this Air Defense has become notorious."

FROM THE RECORD OF INTERROGATION OF WITNESS SENIOR LIEUTENANT A. PUCHNIN: "Question: In case you were assigned the mission of stopping the target's flight by forcing it to land or

destroying it, did you have that capability considering the characteristics of your aircraft and the target?

Answer: I could have destroyed the target unequivocally under those conditions and considering the characteristics of my aircraft and the target. . . . I had the technical capability to force the target to land simply on the terrain...

But the trouble was, General Kromin's criminal indecisiveness proved to be a hindrance, for the mission was even assigned to the pilot nonspecifically: "Conduct a visual search for the target." But there was not a word about determining the target's state subordination and stopping its flight. We will quote an excerpt from the stenogram of Major General Kromin's conversations:

"...Well, will we shoot it down? The pilot reports it is a YaK-12 type." (We will note: "...Will we shoot it down?" And after these words the Cessna-172 will continue its flight unhindered for an entire four hours more on a heading of 117 degrees, over closed areas and military installations.)

"Give General Melnikov the phone."

"Sergey Igorevich. Kromin. I was just speaking with the pilot, who has landed. Well, he says: 'I passed by it at 700 m. A YaK-12 type.' That's what he said. Light-engine... It is so hazy... He didn't see identification markings."

"The target is being tracked stably..."

"Timokhin, please. Comrade General! How are you! General Kromin. Yevgeniy Leonidovich! This object which we have been tracking for two and a half hours fell... Everything I could. We observed it three times on radar. We observed it once visually. According to the pilot's report, it is allegedly an aircraft resembling a YaK-12. But this is unlikely... What should be said? Frankly, I cannot say anything."

"Moscow District now is again tracking this target with one radar company... Now, honestly speaking, it seems to me that this is some kind of sounding balloon, because I (Kromin—O.M.) doubt that an aircraft can stay in the air that long."

You read the stenogram of the conversations and you marvel: "I don't understand," "unlikely," "I cannot do anything," "it seems," "I doubt"... Just how can one explain such uncertainty? A specialist was obligated to know the characteristics of similar types of aircraft. Now it is already no secret that a Cessna is capable of flying even eight hours, covering up to 1,500 km. The fact is, this aircraft of American production was manufactured from 1955 to 1986, and it is popular among pilots. It is easily controllable, which permits a Cessna to fly at treetop level. A landing roll of 150 m is enough for a landing. So was Senior Lieutenant Puchnin's report really not enough for decisionmaking?

Here is the finale of General Kromin's conversations with the superior commander:

"...Almost three hours, Yevgeniy Leonidovich. Where did he come from?... Comrade General, I understood... Yes sir."

"Well, let's take another careful look at this... Who could release a sounding balloon in this area? Perhaps some old woman, perhaps the infantry. You should have noticed it earlier..."

On receiving the intruder report, Major General Kromin became confused. Most likely, insufficient experience told, for in the years of the "experiment," as fate and circumstances caused by the general discharge of specialists to the reserve willed it, he was among those fortunate ones whose career made a swift takeoff. In eight years Kromin covered four career steps while simultaneously managing to finish the General Staff Academy.

"...Not having made any decision, Kromin reported the Cessna to the Moscow Air Defense District and to the Air Defense Forces central command post operations duty officer, but as a simple violator of flight procedures, i.e., as a Soviet sports aircraft that took off without a preliminary flight plan.

On receiving the report, Major General S. I. Melnikov, the central command post operations duty officer, was about to report it immediately to the commander in chief, but dawdled. And then he forgot, although Koldunov was at the central command post twice that day and asked about the air situation..." (SOVETSKIY VOIN, No 7, 1990).

The commander in chief just did not find out up to the end of the day that an intruder aircraft had been over our territory for several hours already. Moreover, when the target was near the capital, Melnikov gave the command to remove this target from notification to the central command post. He thereby gave the Cessna a green light onto Red Square.

From the testimony of Witness I. P. Novikov: "...In the situation of 28 May 1987, with a careful analysis of the situation—detection of the target 15 km from the state border over the Gulf of Finland and proceeding from it into the interior of USSR territory at a speed of 180 km/hr...—they should have classified it as a state border intruder and acted against it as specified by guidance documents."

From materials of the criminal case it is clearly apparent that the Cessna was tracked stably by radars for a long time, it was observed visually, and then it was lost, allegedly because it fell. And soon they detected it again.

One more mysterious episode!

If the reader recalls, Timm, a correspondent of the journal BUNTE (FRG), made a flight in a sports aircraft to the zone bordering the USSR along the route which M. Rust flew. Here are a few conclusions at which he arrived:

"The aircraft took off from Helsinki at 1215 local time (one hour difference from Moscow—O.M.). It landed in

Moscow at 1930. This means that it flew for 6 hours 15 minutes. In Moscow Rust said: 'It took me five hours nonstop.' What did he do for the remaining 75 minutes?.. Why was it necessary for Mathias Rust to make an intermediate landing?

To change clothes? At the moment of the takeoff from Helsinki Rust was wearing jeans and a pilot's green shirt. On landing in the Red Square area he was wearing a red flight suit. An intermediate landing also could explain the fact that there was a portrayal of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima on Rust's aircraft in Moscow which was not on the tailplane when he took off from Helsinki."

Then why did neither General Kromin nor Melnikov, the duty general at the Air Defense Forces central command post, not take into account the fact that there was most likely a landing and not a fall of the target, as Kromin stated in his report?

Too many paradoxes; although, as the procurator emphasized, even the approach of a fast fighter could reduce a sports aircraft to dust.

When I had occasion to be witness to a conversation of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents with the pilots soon after Rust's overflight, a phrase sank into my heart: "If I could have presumed that this what-not would land on Red Square, I would have killed Rust without any command. Then let them put me behind bars and discharge me from the Army... And now what? We go around humiliated from bottom to top..." And if memory does not betray me, these words were said by pilot Senior Lieutenant Yegizaryan, who twice detected the target with onboard radar and closed with it, but he simply was not permitted to execute a combat mission, and because of this he does not quite feel himself.

I foresee some reader's indignation: Why stir up the past, why blacken the Army with your own hand? No, and no again! Truth cannot be slander; truth can only be a cleansing, otherwise we will stumble for the umpteenth time without having learned lessons from the "Rust affair."

I recall on this score a meeting of the Moscow Air Defense District party aktiv in June 1987. The principle of collective irresponsibility, overbearing dressings-down, ostentation... Stagnation in the organization of combat training. Training is being conducted primitively... Participants of the aktiv had occasion to hear about all this.

That was the case three years ago. And how do things stand now with combat training in the units for which Major General Kromin is directly responsible? What has changed? Have the synopses begun to be practiced more conscientiously? Or have they returned to the long-lost physical form? I will cite one fact. Last year a Ministry of Defense commission gave an extremely low evaluation to the level of combat training in a number of military collectives subordinate to Major General Kromin.

And alert duty? On the whole, good; in particular, not very. There are examples of negligence and professional incompetence.

Here are two brief reports by a tactical control officer from a deciphering of a tape recording: "Searching..." and "Target not detected..." Just how did it turn out that combat capabilities of equipment and weapons were not used to the maximum? But when the culprits were given disciplinary and party punishment, the steps taken seemed to some to be too severe: Is the price of a missed target not too great?

As V. I. Lenin wrote, the authority of military personnel is undermined not by the one who points out harmful extremes and performs a correction of them, but by the one who resists such correction. Some are resisting, such as Major General Melnikov, former operations duty officer of the central command post. It is not apparent that this party member/leader drew conclusions after that fatal day. To the contrary, more and more often he allows failures in his work. According to coworkers, he has become rude with subordinates, has accused them unjustifiably of negligence more than once, and has tried to shift the blame to them for his own errors, plus in addition to all that, he committed an abuse of office and a violation of financial discipline. But to this day Melnikov holds a responsible position and is in charge of people. What is this, an official invulnerability syndrome?

It turns out that the Rust matter was not enough to dot all the "i's"? Not days, but years showed that little has changed for the better during this time. And where is the guarantee that history will not repeat itself?

It has been calculated that pressure on the Soviet air border has approximately doubled following the events of 28 May.

Dozens of violations of procedures for using USSR air space are registered practically every day. These include flights without flight plans and late reports through operational channels about an aircraft's takeoff.

So as not to make unsubstantiated statements, I will cite data as of April 1988. Hundreds of violations of procedures for using USSR air space were registered during the previous ten months. The primary "depositors" were civil aviation with 52 percent, the Air Force with 43 percent, and others including aircraft of the Border Guard Troops 5 percent. Statistics confirm that almost all are the result of negligence by flight personnel and unconcern by ground control services. Unfortunately, such facts rarely become the property of glasnost. An exception probably is the case where an uncontrolled military aircraft was in the air space between Chelyabinsk and Ufa at an altitude of 8,000 m for 1 hour 13 minutes. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA wrote about this. The AN-12 was outside the field of view of three air traffic control centers and three air defense posts at the same time. The question automatically arises: In general, how can it happen that a quarter of a century ago Powers

was fixed almost in the stratosphere using previous equipment, while an AN-12 which could have been viewed through binoculars was not detected by present technical equipment? We talked about this with Colonel G. Bramnik, command post operations duty officer.

"The main reason, in my view, nevertheless does not lie in the people, although I will not conceal that we essentially did not take the human factor into account until recently. Only after Rust did the attitude change radically toward questions of professional training of all combat team members, especially operations duty officers. Before this people often were assigned to positions as tactical control officers who had not proven themselves in other positions. It was not by chance that many were removed from alert duty and transferred to other less important sectors during performance appraisals.

"But something else troubles me more. We need more sophisticated automated systems with quality objective monitoring and prompt information analysis, but for this we need additional funds and a specific, scientifically developed program. We need a more precise system of reports and more sophisticated communications. For now we are getting by with the antediluvian telephone set. Just try to maintain if only periodic contact with the lowest-level subunits with our communications channels."

So just what has changed since Rust? Take just the work against small, low-altitude targets. Have obstacles been removed from the path of independent activity of operations duty officers and commanders? And has the procedure for searching for low-flying targets by sectors and by types of radars with subsequent data processing by the command post team been rehearsed in practice? Perhaps qualitatively new analyzers have come to our help? And while I was heaping questions on my companion, a nearby officer intervened in the conversation: "Nothing has changed; it has gotten worse, for the equipment has aged even more in three years."

"That is how it is in principle," emphasized Grigoriy Zelmanovich. "The equipment rather often lets you down." The only thing we have achieved is initiative in decisionmaking. The obstacles really have been removed. True, some tactical control officers and even commanders

simply have proven not to be ready for such a free search for necessary decisions and do not burn with desire to take a certain degree of risk. Of course, the practice of past years, when initiative could come only down from above, still makes itself known here. And many officers not only got used to this principle, but by such arguments even concealed their inability to act competently and imaginatively."

It probably can be said without exaggeration that self-control, mobility of tactical thinking, and a keen sense of what is new are needed here like the breath of life, for a decision often is produced under conditions of considerable vagueness of initial data. Here is an example. On receiving alarming information, the operations duty officer immediately reported "upstairs," as is proper, although he himself had not yet clearly come to know the particulars. Here is where the most unpleasant thing begins. There are calls from all sides: "What do you have there? What is the decision?" But what can the decision be if the superiors themselves do not allow you to detail all elements? And so you think once again: Is it worth it to report? Again a "scissors"! For guidance documents state that there must be an immediate report, even if the target is false.

But with regard to low-altitude targets, I will say only one thing—everything has remained the same. Their detection and tracking is considerably complicated without the application of special measures. A target blends with ground features and becomes difficult to discern. It is impossible not to take into account a number of features: the screening angles and lesser detection range of radars and the target's limited presence in the radar coverage.

And the last thing. On 9 June of this year at 1432 hours a sports aircraft (a Cessna, the very make that the not-unknown Rust used three years ago) crossed the USSR State Border at low altitude over Black Sea waters. It made a brief landing at Batumi Airport at 1435. The pilot tossed flowers and a letter to the ground, from which it appears that he was Hans Ulrich Schneider from the FRG. The aircraft departed our air space at 1441... One more bitter lesson...

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Specifications of 'KIROV' Class Cruisers

91UM0460A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 11, Nov 90 p 15

[Unattributed article entitled: "Ask—We Answer":
"KIROV", 'FRUNZE', 'KALININ').]

[Text] In "VZ" No. 7 of 1989 we published a note on the nuclear guided-missile cruiser [CGN] Kirov and provided a drawing. Thereafter, several of our readers called us to account with the completely justifiable criticism that the TTEs [tactical-technical specifications (elementy)] were missing. Today that possibility has appeared and with pleasure we present to you the new class of Soviet ships: KIROV, FRUNZE, KALININ.

[Drawing labeled: "Nuclear Missile Cruiser" not reproduced.]

As already stated, these are nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers. Their displacement is—24,300 tons, dimensions—(length X beam X draught)—252 X 28 X 11 m. Full speed is—30 knots. Range and seakeeping capabilities are unlimited. Cruising capacity is—60 days. The crew is 610 men and 82 officers.

Weaponry: 20 missile system launchers (PU) for firing cruise missiles against naval targets; 12 medium range guided SAM system launchers; 1 twin mount [1X2] ASW missile system launcher; 2 medium caliber twin gun-mounts [2X2] and 8 small caliber single gun-mounts; 2 six-tube and 1 twelve-tube rocket propelled mortars [RBU]. A helipad is provided for. Electronic armament includes various types of radar, hydro-acoustic instruments and communications. Machinery is—nuclear.

For comparison—the TTEs of American CGNs of the Virginia class are: displacement—10,000 tons; dimensions—(length X beam X draught)—178 X 19 X 9 m; speed—30 knots; crew—472.

Armament: 2 quadruple-tube [2X4] missile system launchers for firing cruise missiles against naval targets; 2 twin [2X2] guided SAM launchers (also used for ASW complex as well); 2 single medium caliber guns (127-mm) and 2 six-barrel small caliber guns (20-mm); 2 three-tube torpedo launchers; two helicopters.

In all the US Navy (1985 data) operates 9 CGNs.

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"Patriot", "Voyennyye znaniya", 1990

Merits of 'Alagez' Rescue Vehicle

91UM0261A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article under "The Fleet Is Being Renewed" rubric: "'Anagez'—Supership or a Mistake?"]

[Text] With the arrival here, in the small bay of Uliss, of the new ship, the general purpose oceanic rescue vehicle

Alagez, it seemed that the bay became even smaller. This colossus filled everything with itself: its length is more than 150 meters, its width more than 20 meters, and its displacement is about 15,000 tons....

The ship has a great autonomy of navigation and is capable of searching for and recovering damaged ships and sunk submarines, of putting out fires, of providing ships and vessels in trouble with electric power, compressed air, water, fuel, freon, and foaming agents, and, finally, of carrying out deep-water dives and the work of divers at great depths.

Much of what is on the Alagez exists, as they say, in single units. This is also true on the first ship of this type, the rescue ship Elbrus. An example is the deep-water anchor system that makes it possible to employ four anchors at depths of up to 2.5 km. Or the steering system that gives the colossus the possibility of maneuvering in awkward inlets and narrows.

The Alagez has deep-water equipment intended for the rescue of the crews of sunken submarines, for searching for and raising different objects from the depths of the ocean, and for the performance of exploratory work.

So that the equipment can work reliably, the Alagez has the corresponding services and laboratories that perform specific tasks. Take, for example, the navigator's command department, which is commanded by Captain Third Rank I. Chektsov:

"Organizationally my command department differs from analogous subunits and warships as well as many rescue ships. We have a laboratory group that includes an engineer-oceanographer. This subunit carries out rescue work, studies the shelf, and monitors its development in the scope of U.N. decisions. We are capable of carrying out different hydrological work and of fulfilling the orders of scientific institutions and organizations...."

At first glance, then, the Alagez is a real gift to the navy. But let us listen to what crew members are saying about it.

"The Alagez has had a difficult fate," thinks Captain Third Rank Yu. Aleshin. "It was under construction for a long time and it was difficult to put together the collective. We had to wait a long time for the passage home from Sevastopol to Vladivostok. Finally we executed an interfleet passage and understood that no one was waiting for us.

"We are still in an awkward place and do not have a shore fuel supply. For water and fuel, they chase us around the bays and inlets like an ordinary tugboat. We are not performing any major tasks and are just waiting for something to happen. Is this why they built a supership? The people are nervous and are leaving the ship. But for us, good specialists are worth their weight in gold. For they are the guarantee of our own safety and that of the people from sunk or damaged ships."

Many other members of the crew expressed themselves in the same vein. In their opinion, the Alagez is an extremely complicated scientific-technical complex intended for the performance of many extremely important and crucial tasks that has not received even that share of the attention of the command that ordinary new ships receive. And this is despite the fact that they require a special relationship. By all appearances, the navy was not prepared to accept such a ship.—Lt. Capt. A. Ivanov, Vladivostok.

Our correspondent appealed to Capt. First Rank N. Koloskov, deputy chief of the Search and Rescue Service of the Navy, with the request that he comment on this material and respond to the questions of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Koloskov] Yes, the navy was indeed unprepared to accept the Alagez. By the way, this has already become a bad tradition here: when they go into operation in the navy and reach the points of permanent basing, the new ships and vessels often find that the conditions of basing lag far behind the necessary level. But I would not want to develop this idea at this time, for much has been said about this.

I know the Alagez rather well. I was directly involved in the completion of the crew for it and observed how the final construction work proceeded. And I will say frankly that I consider the building of such a ship to be a mistake. This is a great failure of our designers, project planners, and those who conceptually determined the given direction of the shipbuilding program.

In the first place, the idea of developing a general-purpose rescue ship was an error. Today we are not in a position to realize it for organizational as well as technological reasons. The Alagez was planned in the 1960's and 10 years passed between the delivery of the leading ship of this project, the Elbrus, and the delivery of the second. Even today, however, we are continuing to stuff it with armament and technical equipment practically identical to what is in the first. As a result, the Alagez is now capable of performing only one function at 100 percent, as they say, and that is to carry equipment for underwater investigations and to search for and rescue submarine crews.

Secondly, the Alagez turned out to be such that its parameters complicate the performance of the tasks facing it. The rescue ship has large developed superstructures, that is, a large area exposed to the wind. It has, as they say in the navy, a significant roll but no provision has been made for active stabilizers. And now imagine what it means to lash such a colossus to a ship that has suffered an accident.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Nikolayevich, knowing that the Search and Rescue Service of the Navy nevertheless needs strengthening, I will suggest: Instead of the Alagez, you obviously would prefer to obtain two or three smaller but more necessary ships?

[Koloskov] I will say frankly that there are many problems with the force composition and technical state of the ships and vessels for naval search and rescue operations. More than half of the ships and vessels have exceeded the established period of service but continue to be used.

In my view, the following measures are necessary. In the first place, review the plans and programs for the construction of vessels for the Search and Rescue Service, stop the building of "general-purpose" ships, and give preference to the development of specialized ships. The navy is not interested in the building of "miraculous giants."

Secondly, it is necessary to make more active use of surface warships and auxiliary vessels in remote zones for the accomplishment of search and rescue operations. For this purpose, they should be equipped during their voyages with transportable diving, firefighting, towing, and other modules and it is necessary to attach groups of specialists from units of the search and rescue services of the fleets.

Thirdly, multipurpose submarines may be used to carry out tasks in the rescue of the crews of submarines lying on the bottom. After redistributing resources, it is necessary merely to construct underwater rescue equipment that can be transported by motor vehicles and aircraft and that could be coupled with carrier submarines. The use of such systems has proven very successful in the practice of foreign rescue services and permitted them to save significant resources.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Must it be assumed that these proposals are only part of a well-conceived program for the restructuring of the Search and Rescue Service of the Navy or will it be proposed to the leadership for review?

[Koloskov] Yes, we are preparing a brief but very saturated report on this question for the coming meeting of the military council of the navy. We think that it will meet with understanding and the military council will take decisive measures to raise the effectiveness of the search and rescue operations of naval forces.

Warrant Officer Complains of Poor Habitability in New Ship

91UM0261B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain Third Rank V. Kondriyanenko: "They Forgot About People"]

[Text] A few months ago, Warrant Officer Yu. Vishnevskiy shared some good news with me: his long-time dream has finally come true—he was assigned to a new and up-to-date ship. Some time later, however, the enthusiasm of the warrant officer was noticeably diminished. The reason is rather banal: living conditions on the ship are abysmally bad.

The warrant officer related that the project planners, in their concern about stuffing the ship full of up-to-date equipment, "forgot" about the crew. For the sailors do not live in the compartments for just a day or two but permanently.

I also visited the new ship. The ship is now undergoing tests, so any modifications are unrealistic. The living conditions are indeed depressing. There is no steam boiler and no provision is made for an electric preheater. And this means that the sailors cannot wash or do laundry. Especially since the supply of fresh water is extremely limited. The sailors' lockers are so small that there is practically no place to keep clothes in order, not to mention the stowing of military clothing in accordance with regulations. The representatives of the planning organization, to whom the crew made their complaints, just shrugged their shoulders, as if to say: that is none of our business, for we just fulfill the order. Only this does not make it any easier on the seamen.

A similar ship has been laid out at one of the ship-building yards and its crew is being formed. Perhaps it is not yet too late and the project planners will think about those who have to operate the new ship.

Reader Inquiry on SU-24 Crash Near Sweden

91UM0261C KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Malyshev by Colonel A. Manushkin; date and place not given: "Was There a Disaster in the Baltic?"]

[Text] On 8 January, the television program "Vremya" reported on the crash of the Soviet military aircraft SU-24 in the Baltic Sea near the coast of Sweden. At the same time, the mass media reported that members of the crew survived. What happened in the skies over the Baltic? Why were the pilots picked up by Swedish rather than Soviet rescuers? Our correspondent, who visited the command post of the unified state air search and rescue service of the USSR, asked the shift chief, Colonel V. Malyshev, to answer these and other questions from readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Malyshev] These were ordinary training flights during the day under regular weather conditions. Two aircraft were over neutral waters at approximately the same distance from the Swedish and Soviet coasts (about 85 km). The deputy squadron commander was flight leader and the echelon commander was wingman. At 15:56, the crew members of the following aircraft, Military Pilot First Class Capt. A. Popov and aircraft navigator Capt. A. Bryukhovitskiy, reported a fire on board and ejected. The water temperature was plus 3 degrees and the waves were one and one-half to 2 meters high.

With the distress signal, an aircraft and a helicopter were dispatched to search for the crew.

[Manushkin] Nevertheless, it was the Swedes who rescued our crew.

[Malyshev] The fact is that the aircraft could only locate those in distress. And the helicopter flying to the site of the disaster had to cover a distance of about 280 km. A Swedish rescue helicopter from the island of Gotland covered about 120 km.

[Manushkin] Is anything known about the state of health of the crew members? After all, they spent more than an hour in the baptismal font....

[Malyshev] That is right. They raised Popov from the water at 19:10 and Bryukhovitskiy at 19:29. They were evacuated to the Swedish air base at Visby and were given first aid. Our information is that the state of their health is no cause for concern.

And a final and, in my view, important refinement to the report of the "Vremya" program on the disaster. In the case at hand, there was a mishap of an SU-24 aircraft of the air forces of the Baltic Fleet. Disasters are defined to be flight events that result in the loss of crew members. As they say, all is well that ends well.

Call to Avoid Reductions in Naval Engineering Education

91UM0272A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Reserve Captain First Rank B. Zinovyev, candidate of Naval Sciences: "Military Reform: Problems and Proposals": "Lessons of the 50's—We Cannot Forget Them Today As We Implement the Reorganization of the Military School"]

[Text] In connection with the military reform one hears more and more about the events of the end of the 1950's when a significant personnel reduction took place in the USSR Armed Forces. At that time not only the officer corps of the army and navy was reduced, but also the number of those who wanted to pursue an officer's career. By 1960, of naval educational institutions alone, 45% of higher schools for command and engineering, all middle technical schools, and the sole naval political school had been disbanded. One Naval Academy was established instead of two. The structure and specialization of the remaining educational institutions changed substantively as did the overall concept of training specialists, taking into consideration the qualitative rebuilding of the naval forces, armament, military technology, and new requirements for the professional training of fleet officers. In addition, a number of policies on the training and education of future officers remained poorly thought out. For example, subjects designed specifically for shore duty in the VMF [Navy] completely disappeared from lesson plans. Shore units need armament engineers as much as they need air, but even up to the present not a single school is training them (before 1960 there was a Higher Naval School (VVMU) for armament engineers). However, the prevailing

opinion still holds that a military engineer with a broad area of specialization should know everything. As a result, the navy gets a "medium" specialist who is not capable of working on a high professional level.

Or, another example. Having increased the training time for specialists in command schools from four to five years and having changed the schools to command-engineering, many people thought that the problem of training highly qualified military engineers had been resolved. But instead, the graduates of these schools are forced to "complete their training" when they are already assigned to a unit.

Among the higher naval schools disbanded at the end of the 50's were unique schools for training and education: the VVMU for armament engineers, mentioned above; the Second VVMU for submarine navigation; the Higher School for Naval Shore Defense; and the Higher Naval Engineering-Technical School. When they were disbanded there was an irretrievable loss of not only training and housing facilities and a wonderful laboratory base, but more importantly, experienced instructors were either discharged early into the reserves or transferred to other places.

It is really necessary now for the Navy to have one higher naval aviation school of its own, with command and navigation departments. Taking into consideration the specific nature of the combat duty of naval aviation before the 1950's, the navy had several of its own aviation-technical schools even though at that time it had no ships that carried aircraft.

Not only disbandment, but also planned dislocations of educational institutions in peacetime may lead to a sharp decrease in the quality of training specialists. Thus, in the mid-70's a phased transfer was planned and implemented, whereby only one department was transferred from the Leningrad group of military higher educational institutions [VUZ] to another large seaport city where training and housing facilities had been previously built. Under these new conditions, however, it took more than ten years just to work out the elementary organization and the system for training specialists for the department. And this system was not worked out in some "desolate place," but at a base that already had one of the schools. But during all these years, members of GEK [State Examining Board] went along with the sharp reduction in the level and quality of specialist training.

When there is a personnel reduction in the Armed Forces, one can cut apart and melt down ships, tanks, and aircraft, and destroy all that was old, and then create new armament. It is more complex to do the same with an organism such as a VUZ. After all, the point is that when a military VUZ is disbanded, a school for training specialists is destroyed. This is a school that determines the level and quality of the professional suitability of its graduates: This is a system of training, and methodical skills of instructors, and much more, all of which form the features of every school. And as experience shows,

much of what was "abolished" before may again be needed, even though in a different way (I can judge this with a sufficient degree of competence after twenty years' work in VVMU departments and in the headquarters establishment).

How, then, within the framework of reductions, can we preserve these unique schools for training specialists? As far as I can see, there are all sorts of possibilities. It would make more sense not to disband these military schools, but to maintain them with reduced staffs. After all, we had schools which had no more than 500 students, and they were justified by the high quality of their graduates. In addition, using these schools as a basis (and not half-amateurish, as at present), reserve officers could also be trained. One can also think about "conversion" of military educational institutions to train specialists required in the civilian world. If this problem is worked out in greater detail, other possibilities could be found for preserving the scientific potential of military schools. The purpose is not to destroy an already existing system for training cadres, but to develop it in accordance with the needs of the Armed Forces, as well as other branches of the national economy.

SU-27 Lands Successfully on 'Kuznetsov'

91UM0385A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel (Res) P. Maslov: "Cruiser Receives Airplanes"]

[Text] As has already been reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, on 20 January the Navy flag was solemnly raised on the Heavy Air-carrying Cruiser Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov. Our fleet was enlarged by the latest combat ship, on which for the first time in the history of the fatherland's carrier construction the horizontal method of aircraft landing and takeoff from the deck using a ski-jump ramp was successfully implemented.

The cruiser accommodates and supports the combat operation of the latest Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters, produced in a naval variant and possessing supersonic speed, modern armaments, and a wide radius of action.

...Test pilots of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry were the first to try out the deck of the air-carrying cruiser. After them, their colleagues took their places in the cockpits of the fighters—military pilots Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel V. Kondaurov and Colonels Yu. Semkin and V. Rossoshanskiy. By now the naval pilots have already made dozens of takeoffs and landings.

The path of Colonel Yuriy Aleksandrovich Semkin to this memorable flight was long and difficult. For several months there had been painstaking practice of all the elements of takeoff and landing on the ground analog of the deck. Special attention was paid to the final approach. It is necessary to precisely enter the "beam" of the optical landing system, which essentially leads the

plane to a given point on the landing deck. This allows the pilot to catch the special hook of the fighter onto one of the cables strung across the deck. This was when experience in working with VTOL aircraft came in handy for Colonel Semkin. Leading test pilots of the OKB [Experimental-design Bureau] imeni P. O. Sukhoy helped him with their advice. And indeed, the Su-27 aircraft itself seemed to follow the military pilot's wishes, so successful were the aerodynamic and maneuver characteristics of the combat aircraft.

When the decision was made for practical landing on the deck of the cruiser, no one doubted successful accomplishment of the flight assignment. Nonetheless all who had the good fortune to be witnesses to the event were very excited, and only Yuriy Aleksandrovich remained unflappable as always.

He is already in his bright orange naval rescue suit. The doctors have attached sensors of special apparatus to the pilot's body to record physiological parameters. At this stage of assimilation of the aircraft and deck it is a necessary procedure. You see, for the time being landing on a ship "airplane-style" may still boldly be classed as a super-difficult task.

I watch the chief designer of the Su-27, K. Marbashev, go up to Colonel Semkin. He speaks a few parting words and touches him lightly on the shoulder: "I wish you success, Yuriy!" The roar of the ignited engines block out all noise and talk. A swift takeoff run and the plane, rising from the ground "deck," sets a course for the sea, where the cruiser is preparing to meet him.

The radiotechnical systems of the cruiser set the plane on a bearing for the ship. Colonel Semkin begins the descent, then makes several passes over the deck, lightly touching it with the wheels of his landing gear. Here it becomes clear that it was impossible to fully simulate all the features of a real deck with the ground analog: the ship runs strictly toward the wind, and the landing deck is set at some angle to the axis of the cruiser. Because of

this the pilot has the impression that he is approaching the ship "sideways." Indeed, this takes a lot of getting used to.

Finally the training approaches are over. The order goes out over the ship loudspeakers: "Attention! Raise cable! The next aircraft approach will be a landing!" The services which operate the braking system set the tension of the cables to correspond to the landing weight of the aircraft. Colonel Semkin makes the traditional "landing pattern" about the cruiser and begins the approach.

"You are in the yellow beam!" the visual approach controller advises the pilot. There is a slight movement of the rudders and a change in engine thrust. "You are in the green beam!" means that he is right on the glidepath. Final seconds before landing. "Passage of stern normal!" In an instant the plane is hooked on the cable. The braking is energetic, but without a jerk. Stop! Several tens of meters from the nose of the fighter the deck stops, and beyond it the sea heaves as far as the horizon.

After a short break Colonel Semkin again takes his place in the cockpit of the Su-27. Like a blue bolt of lightning his plane flashes over the deck of the cruiser and departs for its element—the Fifth Ocean.

Thus the readiness of all cruiser systems to receive fighters has been confirmed, and the correctness of the chosen methods of training the pilots for a difficult operation like an airplane-style deck landing has been tested. For the present of course it is only within the capabilities of aces like Cols. Yu. Semkin, V. Kondarov, V. Rossoshanskiy... After a time young naval pilots too will confidently land on the cruiser. The air-carrying ship has been christened.

Now a large group of young pilots are undergoing training to learn how to land on the ground analog of the deck. As in any new business, not everything is going smoothly. But this is correctable, and in the near future the heavy air-capable cruiser Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov will depart for the ocean expanses in full combat readiness.

Adm Panin on Career, Military Reform

91UM0407A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 8, 23 Feb 91 p 8

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA interview with Admiral V.I. Panin, first deputy commander in chief of the Navy and chief of the Military Political Directorate; place and date not given: "Today Is Army and Navy Day—Democrats Are Not Born"]

[Text] The regular Soviet Army and Navy Day anniversary served as the reason for this interview with the person bearing the same last name as a film hero. But our life became the theme, and through this indispensable occasion, the task. For its transformation is ardently desired not only in the exasperated lines, but also in such major working offices as the office of Admiral V.I. Panin, chief of the Main Political Directorate and first deputy commander in chief of the Navy.

[Correspondent] Vasilii Ivanovich, allow me at first to introduce you to the reader, and, to do this, explain how the film's Warrant Officer became a real Soviet Admiral.

[Panin] The question is unexpected, but, in my opinion, it is pertinent to today's democratic mood, but, at the same time, perhaps, it will help in some measure to respond to insinuations in the mass media that "he who lives free and easy lives happily in the land of Russia."

Thus, I, Panin, a three-star admiral, was born in a peasant's family. My father had a fourth grade education in a church parish school. In 1941, he went to the front and did not return. There were four of us in my 28-year-old mother's family. She did not have any kind of an education. And, to feed us, she worked in tree-felling.

In 1952, I was fortunate to be able to enroll in the Navy's naval infantry school, and afterwards I successively completed the Military-political Academy and the General Staff Academy. I spent my entire service in the Pacific Fleet. I spent a short time on the staff of the party Central Committee as an instructor on naval matters, then I was in the Pacific Fleet once more, and for the last four years I have been a member of the Naval Military Council. This is my service career. Now it is my life.

My family today consists of seven persons. A mother who is already 80 years old, the parents of my wife who are also that old, and a six-year-old granddaughter who cannot live with her parents on Kamchatka for reasons of health, and a daughter who is a student. My appointment and military rank pay is R700, plus my pension plan money—this is the family budget. And, finally, service privileges. This entails a car and a wooden dacha, built in 1945, for which I pay R600 each summer season.

[Correspondent] Now that the reader knows with whom we are dealing, it is a good time to get down to the questions around which passions are boiling, opinions are sparking, and the thunder of explosions can be heard. Especially since the reason for talking about the Army

and Navy is quite appropriate. In this connection, what do you think of the idea of the depoliticization of the Armed Forces?

[Panin] I could say that the decree of the President of the USSR on Reformation of the Political Organs of the Army and the Navy put an end to these disputes. But since you asked the question, it means that my personal point of view on this problem is of interest. Thus, what the chief of a specific political directorate thinks about this problem touches on his vital interests. That is a fact. The idea of depoliticization, even hypothetically, in my opinion, is impossible. And not for the reason that I am defending, as it is customary to say now, departmental interests. Because hiding behind this whip is nothing other than repoliticization, which can lead to an escalation of internal instability. And our own world today is already shakier than it ever was before. Take a look, civil war is breathing down our necks, and it has already singed the face here and there.

The polarization of political forces in society is already visible to the naked eye, but what has it led to? To instability. But then what, do the "depoliticizers" also want this course of things in the Armed Forces? I do not want to be an oracle, but this can lead to unpredictable consequences.

Depoliticization in the mouths of its supporters is presented as the main principle of democracy. They say, it is only freedom from politics that gives personal freedom. But, permit me, is such a declaration really not politics of a specific interpretation? But take today's so-called independent publications that proclaim themselves to be symbols of depoliticization. What, are they outside politics? But has anyone tried to publish views in these publications that differ with their own? This is an answer to the question of depoliticization.

Generally speaking, in order to grow into a democracy, it is necessary for us to overcome yesterday's state and to build a rule-of-law state. It is impossible to do this in a split second. Just as an adolescent, tormented by his own imperfection, cannot become an adult the next day, and just as we cannot step immediately from today's command-administrative system into a democratic society. Democrats, paraphrasing a well-known saying, are not born... And we cannot escape our adolescent age in the transition to democracy.

[Correspondent] The idea of depoliticization became a unique driving belt in the destruction of the glorious traditions in the Navy, one of which was the patronage of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] on behalf of the Navy and slogans for named ships. The drop in prestige in naval service also had an effect on the frame of mind of young officers, and applications requesting discharge began to appear. What do you think about this?

[Panin] This kind of problem exists. But it is less known that we also have a lot of applications from already discharged officers with requests to return to the service.

Then what is the reason for the desire of some officers to leave the Navy? This, if you wish, is a reciprocal reaction to persecution that is unprecedented in the history of our state, and indeed of other states, of the defenders of their native land.

The second reason of considerable importance in the vacillation of some young officers in selecting a life's career is the social situation. A lot was done recently by the Union Government and the Ministry of Defense to improve the life of servicemen. But all of the problems that have piled up over the years cannot be resolved at once.

A critical situation has developed in the provision of housing. It is time to stop just pretending that the Army and the Navy are the beloved child of the people. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the command authorities of the Navy are trying in this situation to ease the difficult social position of servicemen.

I have in mind recent decisions about increasing the age qualification and granting of privileges for enrollment in the Naval Academy, the retention of northern bonuses during temporary breaks in service in these rayons, and increasing payments in hard currency of up to 33 percent in the rate of pay for the period of long-term sea duty.

Of course, these measures are not sufficient to make the difficult work of sailors more attractive and prestigious.

[Correspondent] We have entered the last decade of the 20th century. It is especially significant for our Navy, as the 300th anniversary of its creation is approaching. I believe that it was in 1696 that the boyar дума passed a verdict that "there should be a navy," and Peter the First produced one. How are the continuers of the work of our forebears to respond to this event?

[Panin] First and foremost, we must remain the heirs and the continuers of our glorious naval traditions. A commission has already been established for the preparation of the 300th anniversary of our country's Navy; it is headed by Admiral of the Fleet Ivan Matveyevich Kapitanets, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy. It will be engaged in the material-financial support of the jubilee, and the work on it will involve not only the artistic and creative forces of the Navy, but we are also hoping to get the support and participation of the creative intelligentsia of the country.

We planned to erect monuments to Russian sailors wherever they died for the glory of the country and the Russian Navy.

In a number of other preanniversary measures, I note the publication of a 10-volume history of the Navy under the editorship of Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, Navy commander-in-chief. The first volume will appear this year. That briefly and very sketchily is the preparation for this anniversary.

Finally, using this opportunity, I want to extend greetings on this Army and Navy Day to all of those whose

youth and life have been associated with the defense of the country, and to those who continue this difficult and honorable watch.

Ministry Reform Concept 'Camouflage' for Rearmament

91UM0318A Riga ATMODA in Russian No 1,
15 Jan 91 p 6

[Article by Yuliy Solntsev: "Reorganization Is Not Yet a Reduction"]

[Text] On 19 October 1990, the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU D. Yazov, signed a document titled "A Concept of Military Reform." This was the first major plan for restructuring the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and it will soon be submitted for approval to a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In knowing the activities of this body, there can be no doubt that the program proposed by the minister of defense and running until the year 2000 will be approved. The introduction of this document provides a scientific analysis of the international situation of the Soviet Union and a forecast for the coming decade. It quite correctly points out that along with the disarmament of Europe, the military danger along the southern frontiers of the USSR has increased significantly. Such nations as Pakistan, Iraq, Israel and certain others are concluding work on developing their own nuclear weapons. The political processes occurring in the Arab countries provide every reason to assume that over the coming decade this region will not avoid military conflicts and into which other countries of the world can be drawn. The Iraqi aggression can serve as an example of this. All of this will directly concern Soviet Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and involve the nation's interests. In referring to these forecasts, the USSR Ministry of Defense in its program actually does not envisage a reduction in the size of the Soviet Armed Forces and consequently in the enormous military expenditures of the nation. In the clause which mentions the reduction in the size of the army there are proposals to remove the units of Civil Defense, the Railroad Troops and the construction units of the various Union ministries from its current structures. After this reorganization, the size of the Soviet Army, according to the plan of the USSR Ministry of Defense should be reduced to 3.0-3.2 million men. At present, the Soviet Armed Forces number 3,993,000 men. This reorganization is, in the opinion of D. Yazov and his team, a reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces. The references by the minister of defense to the number of aircraft, tanks, combat vehicles, infantry and so forth to be reduced is nothing more than a camouflaged plan for reequipping with new combat equipment, since in the place of the old types of military equipment to be destroyed, the nation's gigantic military-industrial complex will immediately deliver new more advanced types of combat equipment.

The concept also outlines certain new approaches in the manning of the troops. The period of regular service is to be shortened to 18 months in the ground forces and 24

months in the Navy. Alternative (labor) service is to be introduced for a period of three years. Under the USSR president, a special committee is to be set up for organizing and carrying out this service.

At the same time, it must be particularly emphasized that this concept does not contain even a hint as to the rights of the sovereign Union republics. This entire document makes no mention that the USSR is a Union state. The manning of the troops is to be carried out under an extraterritorial principle. Alternative (labor) service should be provided "at the major construction projects of the nation as defined by the USSR Council of Ministers." It is specially stipulated that the local authorities should not intervene into the procedure for the stationing of troop units on their territories. One is touched by the dim-wittedness of the military department on the question of a professional army. The program permits partial recruiting of troops by hire. But at the same place a table is given for the increasing cost of such an army. From this it follows that the maintaining of professionals will cost the state 3.3-3.65-fold more than at present. But the adjacent graph indicates that the salary for an ordinary soldier should be from 430 to 500 rubles [R] a month while the salaries of senior officers

and generals will be R950-1,100 a month. We might point out that a colonel in the Soviet Army currently receives from R500 to R550 a month. We cannot understand why he becomes abruptly (by almost two-fold) more expensive in a professional army. So these calculations do not appear very persuasive.

As a whole, the nation's military expenditures over the next decade will increase further.

In 1991, the Soviet Army will cost the state R122.46 billion. Thus, we for the first time have learned the nation's real military expenditures, although not completely. The figures do not include funds for the support of the troops of the KGB, the MVD as well as those units which the Ministry of Defense plans to eliminate. But M. Gorbachev at present does not have this money. After the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has allocated its budget to its own republics, krays and oblasts, the last financing source has dried up for the military. For carrying out the military programs, the president will have to carry out a decisive expropriation of the miserly budgets of all the Union republics, because Europe and the United States will scarcely provide help in maintaining the Soviet Army.

Volga-Urals Rear Services Chief on Transition to Market*91UM0262A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Trepalin, deputy commander for rear services of the district forces; date and place not given: "Entering the Market"]

[Text] In the districts and fleets, they are preparing the units and military structures for activities under the conditions of the market economy. These matters were examined recently at the assembly of the leading personnel of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces. Note was made of the active preparatory work being done in the Volga-Urals Military District in the transition to the market path.

The correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Lt. Col. O. Bedula, talked with Lt. Gen. A. Trepalin, deputy commander for rear services of the district forces.

[Bedula] Aleksey Semenovich, when, in your opinion, will market relations really begin to take hold?

[Trepalin] I would put it this way: the market is already breathing down our necks. Ranking personnel of the rear services are continually running into incipient market relations that are seeking stocks allocated by suppliers.

It is now important for us to devise a strategy for troop support under the conditions of the market and a mechanism for its realization. Certainly we have to increase agricultural production dramatically for the purpose of better satisfying the need of units for food products. We attach very great significance to the preparation of military cadres for the transition to market relations. And certainly the question of questions is that of social guarantees to military personnel and members of their families under market conditions.

To resolve these and other "market" problems effectively, we in the district staff are now establishing an economic group and commercial services are being set up in the garrisons.

[Bedula] Thus, the center will turn over to the district some of its rights and duties in ensuring the necessary deliveries. But is the district prepared for this—for decentralization and contractual deliveries under direct ties with ministries and departments, production associations, and enterprises?

[Trepalin] We have such ties but they too must be expanded and new ones need to be established more quickly. In so doing, as never before, there are growing demands on the strict observance of executive discipline, the fulfillment of contractual obligations, and the most rational use of physical and monetary resources. The territorial principle of troop support is being further developed. For this reason, the depots and warehouses of the district may very well accept requests from the troops and themselves send the orders to enterprises, paying for

them independently. I am certain that the territorial principle will free many specialists from routine matters for vital work.

But I will say something else. It is not yet possible to shift completely to direct ties with suppliers: there will be breakdowns in the still-weak market and this is impermissible for the vital activities of the troops. Most of the physical resources, equipment, food, personal items, and fuel and lubricants must come to the troops by way of state orders and centralized deliveries.

[Bedula] Still, troop support falls under uncontrolled prices. Where, in such a case, will the money come from?

[Trepalin] Of course it will be necessary to allocate additional monetary resources. But we too must be more diligent, put an end to laxity, and achieve very strict economy. The interaction between support personnel and the financial service must be closer and better conceived.

We are also proposing a significant increase in the receipt of money by rear services through the sale to the national economy of equipment and property that has exceeded its normal service life. Here I consider it necessary to review our relations with USSR Gosnab as soon as possible, to whom we are selling equipment and property at wholesale prices. It, in turn, resells the items at excessive retail prices. By selling equipment and property on a competitive basis, we will increase monetary receipts by 18 to 19 million rubles [R].

We are also planning a significant increase in the issue of consumer goods by institutions of the food and clothing services and also the organization of the issue of commodities by the repair shops of the fuel service.

A separate topic is that of the so-called virgin battalions. The existing practice, in which the harvest is essentially brought in through the means of the district and Ministry of Defense, must end. The economy needs equipment and people and they must enter into the necessary contracts.

[Bedula] In regard to the transition to the market, there will apparently also be a change in the organization of the protection of health. Will this not effect the preventive care and treatment of military personnel?

[Trepalin] So that this does not happen, I think that the medical service of the district must not only use budgetary funds but also attain much more independence than before. I see the solution to the question in raising the interest of medical workers in the results of their labor. We have many ideas in this regard.

Why, for example, does our medical service provide free medical care for patients from subunits of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB, and railway troops? Why should the corresponding departments not transfer the necessary money to the district? We are now raising the question of material incentives to military personnel

who look after their own health and do not ask for medical help for a period of, say, one year.

I also think that the establishment of medical cooperatives under general health institutions would improve their provision with equipment and would attract qualified personnel. It is essential to give the medical units more independence so that there would be a possibility of changing the personnel schedule depending upon the load and the prevailing nature of illnesses.

I personally am in favor of having officers and warrant officers pay for part of their treatment. To eliminate the squandering of medicines, they must be provided not free of charge but at full cost. In so doing, of course, provision must be made for the appropriate compensation.

[Bedula] And one can probably not get along without military trade in the structure of market relations either. How do you see its role for tomorrow?

[Trepalin] We have already begun to retrain personnel for work under the new conditions. Thirty three people have received instruction in central and local courses for the training of managers and another 76 specialists are finishing their training.

At the same time, assessments have been given on the possibility of more than 1,000 domestic trade enterprises working under market conditions. In connection with a significant reduction of centralized funds, we promptly reviewed all of the work of post exchanges and specific enterprises in the decentralized purchase of commodities. I must also say that a large number of the commodity experts of the directorate, post exchanges, and district and garrison stores, showing commercial initiative, are buying goods in different regions of the country under one-time agreements or barter deals and they then sell them to military personnel. It is planned that in 1991 this kind of purchases of commodities will amount to R130-150 million.

Of course we cannot get along without partial self-provision with products. It was for this purpose that the post exchanges came to possess 3,450 hectares of land this year. And to increase the number of swine dramatically, the trade directorate acquired lands and a swine-fattening complex for 1,000 head in Ulyanovsk Oblast. We are planning to build another such complex for 2,500 head not far from Kuybyshev.

We are now expanding the network of subsidiary farms and are increasing the capacity of military sovkhoses. We will sell part of the output to officers, warrant officers, and civilian employees of the Soviet Army at state prices. I think that this will interest the collectives of the units in the development of subsidiary farms.

And I would also like to say that we are beginning something new that is largely unknown. It is thereby very important to have political stability in the country, in the

Russian Federation, and in the union republics in whose territory the district is located. I believe in common sense and in our people.

Moscow MD Billeting Chief on Housing

91UM0271A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Major-General A. Groshev conducted by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik: "Social Panorama: Return to the Barracks—Monitoring the Housing Problem."]

[Text] Major-General A. Groshev, Deputy Commander of Military District Forces for Construction and Billeting of Troops, tells about how units returning from abroad to the territory of the Moscow Military district are taken care of with regard to working and living conditions, and billeting.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Aleksandr Ivanovich, how many personnel have already arrived and how is it going with their living and working conditions, and billeting?

[Groshev] Beginning with March of last year, dozens of trains have arrived with people, military equipment, and household goods. Specifically, one tank division from the Central Group of Forces has been assigned to us. Up to now the total is more than 13,000 persons, including over 3,500 families of officers and warrant officers. A special commission has been formed, headed by Lieutenant-General A. Golovnev, first deputy commander of Military District Forces, to take care of their working and living needs, and billeting. This commission is doing everything possible to receive people and equipment.

Thus, in garrisons where the tankers from the Central Group of Forces arrived, dozens of barracks for sergeants and enlisted men have been made ready in the shortest possible time, and warehouses and storage areas for equipment have been repaired. For temporary housing of officers and warrant officers several officers' dormitories and even barracks have been reequipped. Old houses and dormitories belonging to enterprises have been renovated, including those provided by the Nizhegorod Oblast Executive Committee.

But unfortunately this is, as they say, a drop in the bucket. There are already around 13,000 officers and warrant officers in the military district who do not have housing. And in the next year or two we shall have to billet another 2,000 families of servicemen who will arrive from abroad. A realistic look at their housing shows that they will return to the barracks (in 1990 alone, 24 barrack-type houses were renovated as dormitories).

The situation is no better for places in nurseries and schools for children whose parents have arrived from abroad. There are no fewer problems here. Just from families of tankers, 500 school-age children and over 700

pre-schoolers came here. It hurts to talk about it, but in many garrisons where servicemen's families came from abroad, children attend schools in three shifts, and each class has 40-45 pupils. It is obvious that the resources of the military district and even the Ministry of Defense cannot resolve these problems easily without immediate assistance from the government.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But the state program for social guarantees for servicemen and members of their families was passed just a relatively short time ago. What real benefit is the military district getting since its implementation?

[Groshev] Unfortunately, and I have to be forthright: This program exists thus far only on paper. But even when it was being studied in the USSR Council of Ministers, many of its provisions were emasculated and the necessary resources were cut drastically. I do not think that this program will go anywhere until a Union agreement is signed.

Judge for yourself. For this year we have been allotted only 44 million rubles to take care of working and living conditions for the troops of this military district, including those who arrived from abroad. We need at least 59 million for this. This does not even take into account the sharp price increases for building materials that have already come into effect. For this year the plan for our construction directorate has increased by one and a half times, and we have to assimilate more than one hundred million rubles for capital investment. How can we do this if not all the funds have been allocated and we do not have the resources, the sanitary-technical equipment, or the building materials. We are also short of qualified personnel. In a word, completion of the first quarter of this plan for guaranteeing housing for servicemen is on the verge of collapse.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The press announced that the government of the FRG has allocated 7.8 billion Marks for construction of housing in our country for families of servicemen coming from the Western Group of Forces. What will be done in the Moscow Military District within the framework of this program?

[Groshev] For this hard currency amount, before the end of 1994 the military district has planned the construction of five housing areas, including communication facilities and infrastructure—schools, nurseries, medical facilities, and shops. Specifically, these will be in Tambov, Kursk, in the Moscow area garrison of Kubinka, and in other places. But first of all, construction will begin in the Kaluga oblast of our military district, where 1,020 apartment units will be built.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Will the aid from abroad help solve the military district's housing problems?

[Groshev] Of course this aid will play a role. But primarily we have to rely on our own resources. I think that it is relevant to remind you of the huge debt for housing that local authorities are in no hurry to repay to the

district military units. First and foremost this applies to the Moscow Council, which every year cuts the number of apartments that were allocated to us by authority of the USSR Council of Ministers. There are also large debts owed by the oblast executive committees of Tver, Tambov, Smolensk, and other oblasts.

Briefly, in order to surmount the housing crisis, we need combined efforts, and here we are counting on specific, efficient assistance from authorities and administrative organs at all levels.

Soviets Unable To Compete To House Troops

91UF0495B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by I. Zhagel: "No Contest...for Soviet Builders Thanks to the Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] The other day "Vremya" aired a story about the 7.8 billion deutsche marks which the FRG allocated to help resettle the Soviet military families that are returning home from former GDR territory. During the TV interview a German banker expressed his regrets that Soviet building organizations had shown no interest in the lucrative bids which were to be paid for in hard currency. Most likely the major part of the residential construction program will have to be carried out by foreign firms.

Most TV viewers interpreted this, of course, as another example of our ineptness. The situation is not that simple, however, and here is the reason. A couple of days before the above-mentioned story was aired, several leaders of Soviet construction organizations called the IZVESTIYA office at the same time. Among them were people from Belorussia and the Ukraine. Their calls to us were caused by the 23 January issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which printed the tender terms according to which "German" construction bids would be distributed. Every caller said that the terms of the contest were such that practically not a single Soviet construction organization could obtain a contract.

The very first item of the tender terms sets a reservation: "The primary contractor should have not less than 10 years (!) of experience in civil and residential construction in a foreign country." This requirement, impractical or simply stupid for many Soviet organizations, could have been discounted as an incorrect translation of some other document that served as a basis for the tender announcement. However, there are too many such "incorrect" details in other items also.

For an explanation I approached A. Solunskiy, USSR Gosstroy [State Construction Committee] deputy chairman, who is also a deputy chairman of this program's special committee. There I heard some strange things:

"The terms of the tender were put together without our knowledge. Practically, the Gosstroy, and therefore

Soviet construction organizations, were removed from participating in the program."

But how could that happen? Who was writing the terms that were practically prohibitive for our, Soviet side? The same tender announcement lists the Ministry of Defense, the V/O "Soyuzvneshstroyimport," and the V/O "Tekhnosport" among its customers.

As for the latter two organizations, I do not think it will be a mistake to say that their well-being as intermediaries is directly proportional to the volume of contracts given to foreign firms. But why the does the Ministry of Defense like Western builders so much and so dislike Soviet ones?

The reason for the dislike is clear, however—dissipation of resources, too much time spent on construction. But let us be fair. Our long construction periods are often caused by the lack of funds, by the inferior quality of materials, and by the lack of sufficient equipment. That is what the German marks could be spent on. All the construction organizations of our country, by the way, spend an average of under \$100 million a year to purchase foreign-made modern machinery. You can

imagine how their potential might grow if they could receive at least part of the 7.8 billion deutsche marks.

This issue should be viewed from this particular angle for the single reason, at least, that if we spend the above-mentioned sum of deutsche marks we could provide housing only for one-sixth of all the military who need it. That is by no means a reproach to the German side—we have to be grateful for what they are giving. But it can serve as a reason to think how we could best utilize this aid.

It is clear that we do not just need some number of apartments; we need a powerful construction complex which would be constantly renewing our residential fund. What is more, many of our construction organizations are out of work now due to the lack of funds. Is this the time to send hard currency back, one may say, to other countries?

The intergovernmental agreements concerning the 7.8 billion deutsche marks did mention, by the way, that this money should stimulate the development of the Soviet construction industry. Who did not like these words? At what stage have they been lost? One would think that we ought to be given responses to all these questions.

Maj Gen Maslov Advocates Continued Conscription

91UM0246A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 90
(Signed to press 20 Nov 90) pp 22-25

[Article by Maj Gen K. Maslov, political department chief, under the "Military Reform: Problems and Opinions" rubric: "Who Is to Defend the Motherland?"]

[Text] Many civilian publications quite often raise questions pertaining to the Army: Why do our Armed Forces have a need for such a large number of nuclear weapons and, as a result, for everything that goes with them (equipment, people)? Just who is that insidious "potential enemy" that is made to appear as a bugaboo to frighten our soldiers? Finally, what kind of army do we require?

Well, the questions are serious, and, it seems to me, answers to them should be of like kind.

The writers argue thought that this is not the Middle Ages, a time when wars were started on the whim of a fair damsel. That they are unleashed to attain definite political, economic, and ideological goals. That one cannot say that the latter exist in any country in the world and that they will serve as a basis for a particular country to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR or invade our territory. On top of that, that our economy is falling apart and the people are at wit's end in their attempts to obtain sufficient food and shelter. That the West for the past few decades has been so obsessed with fear of the "Soviet threat" that the mere thought of the probability of war with us is enough to generate a sincere desire to struggle for peace throughout the world. There—so the writers believe—actually is no threat to our security. That today's Army is made of up nothing but an "oppressed, spineless, and passive officer corps that is indifferent to matters of the service, and of enlisted personnel who are spongy toadies, illiterate, and lacking in initiative; it is an army that is run by an "old clique of a military bureaucracy interested in maintaining the status quo," an army that is nothing but a burden to the working people, one that takes something for nothing and is not needed at all. It is true that the writers—the same ones who confess that their "heart skips a beat in their audacity"—then change their mind to admit that there is still a need for the Army, but it must consist of volunteers.

Now let us take a closer look.

Although the pressure of the ideas behind the new political thinking and the constructive peace-loving course followed by the USSR and its allies have reduced international tension somewhat, success in attaining irreversibility of the nascent positive trends has not yet been attained. Sources of military danger remain. This is attested to by Iraq's seizure of Kuwait. The U.S. continues to work on virtually all the military programs, improve all armed forces components, and increase the

combat capabilities of the latter. The NATO armies are being trained along the lines of doctrines which can hardly be considered defensive. Political and military leaders of the countries that are members of this bloc reaffirm in their statements their commitment to expand the military force. This is a reality that cannot be ignored. Is everyone aware of this? Hardly.

Some comrades, including certain USSR people's deputies, insist that only a volunteer army can be a panacea for dealing with all the troubles and can virtually automatically eliminate all the problems of our Armed Forces. They base this on the argument that "volunteer enlistment" offers the advantage of free choice, as opposed to compulsion; that the principle of social justice in the matter of defense of our Fatherland is nothing but a "good old levelling device."

A strange argument, to say the least. It would be interesting to know something: since when has the defense of the Motherland been a bad thing? What interests of which segments of the population are certain forces in our society attempting to promote by doing away with universal military service? Let us analyze these questions.

The country's 11th and 12th Five Year Plans saw the rise of serious difficulties in drafting sufficient numbers of conscripts into the Armed Forces. This was the consequence of the lower birth rate (due to the Great Patriotic War) and considerable rejection rate of youths on account of poor health. The political ambitions of certain leaders of the Baltic republics, Armenia, and Georgia played an unseemly role in the proclamations stating the possibility of performing service in the Soviet Army only within the borders of their republics.

The government decided to discontinue temporarily the granting of draft deferments—until 1990—to VUZ students engaged in daytime study. This was the latest attempt to assure social justice with respect to drafting of citizens.

However, this measure immediately caused fierce opposition on the part of a certain sector of the population, largely representatives of management, and of the scientific, creative, and technical intelligentsia.

Then a decree passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium restored the granting of draft deferments to students attending all daytime (full-time) VUZ's. At the same time, it was decided to issue reserve commissions to VUZ graduates who complete a course of study in military science departments without their being required to serve a tour of active duty. Thus, the majority of youths graduating from VUZ's are not drafted. (Bear in mind that males account for almost two-thirds of the total number of the country's VUZ graduates.)

If one realizes that the overwhelming majority of the country's VUZ students come from cities, where the level of education and training is incomparably higher

than in rural areas, social justice as it pertains to defending the socialist Fatherland suffers another blow and shows definite signs of bias.

Another factor to consider is that cities once more are the source of a significantly larger number of children from families of the intelligentsia, management, and service sector, compared to that of blue-collar families. In my opinion, there are grounds for the apprehension that the young generation of Soviet intelligentsia will in time be represented by insignificant numbers in the Army.

On top of that, there are scientists, even academicians and certain persons prominent in culture and art—note that these are persons at the highest level—who suggest that we more or less grant exceptions from compulsory military service to certain categories of youth (athletes, actors, musicians), substituting instead short-term military training sessions. They would also grant draft deferments to students attending *tekhnikums* who complete their secondary education prior to enrolling in the particular *VUZ*, and count the time spent in *DOSAAP* training as active military service. The question here is: Just who is to defend the Fatherland? There is no doubt that, on the threshold of military reform, there is a need to analyze the problems pertaining to supplying the Armed Forces with conscripts. And make the necessary decisions; write them into law. Failure to do so could result in serious omissions that would be reflected in national security.

It seems to me that the forthcoming military reform will also make a change in the situation that has come about in our officer corps. It is no secret that many good specialists, people who could be of use to the Armed Forces and the country, are leaving the Army. They refuse to put up with their present situation. They are carrying out a vitally important job—one that is needed by the people—but they are being vilified by various publications. It must be realized that the officer corps is not an abstract concept. It consists of real people who are known to be deprived of elementary social justice. Say what you will, but I tell you that riding the wave of *perestroyka* is a large number of persons only too willing to speak of the supposed privileged position of commissioned personnel who, according to them, live in grand style and just rake in the money. I have spent time visiting the families of officers and never did see any "money rakes." Could it be that they were hiding them? I tell you something else: The darkness of poverty is already falling on military personnel. The following is an excerpt from a letter written by a young officer serving in a unit.

"To get out of the service—that is my main purpose at present. I have not yet submitted my application, since my family and I have nowhere to go. Serving under these conditions makes me miserable. For working 12- and 14-hour days and 10 to 12 duty details a month I am paid

260 rubles. I cannot buy clothes for my wife. It is a shame. I cannot help my parents, who live on a pension. That is also a shame."

According to a survey of the social position of officers and their dependents carried out this year by the USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, this situation is not uncommon for the professional military. How could the material well-being of a Soviet officer (who is, after all, a government person) and his family compare with that of a person who works a normal workday and holds a generally easy job. Look at what was written to *PRAVDA* last year by an associate working in the A. Prokhorov Scientific Research Coal Deposit Geological Exploration Institute of Rostov-on-Don: "Our salaries were recently increased by 25 percent; on top of that, we all receive on a quarterly basis a bonus in the amount of five incremental increases. This year our work is not as good as last year's. We have not introduced new projects; discipline has deteriorated. For this we are paid 500 to 1,000 rubles a month." There is of course no need for comment.

There is a saying which I believe to be true: A country that refuses to feed its army will be forced to feed the army of an enemy. There are some people who take such a narrow-minded view of the sacrifices the Army makes that they not only fail to take note, but go so far as to downplay this. The services the man in uniform has rendered his people and his country, and his place and role in society, can be neither overstated nor diminished. History itself and every passing day bear witness to this indisputable truth.

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Warrant Officer Looks at Problems of Recruiting 'Professionals'

91UM0392A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 90
pp 7-10

[Article by Midshipman V. Maksimov: "Luring Them to Professional Status"]

[Text] Many questions have been aired in the press in connection with the military reform, including those about how warrant officers and midshipmen perform their service. Authors of published works are correct in writing about major shortcomings in organizing the selection, training, and service of this category of serviceman. But as a rule, it is for the most part officers who speak about this. In any case, I have never seen such articles signed by a warrant officer or midshipman. It is probably because many believe that it is easier to view things from the top. I am presenting my own point of view on this question, however, the point of view of a midshipman.

Having gone through the standard route to become a midshipman, called to active duty, training in the Navy's school for technicians, and service aboard a ship, I understood many of the problems that came up during this period. And these problems arise from the very start—during the process of selection for the technicians' school. The overwhelming majority of young fellows find out for the first time about the existence of schools for chief petty officers-technicians at the induction center, since these schools are training institutions of a closed type. The notorious system of secrecy does not allow conscripts to declare their intention to become warrant officers or midshipmen prior to their induction into the service. After all, military commissariats would be fully capable of dealing with selection to technicians' schools as well as, for example, to military academies. I am convinced that if this were the case, many would express their conscious desire to take the two-year training in technicians' school and receive a middle technical education by the time they finish.

In reality, though, as far as I know, selection takes place in a different manner. The representative of the technicians' school (TS), placed on special duty at the navy's induction center, is given the task: Select the number of persons needed in any way you can. And the representative "paints" pictures of golden mountains to the recruits, not worrying very much about the consequences, about which we shall speak later. Rather than, say, spending two years sweeping out below-deck or tightening ropes on the deck, it is better to become a student, learn and enjoy the sweet service, and later receive the equivalent of an All-Union diploma, shoulder boards, and a dagger. The third year is served as a midshipman, receiving good pay, and later everyone is free to decide whether to continue to serve or be discharged. Those who doubt their capabilities are assured, strange as it may seem, that training in a TS is not difficult; the main thing is not to violate discipline, and if training really becomes hard, active duty can be continued in the fleet. Does this sound tempting?

It is easy to picture the mental state of a recruit who simultaneously has collided with the realities of fleet life, received his first "lessons" from his seniors on the length of service, and here he meets the benevolent representative from the TS. The young sailor faces a dilemma: The frightening unknown of what lies ahead in his active duty or the absolutely definite promises of the officer. A certain portion of the recruits select the second. A rhetorical question: Under these conditions is a conscious selection possible?

After arriving at the technicians'school, midshipman candidates immediately see that life here is really not as sweet as had been depicted, and some submit statements right away about not wanting to study. But that is not the way it goes! It is more difficult to get out of here than to come in. As the chief of the technicians' school used to say when I was a student: "We do not have anyone who does not wish to study; we have those who wish to work." And in the course of three to four months, the persons

who, so to say, "do not wish," are actively used for every kind of housekeeping chore before they are sent back to the fleet. The rest of the students, seeing the examples that were set, come to the conclusion that it is not worthwhile to attempt to leave the ST right away, but to wait a year or two since this time is credited, anyway, toward completing one's term enlistment. In summary, then, during this training period, as a rule, more than one-third of all students are sent back to the fleet for gross violation of discipline, chronic lateness, or lack of desire to study.

Not surprisingly, many lose interest in study and in learning about their future speciality because of this kind of situation in the TS. If this were not enough, students learn about apparatus and equipment which has been retired from ships and no longer used in the navy. Study classes remind one of a museum of ancient technology rather than a scholarly office for learning a speciality. Classes are frequently disrupted due to various housekeeping duties. As a result, after two years of such study, midshipmen's shoulder boards are given to students, many of whom definitely intend to serve out their one year and be discharged into the reserves. But... "all kinds of midshipmen are needed." This is also from the arsenal of arguments of the TS leadership.

Midshipmen arrive at their designated place of service and are immediately confronted with new problems. Often it turns out that there are no vacant slots aboard ship in their specialty. Why not? Sometimes it happens that because there is a shortage of shipboard personnel for this category, vacant slots are filled by sailors having term enlistments. They work hard and not any worse than other technicians. The commander faces a choice: Let the sailor perform the duties of a midshipman or give preference to a graduate of the TS, whose low level of training is already known in advance? The result is often that the midshipman is given duty in a specialty far removed from that which he was taught, no matter how badly or poorly. And this means that the chief petty officer of the command element or the technician has to learn a new specialty from his own sailors. What kind of authority can he have in a case like this? It happens that a young midshipman is sometimes looked upon by sailors as a person who managed to evade the difficulties of a term enlistment. As a result, difficult relationships arise with subordinates, and even commanders and chiefs who are already used to constant turnover in this category of servicemen have the attitude of not paying the attention that they should to midshipmen.

Under these kinds of conditions, very few graduates of the TS have a normal progression in their service and stay in the navy. The others, feeling the senselessness of their service, begin to look for different ways to be discharged into the reserves. And here there are things going on that are embarrassing to even mention out loud. But, as they say, you can't get rid of the words in a song.

The problem is that the current Regulation on Performing military Service by Warrant Officers and Midshipmen of the Armed Forces of the USSR does not permit a midshipman to resign from military service voluntarily before his term enlistment expires. It is possible, of course, but only at the cost of discrediting his military position. Therefore, those who have made it their goal to be discharged into the reserves are forced to consciously, I repeat, consciously, carouse and be drunk all the time and violate discipline. On our ship, where a significant part of the crew is comprised of midshipmen, there are always three to five persons in the process, so to speak, of being discharged before their time is up. For various reasons, these persons do not wish to serve and say so, but there are no grounds for discharging them. The efforts of commanders to resolve this problem, however, culminates in all chiefs at all grades believing that it is better to discharge a midshipman for discrediting his position than to have someone who is a perpetual violator of military discipline and who, in essence, sabotages the fulfillment of his service duties. However, even here only extreme measures help. One midshipman-refusenik went on leave and did not return to his ship; another one jumped overboard right in his uniform and had to be saved; a third one, in a drunken state, counts the number of steps on a ship's ladder; a fourth one... Well, there are a lot of ways to show one's unsuitability for military service.

Being interested in this problem, I once spoke to a habitual refusenik, Midshipman V. Koltsov. He arrived at the ship in 1988 after having finished the Navy school for technicians. Until recently, he served conscientiously. Six months ago he got married, and his wife remained behind, at the other end of the country, in Sevastopol. In the first five years of service a midshipman is not authorized living quarters; therefore, living with his wife turned out to be impossible. And it was then that the young midshipman realized that he had made a mistake in choosing his career, and he had made his choice on the basis of what is described above.

Any sane person will understand that this kind of system of training and service for midshipmen is deeply flawed. But nothing has changed in this area in many years. Also, few midshipmen are satisfied with material conditions. It is logical to assume that if the government is not capable of providing normal working and living conditions, then there should be significant material compensation. For a while, at least, this should satisfy midshipmen and stop their departures from the navy. Young midshipmen, however, giving the best years of their lives to service aboard ship under special conditions and separated from their families, receive pay that is just barely higher than the median pay throughout the country. The recent pay increase in base pay for career servicemen was basically for officers. As before, a technician who is responsible only for materiel aboard ship and the chief petty officer of the command staff who is, in addition, responsible for personnel, both receive the same pay. And to boot, these two categories equalize the

conscientious and the negligent. Why could not commanders be authorized to use their monetary fund for discretionary allowances to reward the best midshipmen? At least this would get rid of this equalization.

A resolution of the problem of a just material reward for midshipmen who face their service duties conscientiously would undoubtedly increase the authority of the personnel aboard ships and the prestige of midshipmen's service. Every midshipman should be assured that after several years of hardship and deprivation, he will return home with, as they say, something to show for his troubles. Meanwhile, many are forced to leave the service because their material conditions cannot compensate them for those moral losses that they suffer.

I am convinced that sooner or later our military leadership will understand that the future existence of this system, to put it delicately, does not provide plus points for the navy's combat readiness. It is a pressing requirement in today's environment that during the process of military reform the opinions of those below be considered also, including midshipmen. Otherwise, old, moss-covered problems may remain in the professional army.

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Maj Gen Nikitin on Reforms Needed in Training Draftees

91UM0254A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Maj Gen V. Nikitin and Col V. Petrov, candidate of psychology, under the rubric "The Military Reform: Problems, Suggestions": "Revive Interest in the Service"]

[Text] Programmer With a Sledge Hammer; No One Wants to Be a Cog; According to Duty and to Abilities

Qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces, as we know, has been named as one of the most important focuses of the military reform. This is a general concept, however, and must of course be specifically defined as applicable to the various areas of military organizational development. This is especially important when it comes to the manning of the units, to the selection, distribution and training potential of the personnel. Here we find a total lack of refined criteria for organizing the practical work, quantitative indices predominate, and qualitative indices are used purely symbolically.

Quality indices as applicable to the individual draftee or serviceman should obviously mean his various personal merits (knowledge, skills, organizational and other abilities, professional interests, and so forth, acquired by the time he is drafted), which can be used during the stage of mastering a military specialty and in the subsequent performance of his service duties. It is impossible to realize these parameters without thoroughly studying the person's individual characteristics and taking them into

account for distributing and assigning the draftees among the military specialties and for organizing the practical job training of the servicemen. Nothing of the sort is done either in the military commissariats or in the units, however.

A study has shown that with the existing training periods for the military specialties, approximately 50% of the draftees are unable to master the NCO specialties well; 45%, certain types of operator specialties (in the Air Defense Forces, among others); 25%, the specialty of driver/mechanic. There are certain limitations on the level of development of psychophysiological features (hearing, sense of rhythm and so forth), which make it difficult to master the communications specialties. The future airborne trooper must have a certain basic level of toughness and development of his volitional qualities.

The contemporary youth beginning his service in the army or navy is to a great extent an already developed person with a certain level of education, self-awareness and preparedness to make decisions on his own. He ordinarily has job skills acquired at a school or special vocational and technical school or in industry. A total of 80% of the young replenishments entering training units, for example, have a civilian specialty. Furthermore, 60% of the draftees have specialties related to certain military ones. More than 30% have skills in organizational work acquired in training or production collectives, on athletic teams or in the process of public work. Not to take all this into account is to artificially nullify the draftees' capabilities and deliberately lower the quality of training for the military specialists.

Unfortunately, the overly simplified approaches taken to the placement of the young generation today are making us wasteful and incapable of using our main treasure, the abilities of the people entrusted to us, efficiently and thriftily. The current practice is literally peppered with cases of their ill-conceived retraining in the army and navy.

Motor-mechanic A. Krutykh, graduate of a naval school with seagoing experience, is training to be a PTUR [antitank guided missile] operator. Programmer V. Gushchin, is training to become a tank driver/mechanic; tractor driver and rated auto sportsman A. Kovalenko, commander of a mortar crew; sports parachutist 2nd rank A. Levus, graduate of a DOSAAF school and master of martial arts, a gunner.... And the occupational path taken by Pvt I. Romankin: acquired specialty of mechanic at an SPTU [special vocational and technical school], that of parachutist in DOSAAF, radar operator at a training center, and was assigned as a medical corpsman in the unit.

We know what an acute problem the army and navy have in training junior commanders. The existing service terms make it impossible to test the future commanders in the forces before sending them to training units. This means that more thorough screening is needed during the induction. Neither the military commissariats nor

the command elements of the training units are doing this, however. As a result even graduates of pedagogical schools, professional educators, frequently find themselves in purely technical positions.

What are the causes of these incongruities, and what would be the expedient way to eliminate them within the framework of the military reform?

Today only 9.3% of those engaged in the screening and efficient placement of draftees have the minimal training (at the level of the five day assemblies). The situation is the same at the district training centers. That is, the work of assessing the personal qualities of the people, which is extremely complicated and does not tolerate casual, nonprofessional treatment, is essentially performed by people lacking the proper training. In addition, it is done incidentally, with the possibility, a study has shown, of using no more than 10-15% of the service time. This gives rise to formalism in the study of the draftees and sometimes to simply absurd recommendations for their use.

"Where does the solution lie?" one asks. In the first place, in the improved conduct of methods classes in this subject for officers with the military commissariats and training units by the headquarters of the military districts as required by current normative documents on job screening. Today, however, these classes are interrupted more often than they are conducted. The situation is especially bad in the Kiev, Odessa and North Caucasus military districts. In the second place, we need to make more effective use of those numerous psychologists/specialists (psychophysicologists) presently working at research laboratories and on the main staffs of branches of the Armed Forces. Right now there is no particular need for their expertise in the military commissariats and the forces. In the third place, the time has come to add organic specialists in the training, screening and efficient assignment of draftees and servicemen to the large military commissariats and district training centers. At least there have been plenty of suggestions of this kind "from below."

At the same time, we should not wait for the personnel problem to be resolved but do our best now to avoid errors in the assignment of the young replenishments among the branches of the Armed Forces, troop arms and military specialties in the spring draft this year. We should first of all increase the liability of the military commissariats and the staffs of military units for gross errors in this work. Do the facts presented here not provide grounds for holding the corresponding officials personally responsible as we do in the case of errors in evaluating the health of draftees, for example?

When we talk with future fightingmen, we hear over and over again that they want to serve in positions related to their civilian specialties and continue perfecting their skills, thereby increasing their interest in the service.

Today the army cannot attract youth merely by helping the draftee leave the confines of his native village,

dress him in a well-made, government-issue uniform and giving him all he can eat, as it could 30-40 years ago. By concerning ourselves with enhancing the professionalism of the personnel, we shall at the same time be contributing to better mutual understanding between the Armed Forces and today's youth so that the military service is not regarded as meaningless or as "wasted years." Incidentally, even in the discussion of prospects for an experiment in service by contract for soldiers and NCOs, too much of an absolute was made of the importance of the amounts of pay, in our opinion, and did not take into account the people's professional motivation. It has been established in the armies of the USA, Great Britain and the FRG, which have experience in manning on a volunteer basis, that the youth value the military service not only because of the good pay, but also for the opportunity to improve their skills in a civilian specialty, to increase and reinforce their professional skills and prepare themselves better for a future job in industry.

Military job orientation work performed with the youth can and must become an important factor for enhancing the manning of the Armed Forces. Particularly in the contemporary situation, when anti-army propaganda is being stepped up. The present uncoordinated advertising campaigns of individual military training facilities can hardly be regarded as systematic work with predraft and draft-age youth. They cannot provide real help even for the military VUZs, not to speak of enhancing the prestige of the army as a whole. Furthermore, there will inevitably be fundamentally new tasks involved in reorienting the servicemen discharged into the reserve toward civilian specialties and working out recommendations for their retraining and job placement. This is an extremely important part of taking care of the future serviceman and of his social protection (particularly in a market economy), and it would be wrong to delegate it exclusively to the State Committee for Labor and Social problems and to local authorities.

I am convinced that we need a centralized system of military job orientation. The matter of establishing it must be resolved in combination with new approaches to the screening and effective distribution of the youth, however, as part of the general problem of improving the manning of the USSR Armed Forces in the contemporary situation. We must have a fundamentally new level of organization of all this work. Applying patches and individual solutions will not alter the situation. First of all, we feel, we need a unified structure (center) which could resolve in a comprehensive manner the problems of providing scientific methods support and coordination of all measures pertaining to military job orientation, the screening and effective distribution of the youth, the training and retraining of the appropriate specialists, the provision of operational assistance for the military commissariats, training centers and military units, and maintaining constant and competent interaction with similar structures of the USSR Ministry of Education, the USSR Ministry of Labor and Social Problems, other ministries and departments.

Unfortunately, it is difficult today to accomplish the tasks we have mentioned here. And one of the causes is the inertia of the old thinking and habits born of the "cog" mentality. According to them, the main thing in manning is to fill the slots, and each individual is simply obligated to serve well and be a highly rated specialist wherever he is assigned. Typically, the company and battalion commanders who have to work directly with the graduates of the training units already understand the detrimental nature of such approaches. This is borne out, among other things, by articles published in KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA ("Through the Eyes of a Company Commander," 30 Sep 90, and "Co-authors of Attacks," 2 Oct 90). At higher headquarters, however, they still speak of realizing the qualitative parameters with respect to anything you like, but not to the individual....

Contracting with Students To Acquire Specialists

91UM0384A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed Article under the rubric "Official Section": "In Training on Contract"]

[Text] As a result of the transition to the market, the need is growing for skilled specialists whom military training institutions are not training. Because of this, the USSR Minister of Defense, based on the August 31, 1989 USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 708, issued order No. 443 dated November 19, 1990 which prescribes: "Military unit commanders and commanders of USSR Ministry of Defense institutes, military training institutions, enterprises and organizations can conclude individual contracts with students, with higher educational institution training department students, and with middle special training institution students for purposeful training of specialists. They will be paid an increased stipend by these organizations. After completion of their studies, they are obligated to work in that organization for the period prescribed in the contract concluded, but for not less than three years.

This order defines the conditions for sending Soviet Army workers to be retrained, to study a second skill, or to increase their skills with leave from work.

Rising Numbers of Moslems as Share of Draft Cohort

91UM0384B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by R. Narzikulov, candidate of economic sciences: "Who Will Serve in the Army"]

[Text] During the last 30 years, the small stream of Moslem youth or, as the demographers call it, of Turkish-Tajik youth has been transformed into a powerful current and today it is already comparable in scale with the numbers of draftees of the three Slavic republics. The portion of youth of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan that is 18 years old totaled 19 percent in 1975,

reached 25.7 percent in 1989, and will exceed 30 percent in the year 2005. The identical indicator for Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia equaled 66 percent in 1989 and will decrease to 62 percent by 2005. Actually, the portion of recruits from the southern republics is still higher.

The problem is not so much ethnic differences as differences of world view, life styles, and, the main thing, levels of training. It is no secret that today construction, transportation, and similar battalions of an auxiliary nature are primarily manned with southern youth, half of whom are rural residents who do not know the Russian language. Very few of them are in the officer corps and there are practically none in the high command.

Under the existing ethnic division of army labor (some serve at missile complexes and others mix concrete), the growing portion of Moslem youth signifies an increase of the portion of service troops, first of all by using construction battalions. Thus, the state will have a constantly increasing source of free, unskilled labor. But this is only in the event that we maintain the existing procedures for drafting people into the army. The Central Asian republics are beginning to realize that, along with cotton, their young work force is their significant wealth. For example, Uzbekistan has decided to regulate the draft process based on contract terms. It is possible that in the future the idea of paid deliveries of labor resources which they have in abundance in the south will mature but in this case the army draft will lose its role as the hoarder of free labor.

The thesis about the Islamization of the army loses its frightening force if you consider the ethnic factor in the distribution of draftees among the branches of service. Of course, if you directly tie the size of the draft to the growth of the population, then the portion of Slavs is quite significantly decreasing. However, servicing complex equipment in the coming decades will remain as before the prerogative of those people who come from the European part of the country, whose numbers in absolute indicators will not decrease at all. Incidentally, this is how it was in many multi-ethnic armies, beginning from the time of Alexander the Great and the Roman emperors: The attack nucleus consisted of troops of one nationality.

Furthermore, it will be an impermissible luxury to have an army of five million men by the year 2000 (and it will be precisely this if we continue to draft everyone as previously). Most probably, we will either have to reduce terms of service or increase alternative service. Therefore, the threat of "Moslemization" [omusulmanivaniye] of the army is farfetched.

Novgorod Oblast Fulfills Draft Plan

91UM0392B Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by V. Troyanovskiy: "They Did Not Respond to the Draft Call"]

[Text] The Novgorod Oblast military commissariat is the only one in the Leningrad Military District that fulfilled

the plan for the regular draft call, which ended in February, for conscripting youths into the army. And yet ...

Victor Bogdanov, a young and healthy resident of the city, faced a choice: To go and serve the Fatherland by becoming an enlisted man in the Soviet Army or trade the parade ground for a prison cell. He chose the latter. His sentence sounded prosaic: Set the punishment for V. Bogdanov to be deprivation of his freedom for a period of one year.

"But in fact, this article of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR 'On Refusal to Serve in the Military Forces' stipulates a sentence from one to three years," comments Major A. Sevostyakov, a section chief in the oblast military commissariat. "Unfortunately, thirty-three fellows did not show up at the induction center. Criminal proceedings have been started against all the 'refuseniks.'"

Islamic Spiritual Directorate Decree on Military Service

91P50119A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Astafyev: "Islam and Service in the Army".]

[Text] It is no secret that recently the conscription of young people into active military service has become complicated. Within the last year alone the military commissariats of the Turkestan Military District for various reasons failed to call up more than 30 thousand youths of draft age. The number of servicemen who went AWOL increased sharply as well.

At the same time the current international situation and especially the actions taking place in the Persian Gulf hardly induce pacifist feelings. Unlike certain people's deputies and leaders of informal groups, the leaders of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan [SADUM] understand this very well. While actively struggling against the war and for peace on the planet, they nevertheless believe that the defense of the fatherland always was and remains the sacred duty of each young man. In answer to the doubts of many conscripts and their parents concerning service in the army, the leadership of SADUM has issued a fatwa, "Filial Obligation," a sort of resolution on this issue. The following are the type of directions contained in the document:

"It is well known that representatives of the Islamic peoples serve in the ranks of Soviet troops. With their conscientious service and high level of discipline they increase the honor and glory of the Soviet Army and gladden their commanders and their parents. Unfortu-

nately, there are also among them some who by their negligence, disorderliness, and unserious attitude towards their obligation bring shame upon the calling of defender of the motherland.

"We the leaders of SADUM wish to strictly warn such soldiers that such an attitude towards military service is considered a great sin in Islam, for our religion calls us to defend our land from enemies and to demonstrate valor, courage, and steadfastness on the field of battle."

Col-Gen Vostrov on Training of Professional Soldiers, Future of VUZy

91UM0260B KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Col. Gen. V. Vostrov, chief of the Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Lt. Col. A. Dokuchayev: "How to Train Professionals: Problems and Proposals of Military Reform"]

[Text] We are talking more and more about a professional army. But have we really determined what a military professional is? What will the officer of the future be like and is the military educational system prepared to resolve the tasks facing it?

Col. Gen. V. Vostrov, chief of the Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, gives some thought to this in a conversation with our correspondent.

[Vostrov] Can we now see the look of the officer of tomorrow? Do the military academies and schools have any reference points for their work? Yes, there are reference points. They are the new qualifying performance characteristics worked out in all specialties. Essentially it is the state order to the VUZ's for the training of officer cadres. There has been a fundamental change in the very approach to the characteristics. Previously they defined what the graduate is supposed to know and be able to do in the framework of each academic discipline. Now they define what duties he is trained to perform.

[Dokuchayev] But even the most qualifying order is just an order. It still must be carried out....

[Vostrov] At the same time, one must not underestimate the importance of a competent and scientifically well-founded order—the foundation for all subsequent work. The first steps are now being taken toward its realization: new academic plans and programs are now being worked out. What is special about them? Let us look into this with the example of the Military Communications Academy imeni S.M. Budennyy, which may have gone further than other VUZ's in this area. The instruction here proceeds in three definite stages. The first stage is thorough basic training that is the same for all primary specialties. The second is basic training by specialties. The third stage is the purposeful differentiation of training in the duty function.

[Dokuchayev] Where do we get the time to strengthen both without thereby weakening anything in the process? Are we not deceiving ourselves, considering that there is no change in the time of training?

[Vostrov] There is no self-deception here. It is a matter of the rational organization of the learning process and its intensification. Thus, we have now optimized the

structure and content of training and completely eliminated redundancy in the school echelon, the academy. The cadres are given greater freedom in deciding on kinds of classes.

[Dokuchayev] By the way, are changes planned in methods?

[Vostrov] The VUZ's will shift to the extensive use of active developing methods of training that are similar to those in research. The extent of compulsory lecture-type classes in the academies and senior courses of schools will be reduced to 24 to 30 hours a week. The course has been taken of individualizing training. Even now the most successful and promising students and trainees are permitted to study under individual plans. The following innovation is foreseen. After finishing the first and second courses, especially talented trainees at engineering and command-engineering schools may be transferred to the engineering departments of military academies in groups with a period of instruction of six years for training in complex and science-intensive specialties.

[Dokuchayev] The forces and fleets are criticizing not so much the professional training as the quality of the education of the graduates of VUZ's. Young officers themselves—yesterday's graduates—are also expressing a certain amount of dissatisfaction.

[Vostrov] Of course the task of the VUZ is not only to train a first-class specialist but also to educate him to be a highly cultured person.

It was noteworthy in the Russian military school that the training of the will, mental flexibility, and independent thinking as well as training in honor and moral and physical instruction was put even above education. They taught the cadets and pupils not only military affairs. They helped them to become highly cultured people, gave them instruction in national and world history, and taught them ethical conduct, even such details as the ability to walk gracefully and many other things. It also benefits contemporary officers to understand questions of logic, ethics, esthetics, and the history of national and world culture and to master a foreign language.

[Dokuchayev] Vladimir Andreyevich, do we have many intellectual pedagogues? It is no secret that many "unsuccessful people" from the troops become teachers. The situation is especially difficult in the VUZ's on the periphery, from where there is a continual "brain drain." If an officer has shown talent or defended himself, they will soon attract him away to a VUZ in the capital or other favorably located place.

In general, the military educational institutions have a sufficiently strong and qualified body of teachers. Two-thirds of the scientists working in the Ministry of Defense are concentrated in them. The occupation of teacher requires good training. Candidacies for doctorate's degrees have been established in the VUZ's just in the last two or three years, the network of postgraduate studies has been expanded, courses have been organized

for officers appointed to teaching work, the competitive selection of officers has been introduced for most teaching positions, and the remuneration of labor has been differentiated.

As for the "unsuccessful," I favor the rotation of VUZ and troop officers. But I consider it a very great evil to send to the academies and schools people who could not handle their duties in the forces. Such a practice is the beginning of a chain reaction in which mediocrity will give rise to and produce ever more mediocrity. The "young" postgraduate studies established in the schools require close attention and help.

It is necessary to put in order the organization of educational work. Thus, for example, the computerization of instruction and the introduction of new information technologies is being restrained not least by the fact that the expenditures of labor have not yet been considered in the instructional load on teachers. No consideration is being given to the additional load in connection with the individualization of instruction and the conducting of training exercises with reserve officers.... This is why it is not planned to reduce the number of instructors temporarily despite the reduction in the number of those being taught in the VUZ's. As time goes on, this will make it possible to reduce the ratio of trainees to teachers in the schools to six to one and will diminish the load on the teacher.

[Dokuchayev] The new content of the training obviously also requires new materials and equipment. How is it planned to resolve these questions in the military academies and schools under market conditions?

[Vostrov] As of today, the field educational base is lagging significantly behind the level of development of the troops and the laboratory base is decrepit and outmoded. The VUZ's themselves cannot resolve the many problems. They need help from the guiding bodies of the Ministry of Defense.

Thus, today most of the command and some of the engineering schools are not giving their graduates the necessary computer competence. For 1995 alone, the task has been set of guaranteeing 250 hours of display time per student or trainee in military schools with a five year course of instruction, 100-150 hours in the academies, and 100 hours in the remaining VUZ's. These are not large numbers but it will be difficult to achieve even them. And here is not merely a matter of a shortage of computer equipment but above all of the lack of software.

[Dokuchayev] In the course of the military reform, the army will be reduced significantly and the structure of the armed forces will change. How will the system of military educational institutions react to this? What schools and academies will be dissolved or combined?

[Vostrov] Of course there will be changes in the number and specialization of VUZ's in the course of the reform. Three schools were closed in 1990: the Borisoglebsk and

Saratov aviation schools for pilots and the Vladikavkazskoye Higher Antiaircraft School for air defense. Another nine military schools will be cut back in the course of the realization of the treaty on conventional arms in Europe. Which ones? It is premature to talk about this.

It should be noted that the main changes will take place in the second and third stages of the military reform, when the structure, relative weight and strength of the branches of service will be determined. But the fundamental approaches to the restructuring of the system of military education have been determined.

I believe that the restructuring will proceed, in the first place, in the consolidation of the VUZ's. This will make it possible to ensure the conditions for the establishment of strong and qualified scientific-pedagogical collectives and for the concentration of capital investments in the interests of the development of the educational-material base. It is not a matter of replacing all VUZ's with several large regional centers, as some are proposing with reference to the experience of the U.S. Army. We are not in a vacuum and are not rebuilding our military schools. It would be absurd and simply stupid blindly to copy foreign experience. And it is therefore simply inadvisable to combine such large scientific-pedagogical centers as military academies. That is not the question.

The second direction of restructuring is the systematic conversion of military schools to the preparation of officers with a command and engineering profile. In the future, there will be more training of officers with a period of instruction of five years.

The third direction is the transition to a system of continuous military education. Along with fundamental training received in the VUZ's, continuous education will be accomplished through a developed system of postgraduate instruction capable of promptly and efficiently adapting to the conditions of the changing demands on military specialists.

The list of such directions could be extended. The state program for the development of higher education in the country is based on the priority role of the higher school in the renewal and intellectualization of the society in the transition stage of its perestroika. And, in resolving problems of military education, we must also proceed from its priority role in the formation of the cadre potential of the armed forces.

Paid Military Preparatory Education Courses

91UM0260A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Comment by Col. of the Reserves O. Vladimirov: "To the Aid of Secondary School Graduates"]

[Text] I heard that paid courses are opening for those wanting to go to military schools?—Lt. Col. Yu. Khokhlov

Col. of the Reserve O. Vladimirov, officer in the directorate for military educational institutions of the Ground Forces:

Under an order by the commander of the Ground Forces, the heads of military educational institutions are permitted to establish paid preparatory courses for youths who have declared a desire to enroll in the higher military schools of the Ground Forces.

They are intended to raise the level of the general training in subjects included in entrance exams. For the courses, they accept persons with a complete secondary education as well as students in the graduating classes of general educational schools, tekhnikums, and vocational and technical schools. The state of health of the candidates must be acceptable for entrance into the military school in question. The duration of instruction is from

six to 10 months on a part-time basis in evening or correspondence forms while remaining in production (training).

Upon conclusion of the instruction, the students in the courses take final examinations and receive a certificate that allows them to participate in competition for entrance into the military educational institution of the Ground Forces without having to take entrance examinations.

The payment for instruction is set by the director of the higher educational institution.

One can find out more about the Regulation on Preparatory Courses in any military educational institution of the Ground Forces.

Polish Military to Aid MVD in Crime Prevention

91UM0327A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Runov, TASS correspondent, Warsaw: "A Common Front in the Fight Against Crime"]

[Text] Problems of internal security and national defense were the subjects of discussion by President L. Walesa of the Republic of Poland with P. Kolodziejczyk, Minister of National Defense, and K. Majewski, Minister of Internal Affairs.

Special attention was devoted to issues concerning the strengthening of public order and decreasing the crime rate. It was decided that the two ministries should join forces with the goal of creating a common front in the fight against crime.

The Minister of Defense noted that there is a real possibility of decreasing the period of active duty to one year. During the next call-up in March-April of this year, a significant number of draftees will be assigned to police duty. By springtime the situation on city streets should improve. Patrols and the number of police posts will be increased, and the MVD's equipment will be improved. Replacements for army personnel, in view of the decreased period for active duty, will be made by recruiting volunteers for the professional cadres. These volunteers will work on the basis of a five-year, written contract.

CSFR to Deploy More Troops to Slovakia

91UM0327B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Beskromnyy, TASS correspondent, Bratislava: "A Redeployment of Units of the Czechoslovak Army"]

[Text] Specific questions about the transfer of units of the Czechoslovak army to the Slovak Republic were discussed at a meeting here last Monday between V. Mechyar, Chairman of the government of the Slovak Republic and L. Dobrovsky, the Czechoslovak Minister of Defense.

As the participants of the meeting noted in their press conference, the redeployment of military units emanates from the new military doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic which prescribes an equal distribution for the security of the country. As a result of this doctrine, approximately 38-39 percent of total personnel of the Czechoslovak Army will be stationed in the Slovak Republic instead of 18 percent, as is the case at present. The military units will occupy the same facilities that subunits of the Soviet Army had previously occupied. Nevertheless, another 3,190 apartments will be needed, which will undoubtedly aggravate the existing housing problem even more.

Luftwaffe Ponders Deployment of MIG-29's

91UM0327C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major S. Popov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Discussion About the MIG"]

[Text] Not excluded is the possibility that instead of the long-ago-conceived—but still short-lived—so-called "fighter-90," the Luftwaffe may accept the Soviet MIG-29 in its inventory. This fighter aircraft was taken over by the Bundeswehr from the former East German Air Force [NNA]. In making the announcement, the weekly WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE pointed out that after testing 24 aircraft of this type, the Armaments Section of the FRG Ministry of Defense wrote a memorandum, giving a high evaluation to the tactical flight characteristics of the Soviet aircraft and concluded by stating that there are possibilities for its "long-term utilization."

CSFR Military Union Joins West European Group

91P50117A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by P. Shaparskiy: "Entry Into Euromil"]

[Text] Last week in Prague a plenary session of Euromil, an organization which unites military trade unions in Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, the FRG, and Italy, was held. Now the CSFR Union of Professional Servicemen, which CSFR President V. Havel has called the soldier's trade union, has become a full member of that organization.

The CSFR union of professional soldiers was organized in 1990. Its chairman is Colonel Jan Kriz. Its membership is 17 thousand. The Union, according to its founders, is an independent voluntary organization acting within the framework of the state. Its membership includes both active and reserve officers regardless of their political leanings, religious affiliations, military rank, or current occupation. Clubs made up of at least five persons, which are created as a rule in garrisons, units, staffs, in military-educational institutions and facilities of the CSFR Army, form the foundation of the union. Members pay membership dues at the rate of 50 crowns per year. In addition, the organization may establish supplementary collections of funding for its purposes.

The main goal of the union, according to its founders, is first of all the social defense of servicemen, participation in cadre issues, and the organization of leisure and recreation for officers. The highest organ of the union is the assembly.

A similar organization associated with the Hungarian Army has also expressed a desire to join Euromil.

Mil Chief Designer Tishchenko on Helicopter Development

91UM0274A Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 18, 90 pp 1-3, 26-27

[Interview with Marat Nikolayevich Tishchenko, general designer of Special Design Bureau imeni M. L. Mil, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize laureate, corresponding member of USSR Academy of Sciences, by SOVETSKIY VOIN Special Correspondent S. Ptichkin; date and place not specified, under rubric "Who's Who": "Helicopter Designer"]

[Text] *"Everyone who fought in Afghanistan came into contact with helicopter pilots. Many are obligated for their lives to the courage and proficiency of the Mil pilots and the reliability of the craft themselves. I ask that you pass on words of gratitude to the entire collective of the Mil firm and tell about its work if possible. I would very much like to become acquainted through the journal with the person who heads the OKB [Special Design Bureau] imeni Mil today.*

Major S. Zolotarev

Yes, probably not one machine played such a major role in the life of our Armed Forces and the entire country in the last decade as fell to the lot of the helicopters: Afghanistan, Chernobyl, and areas of earthquakes, floods, fires... It was impossible to get by without the rotary-wing assistants under the most difficult conditions and extreme situations. As a rule, helicopters of the Mil make were first to come help.

We met with Marat Nikolayevich Tishchenko, general designer of the OKB imeni M. L. Mil, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize laureate, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member, in his small office equipped only for work, and not for conferences of many hours with many people.

[Ptichkin] Marat Nikolayevich, there is a display devoted to the firm's founder in front of the entrance to your office. The childhood photographs of Mikhail Leontyevich Mil and his drawings from the front cannot help but touch a person. The display resembles an open family album telling about a long and creatively happy human life. One senses that you treat the memory of Mil very considerably.

[Tishchenko] Mikhail Leontyevich is a real patriarch for us. Many old associates were obligated to him not only for an opportunity to work quietly, but perhaps also for their lives...

The OKB was organized according to USSR Council of Ministers Decree dated 12 December 1947. It seemed that in our direction at that time the Soviet Union had fallen behind the Americans forever. The United States managed to use R-4 helicopters back during World War II. Machines designed by Igor Sikorsky won world recognition in the late 1940's. Helicopter construction in America flourished, bringing enormous profits to

numerous firms engaged in designing and producing helicopters. Mil could only dream of the technological base and the almost ideal working conditions for overseas helicopter builders...

The OKB was assigned a building of prerevolutionary construction and Mikhail Leontyevich immediately became utterly absorbed in work; he even set up a cot in his office so as not to lose time on trips home. Stalin kept a watchful eye on how creation of the first Soviet helicopters was going, since the helicopter design bureaus had been organized on his direct instructions. You yourself understand what such high attention might be fraught with at that time. Here it is worthwhile telling about the following.

It is common knowledge that at the borderline of the 1940's and 1950's a campaign was waged in our country against so-called cosmopolitanism, which often took on a clear-cut anti-Semitic nature. Some directors refused to have anything to do with Jews at that time as if they were evil spirits. Many specialists who had the corresponding nationality were forced to change their place of work, and many at that time were put behind bars as potential spies. People write often and willingly about those persecutions today, but they are silent about the people who did not give in to the general campaign of "witch hunts." Meanwhile, Mikhail Leontyevich was just such a person.

Sensing the fixed attention on the part of Stalin and his entourage, Mil essentially cast a challenge to totalitarian thinking and the entire command system and in fact accomplished what "brave spirits" capable of fighting only shadows of the past never would have dared, although I believe he did not consider his act heroic; he simply did what his conscience suggested. The conscience of a Man...

Inasmuch as in those times the helicopter was not considered a means of warfare, but only a means of transportation, then the demands of the regime service on helicopter design bureaus accordingly were considerably milder than on those organizations which designed bombers, for example. Mikhail Leontyevich took advantage of this and opened the doors of his firm wide for all those being persecuted.

The Ministry of the Aviation Industry very soon dubbed Mil's firm "Jewish" and people in various high echelons looked askance at him for a long time for "excessive" liberalism in cadres policy, but the OKB avoided any kind of substantial repressive measures, Mikhail Leontyevich safeguarded the people, and he brilliantly performed an important government assignment. It was then that what made the name of the firm and its authority in the future was laid down by fully specific actions.

In 1951 the OKB was assigned to design a heavy-freight machine surpassing those helicopters being widely used by the Americans in the Korean War. A prototype of the Mi-4 took off in April 1952, only eight months after the

assignment was received! A large group of OKB associates headed by Mil were presented with the Lenin Prize in 1958 for creating this machine. In just ten years Soviet helicopter builders made a simply fantastic breakthrough into the future and essentially caught up with the United States.

[Ptichkin] And how can one assess the correlation between Soviet and American helicopter construction today?

[Tishchenko] It is to the enormous credit of Mikhail Leontyevich that he was able not only to create superb machines, but also to form a collective capable of accomplishing tasks of any intellectual complexity. Today there is nothing we could not do by our own efforts in the sphere of practical helicopter construction. Moreover, our OKB has solved technological problems which people have not coped with anywhere in the world to this day.

But I would not like to play the hypocrite and give you too optimistic a tone. First of all, it is impossible to view a separate design bureau in isolation from the country's entire national economy; all of us have common problems. Secondly, often it is generally impossible to compare particular indicators in the USSR and United States, but people in this country very much love to do this on any occasion.

Thoughtless copying of U.S. models, both technical as well as organizational, has not led and will not lead to anything good. It is impossible not to take into account that our countries developed for centuries under quite different conditions, and absolutely different sociopolitical and state structures formed for us; otherwise we simply become like children solving the problem of what is stronger, a whale or an elephant?

For example, from the very beginning U.S. helicopter construction firms were set up as complex enterprises designed to work under conditions of the market and rigid competition. But we essentially only developed the design of a machine, working under conditions of a state order. Series plants which are not subordinate to us never experienced particular joy from some kind of design innovations and have no incentive at all for shifting to a new model. To the contrary, it is enormously more advantageous for them to produce old machines under developed technology for as long as possible, for any reoutfitting brings more problems and unpleasantness than really tangible good. And here it is difficult to condemn the industrialists—these are all consequences of the administrative-command system of production organization, where economic factors do not act.

There are seven helicopter construction firms in the United States and Western Europe which naturally are different in level and technical capabilities, but all of them are working, each one is developing its own direction, and each one receives profits from work actually done.

We, however, seemingly are monopolists, since over 90 percent of the USSR helicopter fleet consists of machines of the Mil make, but we have nothing from this monopoly. Even the new OKB building was not built because we developed, let us say, the Mi-24 and received some kind of superprofit. No! Everything was enormously more prosaic. The freeway was being renovated and our building ended up in the construction zone... Only for this reason were we allocated a plot of land and corresponding funds, or else we would have been sitting in a building of prerevolutionary construction to this day.

Or take the state order that exists both for us and for them. Well now, when it is received in the West a golden rain literally pours down on the firm, but for us everything reduces to the familiar Army phrase: Execute and report...

We very much hope that perestroika of the national economy, which is going slowly, but still is going, will bring us appreciable results and will permit finally receiving real pay for real labor.

[Ptichkin] Marat Nikolayevich, you spoke about the Mil monopolism. But is the Kamov firm really not your competitor?

[Tishchenko] If we speak about competition with the OKB which now bears the name of Nikolay Ilich Kamov, different tasks were assigned for the two design bureaus from the very beginning. Mil made helicopters that were more or less general purpose, while Kamov was targeted toward sea-based machines, since coaxial helicopters are very compact and maneuverable; it is not difficult for them to land on a small piece of deck.

In the whole history of the two OKB's there were only a few instances of direct competitive struggle, which would more accurately be called a contest.

In the early 1950's Mil began to design the giant Mi-6, which weighed 40 tons, while at the same time Kamov began creating the rotary-wing Ka-22, a machine of the very same class. The Mi-6 proved to be more successful and is flying to this day. When the decision was being made on creating a fundamentally new combat helicopter, Mil and Kamov submitted their sketches. Preference was given to Mikhail Leontyevich based on blueprints, and as a result the Mi-24 soon appeared.

[Ptichkin] Please say a few words about this machine, which made a genuine revolution in the very concept of battlefield use of helicopters.

[Tishchenko] In fact, at one time helicopters were viewed only as a convenient means of transportation, but in time it became clear that the rotary-wing machines also could be used as purely combat machines.

The U.S. Huey Cobra, which became operational in 1967 and which weighed some 4 tons with combat payload, can be considered the first genuine combat helicopter.

A decree on beginning work projects on the first domestic combat helicopter was adopted in the USSR in 1968, and three years later the first five machines of an absolutely new and original design already had arrived in one of the helicopter regiments.

Mil developed the entire ideology of the new machine, while Soviet helicopter builder Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov carried out detailed direction of the designing. State tests on the final variant of the Mi-24 ended in 1976, after which it became operational. Creation of this helicopter was a great step forward for us; for ten years we were without exaggeration possessors of the world's most powerful and effective combat helicopter. Judge for yourself: the Mi-24 was almost completely armored and its armament permitted fighting not only ground targets, but airborne targets as well. The Mi-24 was immediately dubbed a "flying tank" in the West!

[Ptichkin] You know, more than once I have had occasion to hear from "Afghan" helicopter pilots that they very much lacked specifically an "Afghan" machine: light, maneuverable, well armed and reliably protected, capable of operating under conditions of high mountains. And suddenly it turns out that your OKB began developing the Mi-28 back in 1982, but to this day things have not gone beyond test and demonstration flights.

At one time you were able to create the Mi-4 in nine months and, as you said, eight years were spent on the Mi-24, but in those years the USSR Armed Forces were not conducting combat operations anywhere and did not have such an acute need for a new machine...

[Tishchenko] You have touched on a very difficult and serious problem which cannot be cleared up in a few words.

Leaving aside the political problems of forming the state order, let us examine the question from a purely technical side. It is no secret that the level of complexity of armament has changed very strongly in postwar years. The Mi-4 helicopter simply cannot be compared with the Mi-24, let alone with the Mi-28.

It must be taken into account that both for us and the United States today the average period from the beginning of a new model's design to its acceptance in the inventory equals approximately ten years.

After the Mi-24 was accepted in series production it underwent modification for several years more and the shape of the pilots' cockpit was even changed. The Americans began work on the AH-64 in 1975 and the contract for delivering this helicopter to the U.S. Army was concluded on 15 April 1982, but it was only on 26 January 1984 that the first AH-64 was delivered to the troops. And this was in a country in which, as it seems to many, everything is resolved without problems.

In fact, at first glance the war in Afghanistan should have stimulated and somehow whipped up the work of military sectors of our industry, but this did not happen...

True, a great many problems were heaped on our heads. We were immediately forced to begin very seriously modernizing and correlating to Afghan conditions series produced machines which all the same were developed for a different theater of military operations.

I flew in to Kabul in March 1980, visited almost all helicopter units of the limited contingent of Soviet forces, and became familiar with the actual conditions under which our machines had to operate... Now it can be said that during the time of that war we performed almost a full modernization of the Mi-8 and Mi-24, having adapted them to the specifics of Afghanistan; in essence, machines of a certain kind crossed the border of the DRA in 1979, while different ones returned to the Union in 1989 although their make remained the same.

In 1982 the government made a decision by which we were to begin work on a new machine to counter the U.S. AH-64, and nowhere was it stipulated that a helicopter had to be made specifically for Afghanistan, and as quickly as possible. Our collective was not increased, the OKB did not receive any kind of superfinancing or logistic support, the technological experimental production facility essentially was not upgraded, and there was not even a hint in general about any kind of most favored status.

Nevertheless, along with a constant improvement in fighting helicopters, we were able to create a new combat machine in no way inferior to the AH-64 and, I believe, surpassing it in protection and survivability; unquestionably, the experience gained in Afghanistan helped here.

[Ptichkin] Excuse me for a somewhat provocative question, but which helicopter will win if the Mi-28 and AH-64 meet in combat?

[Tishchenko] I hope that helicopters of the USSR and United States air forces never will meet in a direct combat duel, but combat between the Mi-28 and AH-64 can be pictured theoretically. It is no secret that military equipment both of the Soviet Union and United States is being sold to "third countries." For example, Mil helicopters are supplied to dozens of countries. It is natural that the contact of Soviet and U.S. armament is fully probable in case of any kind of regional conflict, and there already have been such instances.

The Mi-28 and AH-64 are equivalent machines in principle, and success will depend to a greater extent on pilot proficiency. But it is evidently worthwhile noting that as of today the armament on our helicopter is more powerful than on the American one, and the Mi-28 is heavier than the AH-64 chiefly because of this. For example, 30-mm guns are installed on both machines, but the U.S. weapon's round weighs 300 grams, and the Soviet weapon's weighs 1 kg, with all consequences stemming therefrom.

U.S. specialists very meticulously familiarized themselves with the Mi-28 at the last air show in Le Bourget and honestly admitted our machine was fully competitive with the AH-64.

[Ptichkin] From the very beginning your firm put out both military products as well as strictly peaceful products—you have enormous experience in a sensible combination of defense and civilian productions. How do you personally see the conversion of defense sectors?

[Tishchenko] A number of leading specialists of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry have repeatedly expressed our viewpoint on conversion: it must be really sensible. Perestroika of such complex and delicate productions as defense sectors does not allow for brashness and lack of thought.

Unfortunately, there are many people who are invested with state authority but who think very superficially and believe that to achieve any objective it is necessary only to exert oneself. Allegedly the defense people will exert themselves and in two shakes will do, for example, what light industry did not do. Alas, they often do not understand the common truth: to manufacture a really quality product, whether it be a helicopter or a loaf of bread, in addition to good technology one needs a nurtured and fostered high culture of production which you cannot buy for any amount of money; and professionals in their work are needed.

[Ptichkin] It is common knowledge that the purchase of our equipment by foreign partners often was dictated not so much by quality and competitiveness as by political aspects. How is it possible to realistically assess the competitiveness of helicopters of the Mil make in the free world market?

[Tishchenko] I have no doubt of the competitiveness of combat machines. If we are speaking about peaceful products, which nevertheless comprise a large part of the firm's assortment, one has to take into account without fail that the helicopter market is oversaturated and it is not simple for any firm, not just ours, to take root in it.

I fully allow for the creation of joint ventures with any interested western firm. We have something to suggest to the West and there is of course something to learn. We are not acting as suppliants, we are acting as equal partners who know our value. We are ready for mutually profitable business cooperation.

This spring a group of Soviet helicopter builders was invited to the Congress of the U.S. Helicopter Society in the United States, at which I gave an extensive report.

At the Congress I had another meeting with Sergey Sikorsky, vice-president of the firm founded by his father. Our first acquaintanceship took place at the Paris Air Exhibition back in 1967, and since then we have tried to maintain friendly contacts. Sergey Igorevich is a very charming man who wins you over. He is a superb engineer who thoroughly understands the fine points of

helicopter production. I will honestly say that we would like to arrange deeper, more extensive business contacts with the Sikorsky firm.

[Ptichkin] Marat Nikolayevich, how did you become a helicopter builder?

[Tishchenko] I took a very great interest in aircraft model building in childhood and entered an aviation institute, but did not give up my enthusiasm for model building. When I was a student in 1954 I built a model of a helicopter which had set a world endurance record. So when the first academic helicopter group was formed at the Moscow Aviation Institute I entered it without a moment's hesitation, but a large portion of the group was levied on the basis of an order—at that time slow helicopters did not have any popularity; everyone was raving about missiles and jet interceptors.

The stages of my work in the Mil firm were as follows: rank-and-file aerodynamics specialist and designer, team chief, chief of the general views department, and I became Mil's deputy for the V-12 helicopter in the fall of 1968. Mikhail Leontyevich died in early 1970 and I was assigned to head up the enterprise in the fall of that same year.

[Ptichkin] Every designer has his favorite offspring. What machine is dearest of all to you?

[Tishchenko] I could give you the stock answer: the last one, for we know that the youngest child almost always is the family's pet. But for me the dearest one was the "firstborn," the Mi-26 helicopter, whose development we began in the early 1970's. The Mi-26 is the first machine which I took through as the head of the firm—you yourself understand what this meant... There were sleepless nights and there was a terrible overexertion of energy, but the helicopter turned out not simply good, but largely unique. This enormous machine still has no analogues abroad and its specific characteristics are among the best in the world. Naturally, the success of creating the Mi-26 is the success of the firm's entire collective, but I repeat, for me this machine is dear in a special way.

[Ptichkin] The Americans and Japanese, to whom we try to give a nod more and more often, have a real cult of the family, and we too finally are realizing that the role of the family is paramount in forming the individual. Who were your parents? On what examples did they bring you up and did they influence professional orientation in any way?

[Tishchenko] The role of the family of course cannot be depreciated. Our parents gave me and my brother very much. Their influence was not expressed in petty codling and tedious didactics; it was, rather, spiritual. The very example of their life attuned us to achieving a very high goal.

My father was the son of a mathematics teacher, who in turn came from simple peasants of Kharkov Guberniya,

but he was so drawn to knowledge that he left the village, as he told it, taking the only boots for the entire family. My grandfather received an appropriate education and worked all his great life as a schoolteacher. My father's name was Nikolay Afanasyevich; along with unbending persistence, he also inherited from grandfather an enormous craving for study. After school he became an electrician and immediately began preparing to enter the institute, but this was not a simple matter. The difficulties were dictated not by abilities, but by class origin, which was considered dubious for Father, a teacher's son, since secondary school instructors were equated to czarist employees. Today it is even ridiculous to speak about this, but at that time... Father had to withstand a most difficult competition and pass through all kinds of "purgatories" before he became a student at Kharkov Polytechnical Institute.

Nikolay Afanasyevich Tishchenko became a major engineer, known in the sector as a specialist in electrical wiring of metallurgical production rolling mills, and near the end of his life he defended a doctoral dissertation and received Lenin and State prizes. He achieved everything only by supreme diligence, as he had no high protectors. He retired from the position of department chief at one of the scientific research institutes at the age of 70 and left slamming the door, if it can be thus expressed. Despite his old age, Father was a very dynamic man and could not tolerate any kind of stagnation. He concluded that the research institute in which he was working was turning into the likeness of a ministry housemaid and was ceasing to engage in forming technical policy or to engage in basic research in its sector, but more and more often was taking the position of "What would you like?" He began to openly criticize the institute leadership and to write letters to the Central Committee, since he believed in the wisdom of supreme party leadership. In the end, a recipient of the country's highest prizes, he was declared professionally unfit and reduced in position. Father of course immediately quit, even without formalization of a pension, which was formalized for him after the fact, as they say.

The family had a very emotional experience with that battle, which was essentially against windmills, but like the real Don Quixote, Nikolay Afanasyevich fought only alone, insulted even by a hint of any kind of assistance.

My mother, Olga Yefimovna, was a person of quite a different sort than Father; she was a kind and gentle woman, very responsive and... heroic, capable of self-sacrifice for the sake of a high ideal. A person could write an entertaining adventure book about her youth. My brother and I listened to Mama literally with our mouths open as she told about the Revolution and Civil War...

Mother was born to a very poor, large Jewish family bearing a name with a golden hue—Goldberg. She had to think about daily bread from childhood. At the age of eight she already was working in a small confectionery factory wrapping candies. She was drawn into revolutionary activity early. She was a child, but she took an

active part in the trade union movement, and this led to a family drama. As soon as her father learned that his daughter had become a trade union activist, he immediately tossed her out of the house...

Mama received the Revolution with all her heart, and inasmuch as she was a very compassionate person she entered one of the Red Army field hospitals as a sister of mercy. At that time she was 18, but displayed no faintheartedness. Once she carried a wounded commander out from under fire, and another time she herself came under artillery fire and received a serious wound, but did not leave the battlefield.

In 1920 Mother entered the party and immediately received a party assignment—she was sent to the city of Nikolayev to conduct agitation and educational work among women longshoremen at the local port. Alas, the Nikolayev women wagoners did not understand the fiery speeches of the young communist woman and cruelly beat her up.

Mother was sent to the hospital in a serious condition, but she did not become embittered or frightened. After recovering she returned to the port and, as she told it, in time became good friends with the women longshoremen.

Subsequently Mother gradually withdrew from professional party work and entered a workers' high school and then an institute, where love and then family cares came to her. I am sure that were Mother a professional political leader she would not have survived 1937 simply by virtue of her restless character, but she worked mainly with equipment without leaving public activity. She and Father worked shoulder to shoulder for long years, giving all their creative energies to electromechanics.

[Ptichkin] You said you have a brother. Is he too an engineer?

[Tishchenko] My brother, Valeriy Nikolayevich, is a lawyer, a candidate of sciences, and at one time he very much alarmed the entire family with his choice.

When my brother was studying in 9th grade I already was working in the design bureau and once imprudently took him to be on duty as part of a plant militia brigade—the prototype of the present voluntary detachments. And such a thing had to happen that during the period of duty a clash occurred with a drunken hooligan; the brigade militia won and delivered the pugnacious person to the militia. That event produced a tremendous impression on Valeriy. That evening at home he firmly declared that after school he would become a militiaman. Mother and Father believed that a normal person was a person only with a higher technical education, and could not conceive of seeing us as "ignoramus." And suddenly the favorite son was a militiaman! My parents did not at all approve his choice, and exhortations, persuasions, and appeals to conscience began...

Finally Valeriy gave in and after school submitted documents to the Power Engineering Institute, but received a two in entrance exams. He worked for a year as a fitter, applied again and again received a two. It was then that my parents gave in and apparently realized that it was not their younger son's destiny to become an engineer.

Valeriy did excellently in passing exams to the legal faculty of Moscow State University, but received a three in composition, with the result that he did not get through the competition. He entered a correspondence-course department and a year later, after retaking exams, he transferred to the day department. He completed Moscow State University only with fives, received an allocation to the Moscow Office of Criminal Investigation, became an investigator, then became carried away with scientific work, defended a dissertation, and now is working in the MVD Scientific Research Institute.

What else can be said about our family? Grandfather Afanasiy Ivanovich had five children, Father had two sons, and I have one daughter.

Marat Nikolayevich smiled and made a helpless gesture. The time of our talk was ending even though very, very many unasked questions still remained, but it is simply impossible to encompass all activities of the OKB in one interview, just as it is inconceivable to tell about all the practical activity of General Designer Tishchenko and about all his very interesting biography. It remains to hope that our conversation will be continued.

The time of the head of the OKB imeni M. L. Mil is so compressed that it seems it can be felt with the hands. And of course I was grateful for this lengthy and rather frank conversation to the person who honorably continued the job begun 40 years ago by Mikhail Leontyevich, who augmented the firm's fame, and who elevated its authority to an even higher level.

Enormous thanks, Marat Nikolayevich both to you and the entire collective of helicopter builders of the Mil firm for the difficult but very necessary work; thank you for your machines.

And I would like to say this in conclusion. Today's time is characterized by the downfall of almost all authorities of past years, but nature does not tolerate emptiness, and so some kind of bustling searches are beginning for new idols. Little one-day beacons blaze out brightly and immediately go out and one passion is replaced by another. What path should we follow? What ideals should we profess? And to what god should we pray?

Passions boil at rallies, at congresses, and at sessions. We seek new leaders in economics, we seek new entrepreneurs, we seek sponsors... And these searches more and more begin to resemble a nighttime search around a flashlight beam for a key lost somewhere. It is brighter and easier to look near the beam... What we will find here already concerns us little—so great is the general passion for the very process of the search, but time is going by, the clock is ticking...

At times simply anecdotal situations occur, where some brickyard director who has fortunately turned up is proclaimed to be the "hope" of Russian industry. And it is somehow even awkward to remind worshippers of the "hope" who have fallen into euphoria that there is nothing more behind their idol except for a pile of broken, inferior brick and merely good wishes, and there never was.

Perhaps we have done enough circling around the beam? Perhaps it is finally time to change our mind, stop, and look around? Perhaps then we will see that in addition to the manmade light, the real stars have not yet gone out in the haze-covered sky of the homeland?

The real production organizers, the real leaders of science, and brilliant technologists for whom there are no equals in the world never are fidgety and never "tear their shirt" on their chest in public, striving for cheap popularity. They are engaged in a job and they simply have no time to flash boringly before the eyes at rallies and on television screens; there is no time for writing scathing journal articles. They are working...

And it seems to me that one of the most important tasks of those people who are taking on or already have assumed the role of political leadership of the country at such a difficult time, if they are really concerned for its destiny, is not to give in to the temptations of shallow "specialists," but find genuine masters, supreme professionals, and genuine superintellectuals who have real matters behind them; find them and rely on their knowledge, experience, and wisdom in your work.

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Black Sea Fleet Air Freight Operations

*91UM0461A Moscow SYN OTECHSTVA in Russian
No 2, Jan 91 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "Over Two Months".]

[Text] Transport Aviation pilots of the Black Sea Fleet earned 77 thousand rubles [R77,000] for the transport of civilian cargoes. Primarily they are supplying Crimean fruit to rayons of the far north.

Conversion Plans in Aviation Industry

*91UM0273A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Article by A. Kuvshinnikov: "DO NOT CLIP MAP WINGS—Conversion in the Aviation Industry: Goplan's Way Violates Common Sense"]

[Text] The Soviet economy is so antediluvian that it virtually cannot be integrated into the international system. If it does not join the world economic system, any discussion of changing over to a market economy would be absurd. This leads to an exclusive circle. A chance of breaking out of it is offered by conversion.

Many branches of the military-industrial complex which we consider as the most developed have been determined to measure up to world-class standards. Foreign specialists are of the opinion that we stand the greatest chances of becoming a part of an international division of labor in the case of the Soviet aviation industry.

Conversion in the Ministry of the Aviation Industry is a matter of serious activity. The Ministry has come the closest of all other defense departments to developing a total and systematic program concept for branch conversion, one presented a number of times by representatives of the MAP [Ministry of the Aviation Industry] at major international conferences.

Anatoliy Bratukhin, USSR aviation industry deputy minister and a manager responsible for carrying out conversion in the industry, has stated that the program concept is now in finished form from the internal branch viewpoint. However, before the final version is approved it is necessary to go over the project at the international level, the purpose being to incorporate changes reflecting the desires of the foreign partners participating in the program and to synchronize the latter with the existing system of international cooperation.

A. Bratukhin has explained the program's essence clearly and concisely: "First and foremost, the aviation industry should produce a sufficient number of civilian aircraft. The concept is intended to accomplish by means of wide international cooperation a triune goal: the creation of new models of civilian aircraft; mass production of said aircraft for the internal market; and advancement to the external market. Indispensable to the accomplishment of this goal are, first, the removal of secrecy restrictions for which there is no longer any need, and, second, the granting—in deed, not in word—of commercial independence to industry enterprises, associations, design bureaus, and institutes, to include matters of foreign economic activity. This will make it possible to employ their scientific, technical, and manufacturing potential with maximum effectiveness. The Ministry's task here is to orient and coordinate their activity."

Of all the tasks listed by the deputy minister, the general public hears the most about our aircraft being involved with foreign exchange. Numerous writings in various newspapers create the impression that all the MAP's export plans are limited to sale of Il-96-300 and Tu-204 aircraft. This gives rise to both bewilderment—Why bite off more than you can chew?—and indignation: Just look at what we have to fly!

It turns out that the subject boils down to an aspect of external economic activity, one that is not particularly extensive, at that. The gist of the matter is that leading aircraft builders of the U.S. and Europe have such a stack of orders that it will take them decades to fill them, but our abovementioned aircraft can take care of only a certain amount of unsatisfied demand. However, I repeat that this is an aspect, a random coincidence of circumstances that for us has turned out to be favorable.

Export strategy is not based on randomness, but rather on a search for regularities in the market. It pivots about the application of international cooperation to effect joint development and mass production of new aircraft types that are needed in the internal market and in addition are "planned" to be highly competitive on the external market.

For example, West European companies are busy developing a new aircraft that will be used by medium-size lines to carry 75 to 100 passengers, an airplane intended to fill an existing market niche. Work on this kind of aircraft—the Tu-334—is in progress in the USSR. Exchange of opinions has made it possible to arrive at an agreement to use joint forces for the creation of a type model that will be offered in a wide number of versions to suit various markets.

Similarly, it is planned to become involved in international design of a multiple-passenger supersonic liner. This is the basis for Gulfstream's producing a supersonic business-type craft that can carry 15 to 40 passengers and fly distances up to 9,000 kilometers.

These projects are based on a division of labor: The Soviet side produces the airframe, the other partners, the engines and electronic equipment. As far as the engines are concerned, ours for some reason are not considered adequate. However, A. Bratukhin claims that Snecma (France) and General Electric (U.S.) are already studying the possibility of employing the D-90 engine, developed for the Il-96 and the Tu-204, in European and American airliners.

Our intention to fit export versions of Soviet aircraft with American and English engines is dictated primarily by an attempt to accelerate aircraft availability in the world market, since the Western engines in contradistinction to ours have long possessed the necessary international certification. International experts are of the opinion that the certification barrier existing for the Soviet aircraft industry is definitely surmountable. This will however require time, and in this case time is money.

Now about the third direction of the aviation industry's conversion program: production of new materials and assemblies. A special role is assigned in international cooperation to the development of metallurgical production for the aviation industry. This is our acknowledged forte. The enormous possibilities of involving extremely large foreign companies in cooperation—primarily production of aircraft engines—have led to removing the secrecy label from many areas of titanium metallurgy. In progress in the field of aluminum alloys is the development of a program for cooperating with the very large multinational Alcoa Corporation relative to production of weldable aluminum-lithium heat-resistant alloys for use in supersonic passenger aircraft, and aluminum alloys for cryogenic technology.

Talks, intentions, research and development. Something has already come of the above: Joint enterprises and

design groups are even now busy, but they as yet have not started to influence the industry. It is necessary to exercise patience: The decades of industry isolation exacerbated by highly stringent security classification cannot be overcome in a year or even two years.

There are however other problems that exert a considerable effect on increasing the output of civilian aircraft. Abolishment of the Ministry of Machine Building led to the Minaviaprom's [Ministry of the Aviation Industry's] being named responsible for technical supervision and complete satisfaction of the needs of the economy for 14 technological systems for use in light industry and 7 systems in processing branches of the agro-industrial complex.

The Minaviaprom is tasked to create and produce, by 1995, in sufficient quantities with its own resources 570 new equipment models for light industry and 317 for the agro-industrial complex.

The Gosplan made the above decision in 1987 without going into deep analysis of the particulars of the aviation industry. Has the time not come to take issue with this?

Here is A. Bratukhin's point of view, which reflects the position taken by MAP management:

"The Ministry in the last few years has accomplished a great deal of organizational, scientific, and technical work to create and set up production of new types of the abovementioned aircraft. Almost all the industry's OKB's [special design bureaus] and plants were enlisted in this task.

"As a result, conversion today is geared to priority manufacture of civilian aircraft, plus consumer goods, medical equipment, technological equipment for the agricultural and light industries, commerce, and public eating. The time for discussion of the directions conversion should take in the industry has passed. The decisions have been made. They are now being implemented."

The argument is weighty. Nevertheless, to take an outside view, the arbitrary decision to task the MAP with patching up numerous technological holes can actually result in undermining the scientific and technical base of one of the few industries that has won world recognition.

Considering the highly severe civilian aircraft deficit that is strangling the Soviet economy, conversion of the aviation industry to producing wool-carding machines and leather-dyeing production lines has all the signs of senseless waste.

'Arbitrary' Production Assignments Hinder Conversion Efforts

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 91
First Edition p 3*

[Interview with V. Chepkin, general designer of the Saturn Scientific Production Association, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Manushkin:

"Turbines, Onions, and Sheepskins... Such a Combination Could Exist if Arbitrariness Invades Conversion"]

[Text] The experimental design bureau imeni A.M. Lyulka, which is now a part of the Saturn Scientific Production Association [NPO], is known throughout the world. The aircraft engines created here have been installed on the aircraft of P.O. Sukhoy, S.V. Ilyushin, S.A. Lavochkin, A.N. Tupolev, A.S. Yakovlev, and G.M. Beriyev. The high combat qualities of one of our most modern fighter-interceptors, the Su-27, are also explained largely by the first-class engines created by Arkhip Mikhaylovich Lyulka and his successors.

Today the collective of the association has actively engaged in the conversion processes that have affected all branches of the defense industry. Our correspondent discusses the problems that arise along this difficult path with the general designer of Saturn NPO, V. Chepkin.

[Manushkin] Viktor Mikhaylovich, could you sum up certain results related to the conversion?

[Chepkin] I think it is still too early for that. The real work is only beginning. But certain conclusions present themselves even today. During the process of conversion we have had to solve problems imposed on us from above, as it were, arbitrarily. On the other hand, on our own initiative we have undertaken developments for the national economy and civilian production whose specifications are appropriate for us. Why? The answer is obvious. When taking up some unfamiliar work we have had to start almost from scratch and set up our technical equipment from the beginning. There is no need for this if in the development we can rely on our experience in theoretical and practical research in the area of aero- and thermodynamics and vacuum, compressor, and refrigeration equipment... Here, as they say, all that is needed is a certain turn in the direction of our thinking and research...

[Manushkin] It would be interesting to know, Viktor Mikhaylovich, what you, creators of aircraft engines, have been assigned in the plan for conversion.

[Chepkin] For example, we were told to create a machine for passivation (heating) of vegetables. We made it and brought it to the point of series production. The "onion" machine, as we jokingly call it, will be manufactured at the machine building production association in Zaporozhye.

We had to engage in the development and improvement of machines for the leather and fur industry: beginning with the skinning of the animal and ending with dressing and dyeing of the hide. There are about 140 types and modifications of these machines.

[Manushkin] One gets the feeling that you are not satisfied with the nature of the conversion work offered to you.

[Chepkin] Yes, that is true. There is no doubt that we are extremely in need of machines that meet the world

standard both for passivation of vegetables and for processing leather and furs. Lagging behind in this area, as in any other, is intolerable. But we will not solve urgent problems by arbitrarily "assigning" topics for conversion developments to the various design bureaus and defense enterprises.

In principle it is possible to drive nails with a slide rule if you make it heavy enough. But still a hammer is better. That is what is happening with us. The leader of the work on the conversion topic, the "master of onion affairs" as our wits call him, is Yuvenaliy Pavlovich Marchukov. We thank him for his selfless work. But how can one fail to recall here that under the leadership of this remarkable designer auxiliary power installations were created for the Energiya missile and the Buran space ship, and an after burner was created for the Su-27 aircraft. Are we utilizing his knowledge and talent as efficiently as possible?

[Manushkin] It does not seem to me that it is impossible to get by without any losses. But the losses would be less if the basis for conversion processes were precise calculation and a striving to take advantage of the capabilities of each person in keeping with his vocation and experience. A jet engine specialist, even if he is a genius, will find it difficult to create a machine for combing burrs out of sheepskins without basic preliminary preparation. Would you like to see such a machine? The one we came up with is about the size of that large cabinet... In a word, everyone should do the thing he knows best.

[Manushkin] What is the best thing for you, creators of aircraft engines that are discussed respectfully throughout the world?

[Chepkin] For example, we concluded a contract with the Gazprom concern for the design and manufacture of power installations for gas pumping stations, based on modifications of our jet engines, with low proportional expenditures of fuel. It is known that with the present gas lines, up to one-fourth of the gas is lost en route. The fuel is basically "eaten up" by gas pumping stations. But our

gas turbine power installations make it possible to save up to 7 million cubic meters of gas a year with each aggregate. Would it not be possible to use the savings to acquire modern technological lines for the leather industry we were talking about?

[Manushkin] I have heard that your design bureau has created a miniature single-cylinder diesel engine.

[Chepkin] It was developed and tested under the leadership of a talented young designer, V. Andreyenko. Its capacity is six horsepower. The engine can be used for power units, minitractors, and other equipment for farmsteads, gardens, and orchards.

Further. Practically the entire fleet of the country's passenger vehicles operate on gasoline. Our design bureau has done work to develop two-, three-, and four-cylinder engines that operate on inexpensive diesel fuel. We also have technical ideas and developments which, if introduced, would at least double the efficiency factor of heat and electric power plants. Specialists of the experimental design bureau have been studying combustion processes for many years. We could reduce the toxicity of discharges from industrial enterprises by a factor of five to 10 if our work on conversion were linked to ideas like these.

[Manushkin] But what if the conversion does not go beyond the framework of aviation topics?

[Chepkin] That would be the most effective. For example, in conjunction with the British firm Rolls Royce, we are developing an engine that will be used in the Golfstream-Su supersonic aircraft for business people.

We are creating economical engines of the future for both military and passenger aircraft. This is the main direction of the activity of our production association. And it is in this direction that we hope to make our greatest contribution to the strengthening of the country's defense capability and solving crucial national economic problems.

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